Ukraine crisis — and Russia, China and the US
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
The post-Cold War humiliation of disintegration of the Soviet Union would not be lost on many influential and powerful nationalist circles within present day Russia. Nor would the actors behind this epic saga remain unchallenged if Russia could ever challenge them, geo-economics permitting. The route to that disintegration went from the US/West to the Middle East to South Asia and ended in Afghanistan. Reduction from an impressive Warsaw Pact system of alliance to Russia proper only, was phenomenal fall from grace. After Warsaw Pact went to the dustbin of history, the surviving legacy state (Russia) was expected to resuscitate ‘some’ residual influence. Hence the battle for Eastern Europe… Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine; and in Central Asian soft underbelly Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, etc. The polar bear is harmless in hibernation; otherwise, it is a deadly predator… tough, enduring and adaptable. And it remembers friends and foes.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged badly bruised from colonial occupation by the UK, US, France, Portugal, Germany and the Japan combine, after the fall of Ming Dynasty (1644) till its independence in 1949. The communist consolidation against Kuomintang led by Chaing-Kai-shek was opposed by the rich and powerful in the US/West. The Communists won the country without Tiawan, Hong Kong and Macau. Korean War (1950-1953) was the first clash where PRC resolutely and successfully defended its alliance and sphere of influence. Ever since rising China is the centre of mostly ‘hostile’ attention by the US/NATO; most recently under the ‘pivot to Asia’ policy of competition. The Western Grand Strategy in essence endeavours to contain and undermine the Chinese system, especially its economic outreach under the ‘One-Belt One-Road Initiative (OBOR or simply Belt and Road Initiative — BRI), for which CPEC is the pilot project.
Conceptual differences drove the communist PRC from its ideological mentor the Soviet Union, with the West buttressing the divide. However, both China and Russia today have widely interdependent relations. Both remain committed — without any formal alliance — to coordinate diplomatically and economically to keeping the US in check. PRC has been a major partner in reducing the pain of the US/Western sanctions against Russia after the war in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014). Russia remains engaged with the PRC in advanced technology, in addition to computers and broadcasting equipment in return for gas.
And in the cited collaboration, Russia and China bring to bear their alliance power against the US. India’s recent 31st January abstention in the UNSC for the US-sponsored resolution on Ukraine is a case in point. Despite the much-touted Indo-US bonhomie, this is the second time India has supported its ally and former mentor Russia. India had voted in 2020 against a Ukraine-sponsored resolution condemning human rights violations in Crimea at the UN General Assembly.
Last week, I outlined the military situation along the Ukrainian border with Russia and Belarus. The military situation remains graver with Russian build-up surpassing 130,000 troops now; its maneuvers in Belarus in full swing; the US deploying some 8,000 troops to Poland, besides arming the Ukrainian forces; and the diplomatic flurry in top gear with President Emanuel Macron of France visiting Moscow and Kyiv.
Ukrainian forces, as reported, comprise older and mostly recalled troops, poorly trained, ill equipped; deployed in archaic 20th century positional defences, reminiscent of the trench warfare; and not too motivated to fight the Russian juggernaut, they were recently allied with (1945-1991); and with whom they share historic, commercial, cultural and linguistic ties.
The view from critical reporting of the crisis indicates that while the US/Western media builds the war hysteria; the Ukrainian government and public, besides some European powers like Germany, downplay the threat of an ‘imminent’ Russian invasion. An invasion would ostensibly solidify a fractured NATO; whereas the ‘threat of invasion’ keeps the US/NATO guessing and somewhat divided in response. President Putin’s strategy of ‘coercive deployment’ dominating full-spectrum invasion down to limited incursions, once combined with economic intimidation like weaponising gas supply to Europe particularly during the cold winter (35% of European gas needs are met by Russia), make a potent threat. This threat is augmented by Russian diplomatic/alliance clout especially with China, Russian cyber capability and the ongoing Low-Intensity Conflict by Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas Region since 2014.
Russian maneuver hence is dubbed as President Putin’s notice to the US/NATO outlining Russian security concerns i.e. its encirclement by NATO, reminiscent of the Cold War 1.0 Policy of Containment. Ukrainian inclusion in NATO brings Russia’s 2,300 km land and sea borders in direct contact with NATO. From a US/Western standpoint, non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO is negotiable, as the US has hinted.
However, forcing a retreat over the US — asking for removal of US nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe especially the erstwhile Warsaw Pact nations — is difficult, if not impossible to negotiate.
At this point, the possibility of a shooting war between the US/NATO and Russia over Ukraine (not yet a NATO member) seems remote. The US official view is not favourable, and the US public is staunchly opposed to war in distant Ukraine after the Afghan war fatigue.
In crystal gazing the crisis, President Putin may acquire ironclad guarantees from the US/NATO never admitting any state from the erstwhile USSR era of influence. However, the level of Russian investment in the crisis indicates that Russia would not be contented with just that; and would like to see some retreat forced upon the US in Europe, besides restoring greater clout to Russia and its recognition by the US/Europe.
Without resorting to full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin may walk away with Russian speaking Donbas Region under its tested strategy of territorial attainment with or without annexation. Barring miscalculations and mistakes, the window for a full-scale war over Ukraine is closing, as Russia still does not have the estimated 175,000 troops required in the theatre; and full-fledged invasion may change the US/European security calculus drastically, engulfing Europe; as appeasement would appear fatal.
End of Beijing Winter Olympics on 20th February seems critical for initiation of limited hostilities by Russia, if any; as Putin would not like to spoil President Xi Jinping’s party, besides allowing consideration time to the US/NATO.
Whatever the situation, the existing world order is under tremendous stress at the moorings. More next week.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 10th, 2022.
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