The greatest existential threat to Pakistan
On 14th January, Pakistan’s maiden National Security Policy (NSP) was launched. It referred to the pressing water security concerns in the following words: developing a cohesive response to looming water scarcity through improved storage capacity, sustainable water management, and protecting trans-boundary water rights.
Prime Minister Imran Khan eulogised and explained the exhaustive NSP prepared under the guidance of National Security Adviser Dr Mooed Yusuf. On the other hand, India continued its work on the Wular to make it navigable — one of the dozens of ventures New Delhi has operationalised in the last two decades. Pakistan, however, has failed to raise any valid or logical observations under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). This raises the question of whether it is sheer incompetence or connivance?
Let’s first discuss the historical context of the issue.
At the time of independence in 1947, the irrigation system, originally conceived as a whole, was divided between India and Pakistan without considering the irrigated boundaries. This resulted in an international water dispute in 1948, which was resolved through the World Bank facilitated IWT in 1960. The treaty gave Pakistan control over the waters of the three ‘Western rivers’ — Indus, Chenab and Jhelum — with a mean annual flow (MAF) of 70 to 80. Under the IWT, India was allowed 3.60 million acre feet of storage — 0.40 on Indus, 1.50 on Jhelum and 1.70 on Chenab.
Indian authorities estimated the hydropower potential over western rivers to be around 20,000 megawatts (MW), of which some 3,500 MW is being generated. Given its aggressive water reservoir/management policy, India is pursuing a plan to maximise the benefits of the IWT. Presently, Jammu and Kashmir is the only state where the development of hydropower is a priority. Elsewhere in India, the focus is on solar power. The treaty is almost silent on the number of dams on Western rivers. Therefore, India could be working on potentially 150 hydropower projects on or along the western rivers. Theoretically, India can raise one power project every few dozen kilometres.
However, the concern at hand is that the already developed, enormous hydropower projects have caused tremendous environmental degradation and massive deforestation in Jammu and Kashmir, leading to a decrease in the annual water yield in the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers since 1960. Consequently, too much water during the monsoon season causes floods and the flow is too little during the lean season. It also negatively impacts the economy, livelihoods of people and ecosystems.
The continued reduction in river flows since the treaty went into force is a serious concern coupled with massive tree-felling with lackadaisical compensatory afforestation, and a lot of construction. Often builders use dynamite and other questionable techniques that trigger immense sedimentation, which is one of the major reasons behind the shrunken storage capacity at Tarbela and Mangla — the only large dams of Pakistan.
Pakistan is the most downstream country in the Indus River basins, and thus faces a double whammy. Increased water flows into the trans-boundary rivers during rains (causes deluge) which directly impacts the regional ecosystems and the economy in the river basin areas.
The very existence of Pakistan depends on water and sediments carried by trans-boundary rivers. Nevertheless, Pakistani authorities entrusted with safeguarding water inflows as well as Indian activity on or along the western rivers have rarely raised objections to issues such as water-flow fluctuations and sedimentation carriage towards Pakistan.
Unfortunately, Pakistan also lost the few objections and litigation cases it did raise at the international arbitration forums — Kishanganga being a case in point that gobbled up billions of rupees. The Court of International Arbitration for the Kishanganga Dam ruled in favour of India but Pakistan’s legal team — as a face-saving — claimed to have won the case. The Pakistani team failed to defend an open-shut case. The dam gives India control over the Neelum River for diverting water to the Jhelum River basin, which flows from Pakistan into Occupied Kashmir and then re-enters Pakistan. This Neelum River diversion reduced 25% water for the 969 MW Neelum Jhelum project. Consequently, Pakistan is suffering losses of up to Rs28 billion per annum for the units of electricity that could have been available if India did not dam the water upstream.
In contrast, India is counting and planning for every drop of water to optimally utilise trans-boundary water resources. It also dropped a near bombshell on the water security of Pakistan by declaring the Chenab, Indus, Jhelum and Ravi rivers as national waterways to boost inland water transport.
The Inland Waterways Authority of India (IWAI) has already completed the feasibility studies on the Indus National Waterways (NW-46) from Upshi Village to Shey Village — a stretch of some 34.67 kilometres. The IWAI marked a 110 kilometres national waterway on the Jhelum River (NW 49) from Wular lake to Dangpora village. The design of barrages to maintain a minimum of 4 feet depth and 100 feet bottom width for suitable gradients will help India control the flow. This means that the production of hydropower at Mangla, Tarbela and the upcoming Diamer-Bhasha dam will be directly controlled by India. The IWAI has also marked a 53 kilometre (NW-26) on the Chenab River from Chenab toad bridge to Bhadra Kalan bridge.
How can Pakistan face this fierce undermining of its water rights under the IWT?
Article III (2) of IWT states that “India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western rivers and shall not permit any interference with these waters.” This clause of IWT is offering the best legal defence. Article III (4) and I-(15) and Article I paragraph 6 of the treaty restrict India from developing any navigational project on the Western rivers.
So, how can Pakistan ensure its water security in the presence of an elaborate NSP that has marginally touched on the issue? Most of our existing institutional mechanisms i.e. IWT commissioner and other national agencies responsible for national security remain mired in the past — sleepy, selfishly conservative and non-innovative approach. Controlling the flow of the Chenab River will run dry the 100-kilometre long Bambawali-Ravi-Bedian canal. Pakistan constructed the canal during the 1950s as a defensive obstacle that runs close to the India-Pakistan border. A dry canal means a compromise on the territorial security of Pakistan.
Pakistan currently faces a serious water crisis because of its rapidly growing population, urbanization and growing agricultural needs. Any interruption from India in the annual inflow to Pakistan, which makes almost 45% of the total annual flow, will seriously compromise the water security, which is integral for the food, energy and economic security of the country.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 20th, 2022.
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