The long-drawn violence in Afghanistan

Taliban must agree to a political setup providing chance for all the political groups to participate in the elections


Syed Akhtar Ali Shah December 23, 2020
The writer is a practising lawyer. He holds PHD in Political Science and heads a think-tank ‘Good Governance Forum’. He can be reached at aashah7@yahoo.com

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Afghanistan has been under fire ever since the Saur Revolution because of undue foreign interference as well as the doings of many of her own leaders — tribal and political. During these years the self-appointed jihadis of all hue from all over the world flocked to that land to fight America’s war under the policy of containment of communism (USSR) modified with Reagan’s Doctrine.

Having achieved their strategic objective of USSR’s retreat from Afghanistan — also helped by the policy of glasnost of Gorbachev — the United States, forgetting the holy jihad, abandoned Afghanistan to her own fate. Hence, what followed was a sustained period of chaos in Afghanistan.

The land having remained under turmoil was eventually taken over by the Taliban on gun point, of course propped up and supported by outside forces. The Taliban government soon gained notoriety as a pariah state and epicentre of terrorism due to Al Qaeda. Most acts of terrorism were traced to Afghanistan, orchestrated by Al Qaeda. The events of 9/11 were a game changer, as the US and the Europeans in particular realised that Al Qaeda was a serious threat to their social order and vital national interests. Demands were made to hand over Osama bin Laden, but Mullah Omar and his associates refused to do so.

On refusal, the US and NATO, under a UN mandate, landed with boots on ground announcing to bring the offenders to justice. New governments consisting of divergent shades ascended power followed by successive elections to the office of president and the Loya Jirga, with a new political system based upon a written constitution.

America’s focus was more on the dismantling of the Al Qaeda network than on Taliban. The Taliban made tactical retreat to areas conducive for them in order to preserve their manpower. The US, however, during this period has been successful in achieving the strategic goal of incapacitating the Al Qaeda. But, on the other hand, the Taliban sprang up from their safe havens and started a new cycle of violence and gained control in peripheral areas, eventually challenging the Afghan government’s legitimacy.

Having debilitated the Al Qaeda, the US no longer considered them a threat. Through backchannel diplomacy, the US got in touch with the Taliban, eventually inking the Doha Agreement, seeking guarantees from the Taliban that they would not allow their soil to be used against the US and her allies. In return, she gave assurances of gradual withdrawal with certain conditionalities, although annexures were also added but not disclosed. However, the government of Afghanistan was kept out of the new development. The second part of the agreement pertained to the intra-Afghan dialogue without spelling out modalities.

The agreement was hailed by many as a step for peace but without any guarantee from the Taliban to stop violence within Afghanistan, the land continued to burn. Despite all appeals from international forums, the Taliban remained belligerent, using all means for violence. The incidence of violence jacked up with enormous intensity, with a stated objective to have maximum leverage at the negotiation table.

Even in a hostile environment, the formation of the High Council for Reconciliation by the Afghan government provided impetus to negotiations with the initial meetings of the council and the Taliban. But again, snags appeared due to no clear agenda and both sides taking a hard line on the future political setup of Afghanistan, with the Taliban insisting on exclusive power and enforcement of the Hanafi jurisprudence as the main law, while the other side not agreeing due to the diverse religious outlooks present in the society.

After lengthy deliberations, the ice broke on December 2, as both parties mutually agreed to continue with the ongoing group discussions in order to achieve the goal of comprehensive peace. Not only the US but also other stakeholders welcomed the move as a chance to halt violence.

The breakthrough is an obvious boaster to the Afghan government, as it has enhanced its legitimate status. Agreement on procedures and agenda is a leap forward toward sustainable peace, helping both sides to arrive at substantial issues, including confidence building measures such as ceasefire, also known as Teega in Afghan parlance.

The 21-point code reached between the two sides revolves around four basic principles. Amongst those the Doha Agreement of February 29, 2020, will form the basis of negotiations, with a focus on durable peace. This will not include any subject that is against the sacred and blessed religion of Islam or the interests of the country. In case differences emerge in the interpretation of Shariah law, a joint committee of the negotiation teams would make a decision. The other agreed principles were respect for the other side, not to be in haste and to listen to each other with patience. Committed to prepare verified minutes and to release only agreed upon statements; maintain confidentiality, not to re-open the decided issue and not to allow anyone in the room except the negotiators.

The recent development may be taken as a first step towards a 1,000-mile hazardous journey with many ups and downs. The success of the dialogue depends upon reaching a common ground and cessation of violence. The issue of Hanafi jurisprudence or any other should not be a big problem. Pakistan is pursuing a Constitution stating Islam as a state religion with a proclamation that no law shall be against the Quran and Sunnah. However, this provides a democratic system carrying the principles of pluralism. The same model can also be adopted over there.

The Taliban must agree to a political setup providing equal chance for all the political groups to participate in the elections in order to have durable peace. The insistence for exclusive power will only cause alienation, leading either to dictatorship of the Taliban or continued fire in the form of violence. The recipe is common ground.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 23rd, 2020.

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