Introspection on tumultuous foreign policy

On the second last day of 2022, the country's civil and military leadership met to discuss the renewed threat posed by the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

But this was the last Pakistan wanted to discuss in the outgoing year as the dreaded terror outfit was driven out and successfully eliminated through a series of military offensives and intelligence-based operations many years ago.

The security situation had improved a great deal as evidenced by fewer numbers of attacks in urban centres whereas the once ubiquitous and notorious suicide attacks became virtually non-existent after 2014 in Islamabad.

The encouraging security situation led Pakistan to successfully convince cricketing nations to tour the country. Australia, England and New Zealand -- countries that had earlier refused to send their teams -- finally toured Pakistan. Western countries revised their travel advisories while others were in the process to do the same.

But then the Afghan Taliban returned to the political firmament of Kabul – a victory celebrated by Pakistani policymakers. The jubilations in Pakistan stemmed from the fact that the Afghan Taliban takeover would serve the country's interests.

There was more than the hope that the new Taliban government would neutralise the terror threat that emanated from the neighbouring country. Islamabad minced no words about the nexus between the Afghan intelligence service, operated under the Ghani administration, and the hostile agencies, namely Indian RAW.

Pakistan kept insisting on its stance that the RAW-NDS alliance was behind the TTP and its affiliates. The return of the Afghan Taliban meant that those hostile agencies or anti-Pakistan elements would no longer have the space to operate.

‘Failed strategy’

However, what played out in the aftermath of the formation of the new regime was contrary to the upbeat expectations.

The TTP, under the Afghan Taliban, has not only regrouped but is now once again challenging the writ of Pakistan. The flawed Afghan strategy, particularly on the TTP, came back to haunt Pakistan in 2022. It is now evident that the policy to allow TTP terrorists to return as part of confidence-building measures has backfired.

In fact, officials now in private discussions admitted that Pakistan's strategy to make peace with the TTP has failed and certainly required recalibrations.

The failed TTP strategy is directly linked with the Afghan plan. Moreover, the TTP alone is not posing a threat but the Afghan Taliban regime too is giving Pakistan a tough time.

The repeated border skirmishes between Pakistani and Afghan border security forces were not the kind of relationship Islamabad had wished for with Kabul. During the Ghani and Karzai governments, such frictions were understandable since Pakistan always viewed those regimes with suspicions.

However, the Afghan Taliban are no different than Ghani or Karzai governments. Like the previous governments, the Afghan Taliban are also opposed to Pakistan’s move to fence the 2600km-long porous and rugged border.

The recent incidents at the Chaman border were the result of Pakistan’s efforts to repair the damaged portion of the fence. Pakistan has always sought a friendly relationship with Kabul in the hope that will not only provide a strategic edge but also open much-needed regional connectivity. But the Afghan Taliban's policies will not allow this to happen.

Islamabad has been a strong advocate of staying engaged with the Afghan Taliban regime. However, its recent move to ban female education, and its failure to form an inclusive government and prove as a reliable partner against terrorism have all undermined Pakistan’s plans.

If 2021 was the year of celebrations for our policymakers, 2022 is certainly a year of introspection and reflection on the Afghan strategy.

In April Pakistan saw a change of government through a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Imran Khan. That change brought a coalition government comprising 11 parties including PMLN and PPP. Most of the parties in the ruling alliance were critical of the PTI government's foreign policy.

Imran dubbed them as an imported government implying it was backed by the US. Even if they were not backed by the US, there were expectations that the relationship with the west particularly the US would improve or at least there would be reset. Before Imran’s ouster, Pakistan's relationship with the US and other Western countries was under stress.

His visit to Moscow in February on the day when President Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine irked the US and its western allies.

Even before the Moscow trip, the relationship between Imran’s government and Biden's administration was not good. Angered by Imran’s certain statements on the Afghan Taliban, President Biden didn't even telephone the Pakistani prime minister.

There were a few high-level exchanges between the two sides. But the ouster of the PTI government saw the resumption of high-level engagements. In the short span, Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari met thrice with his US counterpart Anthony Blinken.

While there has been a flurry of exchanges between Pakistan and the US, there has been nothing tangible came out of those contacts yet.
Despite criticising Imran’s Foreign policy, Pakistan, under Prime Minister

Shehbaz Sharif, continued to maintain balance in Pakistan's relationship with big powers. Prime Minister Shehbaz met the Russian President at the sidelines of the SCO summit vowing to strengthen ties. At the UNGA session in New York, he held meetings with several leaders including the French president with whom Imran had an uneasy relationship.

However, Shehbaz had to wait for four months before being invited to China to meet President Xi.

It was unusual given the fact that new prime ministers in Pakistan often visit Beijing within days of taking charge. The unusual delay was attributed to strict Covid-19 protocols but also to the wait-and-see approach by China because of political uncertainty in Pakistan.

Given both PMLN and PPP in the past tried to seek rapprochement with India, it was expected that some positive movement might take place on the Pak-India ties.

At a keynote address at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, young Bilawal spoke about the rethinking of the country’s foreign policy. He dropped hints of a shift in approach towards India. But those hopes were dashed as back-channel talks couldn't produce the desired results.

Instead, Pakistan and India engaged in a more intense war of words at the end of 2022. Bilawal's statement calling Modi the "butcher of Gujarat" dealt a fatal blow to any chances of rapprochement in the foreseeable future.