Unpacking Russia’s military offensive
Design: Mohsin Alam
Russia, by compulsion staunchly defends its erstwhile ‘USSR sphere of influence’. This includes its former landmass in Eastern Europe (where it asserts itself commensurately west to east; more in the east, closer to home); the Central Asia (where it cedes no influence); the Baltics (where it cedes influence marginally); the Middle East (where it ensures strong alliances and reliable partnership (like with the Assad regime in Syria and with Iran); the Asia-Pacific (revival of strong ties with China while portraying Japan as the US surrogate); and beyond.
Russian grand strategy
Russia under President Putin - as expected of his KGB/nationalist credentials - vies for revival of its lost glory; forcing similar retreat on the US from Europe - geoeconomics permitting - that the US forced upon the erstwhile USSR in the 1990s. Under its policy of revival and reassertion from Middle East to Eastern Europe and from Syria to Afghanistan; Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, tore Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 when NATO (perceived as the US extension) promised both countries ‘eventual’ membership. And Russia started armed insurrection/civil war through proxies in Ukraine’s southeastern Donbas region.
Russia - analysts feel - also wanted to evict the US from Europe, as the US, fractured at home, retreated from abroad after defeat in Afghanistan. And Europe especially Germany, the European bulwark, was too addicted to Russian gas and trade. Majority Russians supported Putin’s assertiveness in Russian’s ‘near abroad’ as revival of Russia’s past status, thinking Russia was sufficiently hardened against Western sanctions.
President Putin had endorsed Russia’s ‘nuclear deterrent policy’ in June 2020, allowing use of nuclear weapons, in response ‘to a conventional strike’, if it targets Russia’s ‘critical government and military infrastructure’…threatening the very existence of state. He is also on record to hint at nuclear retaliation, not caring about a world ‘where Russia no longer existed’.
Russian was also bolstered by its widely interdependent alliance with communist China after ironing out differences, an ideological legacy of the Soviet Union. Today both China and Russia remain committed - without any formal alliance - to coordinate diplomatically and economically to keep the US in check. It was China that reduced the pain of Western sanctions against Russia after conflicts in Georgia and Crimea. And in the cited collaboration, Russia and China bring to bear their alliance power against the US. India’s 31st January abstention in the UNSC for the US-sponsored resolution on Ukraine is a case in point.
The underlying politics
Russia fulfills around 35% European gas needs. Europe, with dwindling gas reserves, finds no affordable alternative to Russian gas as some countries are totally dependent on it. This dependence ranges from 100% (North Macedonia) to 94% (Finland), 49% (Germany), 46% (Italy), 40% (Poland) and 24% (France), etc. Qatar, meanwhile has declared it could not replenish the needed gas by itself until at least 2027. And Central Asia remains complaint to Russia.
The crisis in Ukraine is also engineered ostensibly by the US/Allies to dissuade Germany from pursuing the economically significant North Stream 2 (Nord Strom 2) pipeline project. The NS-2 (NS-1 is operational sine 2011) would have provided German consumers with inexpensive, reliable and clean energy, significantly boosting Russian gas revenues in return. A representative study conducted in May 2021 found 75% Germans supporting NS-2.
The US fears, such Russo-German economic interdependence would dilute NATO; weaken German standing against Russia; and threaten Washington’s primacy in Europe. Ukraine in particular opposed the under-sea NS-2, fearing loss of leverage and transit levies through overland pipeline networks, calculated at around $3 billion per year.
The US/NATO aims, discerned through unfolding of the Crisis include; imposing a recoil on Russia; degrading its military capability significantly; completing its encirclement by expanding NATO; and chipping away at the Russian sphere of influence. The race to equip and train Ukrainian Forces and the US/NATO braggadocio about intelligence-sharing, enabling Ukrainian Forces it to kill over a dozen Russian generals and sink Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, substantiate the cited objectives.
Ukraine’s significance to Russia
Russia has historic claims over Kiev as the birthplace of Rus, the first modern Russian state in 9th Century. Ukraine has been part of Soviet Russia (Ukraine Socialist Republic) and thereafter, the Russian Commonwealth (CIS). Today one in six Ukrainians is actually an ethnic Russian; one in three speaks Russian as their native language’. Others speak Ukrainian. Most Ukrainian media is in Russian.
While, eastern Donbas Region is mainly Russian speaking and pro Russia; the western part bordering Eastern Europe is more pro-West/pro-NATO, creating internal fissures. Russia is accused of historical subjugation by western Ukraine, and loved for shared heritage and history by the eastern half. Ukraine, in Russian imagination is ‘Rusi’ with centuries-old linguistic, demographic, cultural, historic and economic ties; despite the somewhat rebellious behavior of its western half, led astray by allure of the US/Europe. And Russia accuses genocide/war crimes in Donbas, ever since Ukrainian Government troops started fighting the Russian-backed rebels.
Ukraine under its vastness had imposed a ‘strategic overstretch’ on the German Wehrmacht, in World War II. Hitler, having lost faith in encirclement battles, as more Soviet soldiers managed to escape the encircling pincers, decided to defeat the Soviet Union by economic means. Hence his fateful decision to steer forces south towards the industrial center of Kharkov and the Donbas Region. Earlier in 1812, Napoleon’s Grande Armée had also floundered on the vast Ukrainian steppe, west of Moscow. In retrospect, geo-militarily speaking, Ukraine has traditionally provided the proverbial ‘strategic depth’ to Russia proper.
On geo-economic matrices, Ukraine has been breadbasket to mainland Russia and the world. Both Russia and Ukraine provide a quarter of global wheat exports. Until recently, Russia was Ukraine's largest trading partner. In Soviet times, Ukraine accounted for 30% of Soviet defence production and 40% R&D in some 1,840 industrial centers. Most Soviet ICBMs were built in Dnipro Plant in Ukraine, besides its only aircraft carrier. At independence in 1991, Ukraine inherited the 3rd largest nuclear arsenal after the US and Russia, that Ukraine agreed to remove in exchange for security assurances.
Political situation in Ukraine worsened in 2013 during Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) protests in Kiev, when Ukrainians rejected a deal to integrate Ukraine economically with Russia, by pro-Moscow President Yanukovych. People favoured the EU route. The protests led to Yanukovych stepping down, as he opted for a $15b bailout from Russia to salvage Ukraine’s deeply troubled economy.
In Russia’s security calculus, NATO had assimilated most erstwhile Soviet era satellites states/socialist republics, from Baltics to Finland to Poland to Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. Moscow had been uncomfortable by NATO’s chokehold around Russia proper. Since 2016, NATO maintains four fully operational multinational forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. And over 5,000 US/European troops work closely with the Baltic nations’ defence forces. NATO has deployed ‘Aegis’ ballistic missile defence in Romania; and the US since 2009 continues to deploy nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Netherlands directed solely at Russia. Putin had also accused Ukraine of trying to go nuclear.
Ukraine’s military geography
Ukraine’s 603,628 square kilometers (2,782 kilometers coastline) comprises two different biomes (bio-geographic areas): mixed forest towards the middle; and steppe towards the Black Sea littoral interspersed with lowlands, uplands, plateaus and basins.
Mostly part of Great European Plain, Ukraine’s fertile steppes/plateaus are crossed by Dnieper (Dnipro), Seversky Donets, Dniester and the Southern Bug Rivers, emptying into Black Sea and the smaller Sea of Azov. Danube River delta in the southwest, forms its border with Romania. Besides, Carpathian Mountains in the west and Crimean Mountains in the extreme south along the coast (of no military consequence in this war), the only formidable obstacle to military movement is the forested, riverine terrain and wetland north of Kyiv (Pripyat and Pinsk Marshes).
Once frozen in winter (upto February), this marshland makes Kyiv vulnerable to any attack from Belarus, a mere 56 kilometers north, as the frozen wetland supports sustained military traffic. Spring thaw and the ensuing low bearing capacity of the ground due to mud, converts it into formidable obstacle, that significantly hindered the Russian offensive against Kyiv. The 1,600-square-kilometer Chernobyl Zone (the site of 1986 nuclear disaster) also restricts movements along this Axis due to residual radioactivity.
Dnieper River compartmentalizes any north-south military offensive into eastern and western halves. Donbas region’s military geography (pro-Moscow separatists) supports Russian military effort from the east. The Russian Army reoriented south/southeast during 2nd/current phase of their operations. Sprawling Ukrainian cities/towns pose attacker with a predicament. Mere investment (encirclement) ties down significant forces, let alone clearance that requires a 9:1 numerical superiority over the defender.
Russia’s westward advance from Donbas could be held-up by Ukraine inundating the ground by blowing the massive Dnieper dam near southern city of Zaporizhzhya (also causing damage to its own people). Stalin did so to stop the German advance in World War II.
Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in the south are Ukraine’s only sea lines of communications. Russia’s annexation of Crimea improves her maritime posture/access. However, Russo-Ukrainian sea trade, and Black Sea Fleet’s outside forays (supply of rotational troops in Syria through Mediterranean) depends upon Turkish goodwill. Russia did construct a 20-kilometer-long bridge over Kerch Strait (connects Black Sea and Sea of Azov) in 2018 to link Crimea with mainland Russia.
Phase I (24 Feb – 19 Apr 2022)
Russian offensive’s first phase comprised a Northern Front, launched out of Belarus to target Kyiv; a Northeastern (NE) Front directed at the city of Kharkov (Kharkiv); a Southeastern (SE) Front within which a Southern Prong was launched from Crimea; and not a very powerful SE Prong directed at the cities within Luhansk and Donbas region/oblasts. In early April, Russian troops in southeastern Ukraine were brought under General Alexander Dvornikov. The Northern Front (after failing to invest Kyiv) and NE Front were subsequently reassigned to the SE Front (fighting in Mariupol) for Phase 2 of the offensive.
Attack against Kyiv under Northern Front comprised a Main Effort striking south from Belarus along western bank of Dnieper, to invest the city from the west. The Secondary Effort, along eastern bank of the river was to encircle Kyiv from northeast and east. On 26 February, Russian airborne forces tried to seize two key airfields around Kyiv with mixed results. Spetsnaz forces were infiltrated in Kyiv to link-up with airborne forces and mechanized advance from the north.
The Front had to pass through the contaminated ghost town of Chernobyl and the legendary tough terrain of Pripyat (Pripyat Marshes). Russian forces were held-up at Ivankiv, a northern suburb of Kyiv. By early March, the reportedly 64 kilometers-long convoy had made little progress. The Secondary Effort along the Chernihiv (Kyiv Oblast) was also held-up after partial siege of the Chernihiv city.
This entire Effort stalled by 20 March, because of armour unable to fanout astride the fewer roads due to forests, waterways and the dreaded ‘General Mud’, as the soiled ground was called in World War-II. Besides, Russian logistics were constrained due to long and vulnerable supply lines and dogged resistance by Ukrainian tank hunting parties. On 16 March, remaining Ukrainian forces mounted a counter-offensive with partial success. The Effort, designed for a quick victory was fully retracted by 7 April for resupply and redeployment. Thereafter, Russian forces relied upon stand-off weapons including artillery, rocket barrages and missile strikes.
The NE Front was able to capture Konotop city/other towns (Chernihiv Oblast) and Sumy city (Sumy Oblast) on 24 February. Although Sumy Axis threatened Kyiv from east due to terrain favourable for mechanized operations, NE Front did not press the attack, as it was then depleted by siege warfare. The Front subsequently withdrew by 7 April.
Meanwhile on 1 March, the Eastern Front, after relatively unimpeded advance, bombed and invested Kharkov City, some 35 kilometers from Russian border. Ukrainian Forces offered stiff resistance and attacked Millerovo air base (Rostov Oblast, Russia) on 25 February using OTR-21 Tochka missiles. On 17 March, Russia captured Izium City (Kharkov Oblast, eastern Ukraine). However, battle for the badly damaged and predominantly Russian speaking Kharkov continued. Ukrainian government had ordered remaining residents to evacuate west.
Along Southern Front, on 24 February, Russian forces took control of the North Crimean Canal, supplying Dnieper water to Crimea. It was cut off since 2014. Mariupol was besieged on 26 February simultaneously linking the Front with separatist-held Donbas region. On 1 March, Russian forces resumed their attack on Melitopol, which was later taken.
On 25 February, Russian Navy undertook an amphibious assault ashore the Sea of Azov on a 70-kilometer coastline west of Mariupol for expected deployment of marines. A second pincer including 22nd Army Corps developed operation north from Crimea capturing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant by 4 March. A third prong from Crimea moved northwest towards Kherson and captured the city, the first major Ukrainian city to fall. Mariupol was completely encircled by 18 March and fell during Phase 2.
Along Western Ukraine on 14 March (Phase I), Russian forces conducted multiple cruise missile strikes over a military training facility in Yavoriv (Lviv Oblast), close to the Polish border. The missile attack was later expanded to the entire oblast. Intelligence suggested that these cruise missiles were likely air-launched from warplanes flying over the Black Sea.
In air warfare, Russian Air Force (RAF) attacked Chuhuiv air base - housing Turkish supplied Bayraktar TB2 tactical drones - on the first day of their operations. It was followed by continuing attacks on other Ukrainian air bases. Russia’s initial SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) operation had caused extensive damage to many Ukrainian air defence facilities, run-ways, Radar Systems etc. Russia had reportedly used the newly inducted 9K720 ‘Iskander’ missile systems, fired from Belarus on 27 February, against Zhytomyr Airport in Western Ukraine.
The aircraft losses on both sides are, interestingly, almost equal around 55. Russia still has good inventory of fighter jets and helicopters available near Ukraine. So far US/NATO has resisted the Ukrainian demand of establishing a ‘No Fly Zone’ over Ukraine for fear of direct confrontation with Russia.
In Naval Warfare, Turkey invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention, denying passage to four Russian naval vessels through the Turkish-held Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, as the warships were not registered with Black Sea bases as home. Russian Navy shelled and occupied the Snake Island and captured about a dozen Ukrainian ships in Berdiansk (a port city in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast in SE Ukraine), including the Polnocny-class landing ship Yuri Olefirenko. On 13 April, cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was sunk under controversial circumstances. The US now claims providing Ukraine with targeting data/other intelligence for the purpose.
Phase II ‘Eastern Assault’ (19 Apr onwards)
The "Eastern Assault" across the 300-mile frontage from Kharkov to Donetsk and Luhansk, commenced with missile auxiliaries simultaneously targeting Kyiv and Lviv (Western/NATO aid hub) in Western Ukraine. According to Russian Ministry of Defence, Phase 2, has four main and modest objectives; a) taking over Donbas (in progress); b) creating a land corridor upto Russian-held Crimea (mainly done); c) blockading Ukrainian Black Sea ports (accomplished); and d) taking control of southern Ukraine and creating an exit to breakaway pro-Russia Transnistria region on Ukrainian-Moldov border (in progress). The political aim, Western officials suspect, still remains toppling of the Ukrainian government, by force if necessary.
The Assault under General Dvornikov was launched by SE Front, reinforced by forces withdrawn from N/NE Fronts. Russian ground forces for the reconstituted offensive comprise 1st Guards Tank Army, and full/partial complements from 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 20th, 35th, 41st and 58th Armies, along auxiliaries. They are supported by Donetsk People's Republic Armed Forces, Luhansk People's Militia, Wagner Group (militia) and Libyan/Syrian contingents. Ukraine has two tank brigades (4th and 17th), two mountain assault brigades (10th and 128th), four mechanized/motor brigades (24th, 53rd, 56th, 72nd), one airmobile brigade (81st) plus air assault forces and Georgian Legion, territorial forces, foreign mercenaries/volunteers on its order of battle.
By 18 April, Mariupol was almost entirely captured by Russian forces, except the City’s steel plant (Azovstal Iron and Steel Works), now in Russian hands with around 2,000 soldiers as prisoners. Russia suspected many foreign fighters were holed-up in the sprawling factory.
Along the Mykolaiv–Odessa (Odesa) Front, major cities of Mykolaiv and Odessa continue to face Russian missile and aerial attacks, resumed on 24 April. Odesa, the seaport on northwestern shores of Black Sea, is under a virtual blockade. So, the westward expansion of Russia's battlefront along the northern shores of Black Sea/Sea of Azov would transform Ukraine into a land-locked country. This leaves the export of some 22 million tons of Ukrainian grain at Russia’s disposal with global implications.
It is Russia’s reported interest in the breakaway region of Transnistria that seemed to have rung alarm bells in US/NATO, hence the phenomenal spike in material aid and other assistance to Ukraine.
In military parlance, the Russian Main Effort (ME) along eastern Ukraine aims at encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izium and Donetsk/Luhansk Oblasts; the Secondary Effort (SE) is poised towards Mariupol/Kharkiv Cities. The remaining two auxiliaries are directed along Southern axis and towards Sumy/NE Ukraine. Russian forces, however lately seem abandoning wider encirclements, opting instead for shallower ones. Russian tactical/operational errors, especially river crossing operations, leave much to be desired; however, mass force application generally overcomes its shortcomings. Russian tactics is still massive use of artillery, rocket systems and missiles, followed by armor advancing in large formations as terrain along Eastern Assault supports mechanized operations.
Russian offensive, contested fiercely by reinvigorated Ukrainian Army, is making slow but sure-footed progress. As Ukrainian Forces grapple with Russia’s decisive edge in long-range artillery and numerical superiority, despite tactical successes here and there.
Ukraine’s Special Forces operating behind enemy lines continue to target Russian railway infrastructure, the mainstay of Russian logistics. Compared to the rigid hierarchy of Russian command structure, Ukrainian troops enjoy more autonomy for on-spot decisions and exploiting fleeting battlefield opportunities.
American officials estimate 25% depletion of Russian combat firepower besides munition shortages.
Analysis
Politically in Putin’s decision matrix, the role of NATO/US response, in its present scope and scale, does not seem to have been factored-in. President Biden signed an updated version of World War II era ‘Lend-Lease Act’, facilitating requisite arms shipments to Ukraine. NATO/US staging areas along Western Ukraine close to Polish/other borders have not been vigorously targeted by Russia, allowing unimpeded aid escalation to Ukraine by some 40 countries. This is a costly miscalculation. How far the International Law permits such overt and covert interference, depends upon who interprets the law.
The War has pulled back NATO from ventilator; and contrary to Russian desire of its curtailment, NATO got a lease of life, proceeding to admit more members (Finland and Sweden) and spurring increased defense spending. American intelligence and communications support remained critical for Ukrainian forces as it helped killing of around a dozen Russian generals, besides helping sinking Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet in April.
The covert and overt escalation by the Western Alliance has its own dynamics, since climbing down the ‘escalation ladder’ is much harder than climbing up, given the huge political cost involved. Although, the conflict makes future wars of territorial conquest difficult, if not unlikely,
Militarily, the relative incompetence of the Russian General Staff is surprising. Launching a major war on faulty assumptions like an early Ukrainian capitulation; a less resolute US/NATO response; over-rating its own performance/coordination; ignorance of force morale due to Russian kinship with Ukrainians; lack of jointness among Russian ground and air forces; besides, neglecting the quintessential lesson of dilution-in-space etc are some examples.
Collaboration by pro-Moscow Ukrainians seems to have been a critical assumption by the Russian Military. However, prominent Russian-leaning politicians like Ihor Terekhov, mayor of Kharkiv, and Hennady Trukhanov, mayor of Odesa remained fierce defenders of their cities against Russia.
Due to the cited kinship and other political considerations, Russian Military exercised restraint in force-application during initial phase of the War, preferring instead to incrementally notch-up force application. Russian attrition in encirclement battles was also high. And now it simply does not have the requisite decisive numbers to tame a country as vast as Ukraine, through conventional means. Russia reportedly used older weapons and vintage munitions, saving modern arsenal for later use.
Western military analysts also attribute Russian military sloppiness to poor performance of Russian equipment, and failure of Russian Air Force (RAF) to provide air cover and favorable air situation for ground operations. RAF’s relatively poor/subdued ‘offensive air support’ is also ascribed to relative inexperience of Russian pilots for the kind of operations; and shortage of precision-guided munitions. Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries particularly mid-range SAMs compel RAF pilots to fly low, making them vulnerable to Stinger/other shoulder-fired missiles.
Drones have been a potent force multiplier in this war also after proving their lethal effect in the Azeri-Armenian conflict in June 2020. Russian drones especially the small Orlan 10 drones particularly during the battle for Kharkiv; and the US Switchblade and Turkish-supplied Bayraktar drones with Ukrainian Military, proved to be a lethal, loitering presence.
Besides military repercussions, this conflict has and will permeate international trade, commerce and economy in unfathomable ways. Russia and Ukraine together supply a third of world’s grains, which is on hold. As a consequence, Africa in particular is hit hard by food shortages and soaring prices. Food emergency is likely in the making.
Exacerbating the corona-induced disruptions to global logistics/supply chains, causing inordinate delays; the soaring maritime transportation costs would further rise due to war related insurance costs and non-availability of Russo-Ukrainian maritime assets and infrastructure.
Consumer prices at the gas stations are all-time high. Governments, like Pakistan, providing subsidies to shield people against inflation, are in a quandary. The specter of Russian energy out of European/US system is haunting, inflationary and costly, with no alternatives till Qatar is able to bridge the supply shortfall (gas only); and that is not likely before 2027.
The global effort spanning decades to move away from fossil fuels to cleaner and greener energy is set back by years. Environmental footprint of both armies fighting, destroying infrastructure, causing emissions and damaging flora and fauna is huge.
International Relations, from the happy days of WTO, Global Village and the Treaty of Maastricht are again animating towards the tense decades of Cold War and bloc politics. Regional politics is forcibly re-oriented under the intonation of ‘with or against us’. Pakistan seems to be the first casualty of its Russian ‘mis’adventure.
At the societal levels, Russian invasion has caused the greatest humanitarian/refugee crises in Europe since World War II. Physical destruction of infrastructure, weakening economies and political institutions, loss of life and limb, damage through displacement, lost homes/businesses and lost incomes will take generations to heal. War trauma caused by the ubiquitous tv screens is distressing to children and adults alike. The conflict has deepened societal divisions, already aggravated by proliferation of social media.
End state
Despite the thundering proclamation by the European Commissioner on 25 May, that ‘Ukraine must win’; a decisive military victory by Ukraine over Russia to regain all its territory is not realistic. The conflict would likely end through a settlement that would allow for a sovereign Ukraine with ‘some’ territorial concessions to Russia.
The US desire, if any, in trying to weaken Russia permanently, or destabilizing Vladimir Putin, or having him removed and make him accountable as war criminal has deeper global implications. Russia would continue to control European energy and global grain. And despite poor Russian planning and fighting, its military is still too strong. Mr. Putin’s investment of substantial personal prestige in this war needs to be reckoned with. Russia, realistically would need to be given respectable options as war termination strategy.
Ukraine’s impracticable expectations would draw the Allies deeper into a costly, drawn-out war with accidental conflagration into the nuclear realm. As, Russian military doctrine visualizes using tactical nuclear weapons defensively in a losing war (like total defeat in Ukraine). NATO/US, hence need to manage its escalatory rhetoric and actions; and Kyiv’s expectations pursuant to genuine assessment of Ukraine’s means and ability to withstand more destruction, it can sustain.
(The author is a retired Pakistan Army major general who writes on defence, global affairs and political sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and his Twitter handle @20_Inam)