Pakistan’s TNW and the state’s security paradigm
The writer is an Executive Director of BTTN, at BUITEMS
Leading scholars argue that security is the predominant factor for a state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons particularly for a state that confronts an acute security threat emanating from an acute security dilemma it faces. Today, 90% of the world’s nukes are possessed by the US and Russia together. They include a variety of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Some of the US TNWs are still stationed in Europe and are perceived to ensure deterrence stability between Russia and the European allies of the US. The same are not even part of a bilateral arms control regime, the New Start. The withdrawal of the US — and of Russia subsequently — from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 is a reflection that TNWs will continue to stay as a deterring force between the nuclear rivals.
India also developed nuclear weapons and its related delivery systems including that of TNW Prahaar (Strike). India was the first to develop both its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan followed suit — in response to India’s nuclear weapon tests in 1974 and 1998 — for genuine security reasons. Many in Pakistan largely perceive that the security threat from India continues to enlarge in South Asia because of India’s potential development of deterrent forces and modifications in its force posturing. This in turn provides India the incentives to strike first and preempt Pakistan’s deterrent forces without even realising how erroneous such force posturing could be as it could even accidently escalate a military crisis to nuclear level.
Therefore, India’s development of hypersonic missiles, ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), sophisticated air defense system S-400, tactical nuclear weapons, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and other essential ingredients of emerging technologies further increase security dilemma, arms race and risk of escalation in South Asia.
To retain strategic balance, if not nuclear parity, Pakistan may produce effective countermeasures vis-à-vis its potential adversary. One needs to comprehend Pakistan’s deterring contextualisation for developing its TNWs i.e. to potentially deter India from executing its Cold Start Doctrinal force posturing through the logic of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.
Arguably, no country may let its vulnerabilities be exposed to its rival. Therefore, plugging the deterrence gap becomes the first and foremost strategic priority of a vulnerable state against the potential rival. When it comes to the always/never dichotomy, no security leadership becomes insane to unleash nuclear forces when absolutely not needed.
That said, the similar logic implies to Pakistan deterrent forces including that of its TNWs nuclear weapons, which primarily is to create the fear and manipulate the mind of the adversary so that its nuclear rival is effectively prevented and deterred from unleashing its juggernaut military aggression against Pakistan. As long as nuclear weapons deter the potential rivals successfully, why should these weapons be used and why it may wrongly be perceived that these weapons are destabilising!
Although the following essentials such as use and lose dilemma and pre-delegation are invariably attributed with the TNWs, such worries can be minimised if and when the TNWs are treated with a centralised command and control system. Besides the central command and control mechanism emplacement to reduce tactical worries with regard to TNWs, it is imperative to understand the rationale of TNWs development. That being noted, if the nuclear rival assumes that TNWs are developed for deterrence forces and that the rival is prevented from undertaking action not acceptable to the opposition, then TNWs will ensure deterrence stability. However, if the rival underestimates the deterring value of the TNWs while attempting to preempt these weapons, then such an episode could create potential risk of escalation to strategic instability between the rivals.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 31st, 2022.
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