Balancing the dragon in the Middle East
The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. She is a LUMS and Warwick alumnus
In the past few years, particularly after hacks on official Qatari websites in 2017 had triggered the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) worst crisis (Qatar-Gulf crunch), countries in the Middle East region, particularly the Gulf, have made extensive efforts to assemble and establish their cyber capacities. Guaranteed and continuous cyber cooperation is now deemed a requisite to effectively counter and monitor threats such as those pertaining to hybrid warfare, supervising terrorist movements and monitoring financial activities.
Today, no relationship is more consequential for the future of world politics as that between the United States and China. The pivot of the growing distrust between the two countries (which already encompasses trade and technology) is now shifting towards the cyber realm. In 2018, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) labelled China as antipathetic; and in 2020, the Trump administration revealed the Clean Network Initiative (CNI), a digitated trade zone which aims to protect data privacy and human rights by introducing its own Global Data Security Initiative. Unsurprisingly, it dismisses and discounts all Chinese companies. This also adds fuel to the concept of ‘splinternet’ where now the internet — once regarded as a universal common joint — is now becoming, amidst all the intricacies in global politics, a labyrinth of conflicting rules. It is in this maze that both the US and China are hastening to draw in as many states as they can.
Presently, the GCC countries have developed a diverse portfolio of technology partners which include both Chinese and Western firms. Such balancing acts can be seen throughout the GCC energy and transport sectors as well. Chinese companies include Huawei, which is involved in the establishment and growth of 5G networks by both Etisalat and DU in the Emirates. Ericsson, IBM, Microsoft and Nokia are some of the companies on the Western front where the digital infrastructure of the GCC is concerned.
Of course, as it stands, the CNI will leave the GCC states with no other alternative but to choose a side amidst the growing friction between the US and China. While the latter’s non-interference policy in regional affairs and internal conflicts is appealing, it should not be forgotten that the US has been and continues to be the main security guarantor for these states.
However, in light of his picks for the foreign and security policy posts, it seems that the incoming Biden administration will avoid turning China into an outright adversary while at the same time usher in GCC states under the cover of the CNI. This portends a dilemma for Washington, given that there are growing calls for ending US support to certain states over human rights concerns which will easily push these states towards China. Moreover, if GCC countries are not part of CNI, it would jeopardise the US ability to work with these states on key security matters.
For the GCC states, failing to abandon their partnerships with Chinese companies could limit their own security guarantees provided by the US which would make them more susceptible to growing outside threats given the heightened tensions in the region.
It should also not be forgotten that choosing the US could push China closer to Iran and especially when the two sides are said to be embarking on a $400 billion strategic partnership, though this is yet to be officially confirmed from Chinese officials. Time will tell what 2021 will herald in but without a doubt the Middle East will be the new battlefront for the eagle and the dragon.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 13th, 2021.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.