Pakistan’s extremism problem

The TTP made a comeback in Pakistan’s western border areas with an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities in 2022

The TTP has made a comeback in Pakistan’s western border areas which saw an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities in 2022. In view of the evolving threat, the National Security Committee (NSC) met on January 2, 2023 and reiterated their policy of ‘zero tolerance’ for terrorism. Pakistan’s war on terrorism thus seems heading for a long haul.

While the government’s sincerity to curb the terror threat could not be doubted, there is a need to understand the root causes of this menace so as to eradicate it through a comprehensive strategy. While the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021 catalysed the TTP resurge, the deep-rooted colonial-era fragility in the Pashtun tribal belt or newly merged tribal districts (NMDs) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the adjoining Balochistan provided impetus to the TTP to penetrate into the region.

Within this context, if we look at the security apparatus in the border tribal belt, once referred to as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it was not sufficient to provide security umbrella to this nascent region bordering conflict-ridden Afghanistan. After the merger of FATA into KP in 2018, sufficient attention was not paid to beef up the border security and the local security apparatus to address security concerns in the region. The transformation of colonial-era local security forces into a regular police force and establishment of policing infrastructure remains at a snail pace. Despite concerns shown by the local communities to address the security vacuum, no concrete steps have been taken so far. Hence, instability arising out of Afghanistan is jolting the tribal belt which is too weak to repulse the repercussions of a reviving conflict at its doorstep. Taliban’s takeover of Kabul has also provided momentum to the TTP and Baloch insurgents to expand their activities in Balochistan.

While looking into the political sources of fragility, both the Pashtun tribal belt and Balochistan are politically marginalised and remain caught between the tradition (tribal elders and Jirgas) and modernity (democratic institutions) to deal with their routine affairs. The youth in these regions, comprising 60% of the total population, find themselves in contradiction with these colonial era setups. They are truly a stakeholder in any peace initiative due to their exposure to social media making them aware and expressive of their rights. Along with it, womenfolk in both the regions and the newly emerged business classes further enhance the number of stakeholders which requires a representative system to remain intact in these areas. However, the fragile political setup with parallel colonial era structures lead towards marginalisation of these newly emerging stakeholders, hence fuelling both political uncertainty and resistance to these reforms.

Apart from the security and political vacuum in the region, the inability of the state to ensure public service delivery has further weakened the social contract in these marginalised regions. Despite being resource-rich and geo-strategically significant, both ex-FATA and Balochistan remain abysmally poor and weak. Almost 75% of the population in ex-FATA live below the poverty line. In Balochistan the ratio of out-of-school children is estimated at around 50%, which continues to tie these illiterate people to the traditional institutions in the area. This economic marginalisation has given strength to extremists in both the regions.

It is heartening that the NSC statement of January 2 spoke about the “people-centric socio-economic development” as a priority to fight extremism. However, the security situation is evolving fast and practical steps need to be taken to invest in building state institutions and improving public service delivery. This would require enormous financial resources — something that does not seem in sight, given the precarious state of national economy. While large-scale military operations have taken place in the past, any new offensives, without a non-kinetic counter-violence approach, would only provide a temporary breather. Without a revival of social contract between these communities and the state, Pakistan’s western border areas will remain the country’s Achilles heel.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 14^th, 2023.

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