Not for the first time, Mr Khan!
It has always been, and perhaps will continue to be, a bumpy road of interaction between Pakistan and the US. They come together in special occasions for a brief period, as two planets seen in close proximity in the sky, in the spirit of mutual consideration and then set apart leaving behind some good and bad memories. This occasional and casual interplay does not allow trust to build and the relationship to blossom into something meaningful.
And this transactional relationship (proclaimed as strategic) has had an opportunity cost that each country pays in more than one ways. To put this into perspective, one has to give a quick glimpse of what went wrong (and why) over the last seven decades of the Pak-US interaction. The picture so presented may not be perfect and may not have much predictive power but it will certainly tell a convincing story thanks to the benefit of hindsight.
In the early 50s, when Pakistan has just emerged on the world map, the cold war was heating up with two blocks (the so-called free world led by the US and the communist states led by the USSR) making it increasingly difficult for small countries to sit on the fence. Due to strategic and economic compulsions, every country had to choose sides as neutrality (non-alignment) was less risky but had low returns too.
Political leadership in Pakistan, with no experience in international relations, found it convenient and prudent to join the US-led camp thanks to the hangover effects of the British Empire in politics, bureaucracy and education system. A decision to choose a different path would have many issues of system alignment as communism was founded on radically different principles defining relationship between state, market and society. It would be probably a strategic mistake for a nascent country to tread an unchartered territory without a map in hand.
The US, on the other hand, had emerged as the principal beneficiary of WW-II with its eyes on defeating communism to become the sole superpower. Its dominant role in the UN, NATO and IMF was showing signs of authoritarianism, cloaked in democracy and human rights, on international stage. Weak countries (such as Pakistan) found themselves stuck between the rock and the hard place. Foreign policy of many countries reflected the strategic calculations of two superpowers rather than their own national interests.
Pakistan became a member of SEATO in 1954 expecting to receive security assistance and political support to counterbalance India’s aggressive designs. Economic assistance through various programmes did help Pakistan in infrastructure development and institution building but it had a cost too.
In the 1965 war, the US, instead of helping Pakistan militarily, blamed it for initiating war against India. It again failed to honour its commitments of sending military aid and navy to push back India in 1971 war. In 1979, Pakistan sided with the US against Russia; created Mujahedeen, provided airbases and set up training centres. Russia finally had to leave Afghanistan in 1989.
Now, under the pretext of its nuclear programme, the US imposed military and economic sanctions on Pakistan after 1989. When Pakistan was forced to detonate its nuclear device in 1998 in response to India’s nuclear tests, it imposed the toughest sanctions on Pakistan. India was later made a member of the NSG.
In the war on terror, Pakistan was offered the non-NATO member status that continued, with economic and military aid attached to it, until 2011 when the US carried out military operation in Abbottabad (killing Osama bin Laden) without taking Pakistan into confidence. Even CPEC was not spared from making it controversial.
The recent political crisis in Pakistan seems to be a continuation of what has been a ‘strategic norm’ established over the years. Both the US and Pakistan need one another for different reasons at different times based on how geopolitical landscape changes. To expect strategic relationship between two unequal partners when both have their core interests aligned somewhere else would be living in a fool’s paradise. The relationship can best be described as a marriage of convenience.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 30th, 2022.
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