Denial of bail only if suspect ‘deliberately’ delaying trial

The Supreme Court has ruled that to convince it to deny bail, the prosecution must show that there was a concerted effort by the accused or their counsel to delay the conclusion of the trial by “seeking adjournments without sufficient cause on crucial hearings” or by “making frivolous miscellaneous applications”.

The court also observed that there has to be material to show that the accused would pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail.

"In the absence of any such material, bail cannot be denied to an accused on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial," read a seven-page judgment authored by Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah.

A division bench of the court, led by Justice Shah, was examining the extent and scope of the right of an accused to bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The bench observed that mere mathematical counting of all the dates of adjournments sought for on behalf of the accused was not sufficient to deprive the accused of his right to bail under the third proviso.

It added that the statutory right to be released on bail flowed from the constitutional right to liberty and fair trial under Articles 9 and 10A of the Constitution.

"The act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the timely conclusion of the trial must be the result of a visible concerted effort orchestrated by the accused,” the verdict read.

Also read: SC widens scope of ‘sufficient cause’ in bail matters

“Merely some adjournments sought by the counsel for the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on behalf of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial, unless the adjournments are sought without any sufficient cause on crucial hearings, i.e., the hearings fixed for examination or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or the adjournments are repetitive, reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial."

Justice Shah said the provisions of the third and fourth provisos to Section 497(1) of the CrPC must be examined through the constitutional lens and fashioned in a manner that is progressive and expansive of the rights of an accused, who were still under trial and had the presumption of innocence in their favour.

The court observed that the purpose and objective of the provision was to ensure that the trial of an accused was conducted expeditiously and the pre-conviction detention of an accused did not extend beyond the period of one year, in cases involving offences not punishable with death.

"In such cases, if the trial of an accused is not concluded within a year of his detention, the statutory right to be released on bail ripens in their favour.”

The judgment noted that the second exception to the right of the accused to be released on bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of the trial was provided in the fourth proviso.

"According to [the fourth proviso], the provisions of the third proviso do not apply to the accused who is a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; or a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal in the opinion of the Court; or an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.”