Resolvable problems of the Afghan government
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
Irrespective of the Western propaganda against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), particularly with regard to the rights of women and minorities with girls’ education topping the agenda, all does not seem well within the Emirate. There are issues like the IEA fault lines, its relationship with the TTP and by extension with Pakistan, the ISIS-TTP nexus and its looming shadow over Afghanistan, and IEA’s sustenance and credibility.
IEA fought a long and hard battle to liberate Afghanistan from foreign occupation. The fact that this decades-long struggle would have never come to fruition without Pakistan’s steadfast, risky and multi-faceted support, is an open secret. The fact that Pakistan still remains committed to the survival of IEA and its wider recognition is also an undeniable fact. And that Pakistan at large and the provinces of KP and Balochistan are directly affected by continued instability on the Afghan soil. And that Pakistan’s expectation of IEA to reign in renegade elements within the TTP is also just, practical and urgent for attention by the IEA.
To be fair, much that the IEA would want to rid itself of the legacy issue of TTP (as argued repeatedly), and establish its suzerainty over the entire Afghanistan, there are practical impediments that make a wider and acceptable resolution difficult, if not impossible. Within the IEA, the apparent north-south divide between the more ideologue Qandahari Group led by Mullah Yaqub, the son of late Mullah Umer, and the relatively pragmatic Khostwal Group led by the battle-hardened Haqqanis, has come to the fore.
Qandahari faction is, circumstances allowing, moderately tougher with Pakistan, and does not see eye to eye on many interpretational aspects of jihad with Pakistani state and religious interlocutors. It also animates towards ‘Jihad without borders’ per se. The pragmatist Haqqanis recognise Pakistan’s logistic, demographic and geostrategic indispensability and want to maintain a closer and mutually beneficial relationship. Their comparatively friendly comportment is also tied to the word Haqqani…linkage with Darul-Ulum Haqqania at Akora Khattak in KP, Pakistan…their alma mater.
From Pakistan’s side, ‘some’ stakeholders in the civil and military treat Afghanistan shabbily, seemingly insensitive to historic and sociological imperatives. Policy formulation and implementation contains erroneous notions like the regrettable ungratefulness of Afghans; the desire to keep IEA plaint; playing a more visible and uncalled for role in IEA’s internecine power play and government formulation; and pressurising IEA vis-à-vis TTP though naïve steps that are creating ‘exploitable’ animosity among Afghan general public against Pakistan. Border restrictions on Pakistani side at most crossing points is one case in point, which rot many a perishable goods. The Pakistani bottlenecks at the border crossings are corruption-laced and hostile towards Afghan traders and general public, to say the least.
Following from the above, much that the pro-Pakistan elements within the IEA would want to play down the many irritants in bilateral relations; the nemesis within the IEA would continue to overplay the fault lines. This emergent see-saw is a rather newly injected variable that is likely to stay. Anti-Pakistan lobby takes exception to our friendship with the US/NATO during the jihad; scoffs at our Western predilections; and derides the apparently lesser religious credentials of our elite. This, once combined with its yearning for ‘Jihad without borders’, makes a toxic mix. TTP is ‘mostly’ sold out to this narrative. Their recent tashkeel (organisation) for different wilayats (provinces/divisions) and wolaswalis (districts) of KP and Balochistan betrays their intentions.
The 2022 peace parleys in Kabul were inconclusive, however, immediately after, the TTP made spectacular entry in Swat and other areas in strength. Henceforth, the law and order situation in Swat, some tribal districts and the outskirts of Peshawar has taken a nosedive. Target killing, raids, fire attacks, kidnapping for ransom, assassinations and ambushes dominate the TTP tactics. How TTP made a re-entry in Swat through a fenced border is one among many unanswered questions. There are many theories in circulation, one being to embarrass the PTI government in KP. However, a lot remains unknown and obscure.
TTP’s re-entry, and it occupying political space, is worrisome. KP, especially its tribal districts, were cleansed of their criminal thuggery at great human and material cost. Relapse of geographic and notional space back to TTP renders all such sacrifices futile. As TTP’s hardcore cadre would never succumb to Pakistani state (evident from their demands of undoing FATA merger and permission to carrying arms, etc), its restless rank and file would ultimately require another operation to smoke them out. Their purported change of heart, or some ‘understanding’ with the authorities, or other expedient rationales would come back to haunt us.
From a rational distance, it makes sense for IEA to encourage TTP’s return to Pakistan, since it cleanses Afghanistan, extends IEA’s geographic writ and enhances Afghanistan’s negative leverage with Pakistan by default. Domestically, it pacifies the cited Ideologue Group by continuing the jihad, besides finding a softer landing for their brothers-in-arms in Pakistan. And it embroils the ‘lesser Islamic’ Pakistan. For the pragmatist Khostwals, riddance of TTP helps IEA militarily against the ISIS, as sizeable disillusioned TTP manpower elopes to the ISIS in search of action. Moreover, the IEA, deeply rattled by the almost daily attacks by ISIS, would want to reduce the number of their headaches, TTP being a major one. It also helps IEA to refocus on ISIS, which follows a takfiri school of Islamic thought and is nihilist in its method and approach. Takfiri extremist groups emphasise unquestioning allegiance, seeing Islam through narrow self-righteousness, terming other Muslims apostate on flimsy grounds.
In one’s reckoning, after winning the larger battle against the foreign occupation forces, IEA is coming to terms with the many ideological wars within and amongst its rank and file and with the ISIS. This is generally the pattern ideological movements follow…joining hands against wider nemesis but bickering on power-sharing once successful. This is not necessarily the end of IEA; it is an inescapable pattern. Pakistani interlocutors, sensitive to the chasm, are advised to be more environment-savvy by keeping IEA in good humour, without alienating any group. IEA economy is important.
In such milieu, it is also emphasised to cultivate favour with Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, IEA’s spiritual and ideological leader. His decreeing against the non-conforming TTP cadre would be a coup from within.
And it is the only ideological antidote to an ideological problem.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 13th, 2022.
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