The inviolability of defending Pakistan
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
This column should have been written earlier if the facts known today were known earlier. The defence of Pakistan is sacrosanct and inviolable. However, some associated with military establishment in both India and Pakistan harbour certain notions that betray the ground realities. There are entrenched beliefs that may misguide policymakers towards unintended and dangerous consequences.
The Indian military establishment, both serving and retired, believes that there is space for conventional conflict, short and swift, between the two countries even under South Asia’s nuclearised environment. That the compulsion of response from Pakistan stands on the shaky troika of economic weakness, political divide and lack of perceptual spine. This cannot be far from the truth, as stated repeatedly in this space.
Whereas on the Pakistani side, ‘some’ quarters are pointing at the ‘yawning gap’ between the comparative national power potential (NPP) as reason for ignoring, undermining and downgrading any actual or perceived Indian aggression. These quarters cite economy and war stamina, political divide and international pressure as grounds to avoid responding to India’s transgressions, even across the International Border (IB). These peaceniks and ‘doves’ are also more susceptible to international (read the US) pressure, and fears of escalation in case of a shooting war. These notions, though geo-militarily reasonable, belie the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan environment in a ridiculously naive manner.
The cost-benefit analysis of this group ignores Pakistan’s ‘force multipliers’ like will-to-fight, motivation, the power of faith, a just cause, jazba-e-jihad (elevating war with India to jihad or Holy War), nation’s crisis-coherence, etc, besides our nuclear capability. History would not be very kind to Gen Bajwa, the reviled peacenik representing this thinking.
On 14 February 2019, an Indian Central Reserve Police Force convoy was attacked near Pulwama district in IIOJK by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber killing 40 troopers. The attack, by an IIOJK youth, was claimed by Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). In retaliation, India launched ‘Operation Bandar’ targeting ‘supposed’ JeM camp near Balakot (KP) on February 26. A dead crow was later found at the scene with no other damage. The US urged Pakistan’s military leadership not to respond, as there were no fatalities.
This was the first time since 1971 that Indian aircraft had crossed the IB, and the public mood was very incensed. India’s jingoistic media was propagating stories of superiority. In the run-up to response, as deliberated in the National Security Council (NSC), headed by the then PM Imran Khan, the decision to respond or otherwise was left to the discretion of military commanders.
The information gleaned now suggests that the spine that strengthened Pakistan’s resolve and response, and where Allah helped us, was the joint effort by the then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) Gen Zubair Hayat and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Mujahid Anwar Khan… both soldiers of substance. During the crisis, which ultimately vindicated Pakistan, Gen Qamar Bajwa was said to be dithering and indecisive, compared to the cited Generals.
Again, under Gen Bajwa’s watch, on 9 March 2022, a BrahMos NG (Next Generation) missile originating from Sirsa in India’s western Haryana state crashed near Mian Channu in Pakistani Punjab. Pakistan meekly accepted the Indian explanation of ‘accidental launch’ due to a ‘technical malfunction’. In both these instances, PM Imran Khan went along the Military with no input at variance. Pakistan’s political and military leadership during the BrahMos case could have — taking a break from the ongoing political circus — asserted to declare ‘Pakistan’s sovereign right to respond’…accident or no accident. Or in a sinewy manner, targeted the missile launch site.
These two incidents send wrong signals. And, as mentioned earlier, erroneously confirm the Indian military establishment’s view that there is space for limited conventional conflict under the nuclear umbrella. This is an incorrect and dangerous supposition, as personalities matter. In the first incident, public backlash led the Military’s hand with the Joint Staff and Air HQs correctly reading the pulse. In the second incident, due to preoccupation with the political circus underway (and justifying that there were no casualties on ground of impact), response to BrahMos (NG)’s errant strike was ineffectual.
Besides regional repercussions, inability and/or unwillingness to respond to Indian aggression has deeper implications for Pakistan and its Military, which need to be correctly understood. Under popular wisdom, if Military shows inability or unwillingness to defend Pakistan’s geographic frontiers and does not respond to violations, irrespective of the cost-benefit analysis, Military’s raison d’etre, or reason to exist is compromised. Under that notional impotence, its claim to repute and respect is greatly undermined. No measure of nation-building undertakings (flood duties, elections, census, canal de-silting, etc) will salvage and substitute for it. The NPP asymmetry notwithstanding, responding with ‘available’ resources would always be a compulsion and not a choice with our Military, now and in future. As any inaction dilutes ‘deterrence’.
Indian jingoism is equally disturbing. Conflict between India and Pakistan, however trivial, has the potential to transcend into the dangerous domain of a nuclear war. Once on the ‘escalation ladder’, it is difficult to climb down due to lack of communication, miscommunication and faulty intelligence about the other side. This can let the situation spin out of control. From Pakistan’s standpoint, force and infrastructure destruction, territorial losses and perceptual defeat would trigger a nuclear response, forcing India to respond and Pakistan to counter respond. No Military leader in the changed circumstances and under the glare of social media would be able to live with the ignonimity of defeat on either side.
Therefore, Military’s logic for conflict on both sides has inadequacies. Indian leaders need to know, when it comes to India, there are no quarters given. Year 1971 still haunts us. Why and what for would be a Military worth if it doesn’t enable the nation to live with honour and dignity, and in peace and freedom. That from Pakistani citizens’ point of view means fighting with all ‘available’ resources ‘whatever the cost’; as smaller nations, like Pakistan, survive on ideology, morals and principles, more than on geo-economics alone. Otherwise, why a weaker Ukraine, a year on, would still be fighting a much larger and much stronger Russia.
Conceding to the peaceniks and doves amongst us, we run the risk of undermining the very basis of Pakistan’s independence and nationhood. Allama Iqbal’s timeless dictum in his epic Bal-e-Jibril says: Hey jurm-e-zaifi ki saza marg-e-mafajat…the punishment for weakness is sudden and untimely death.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 2nd, 2023.
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