Azeri victory in Nagorno-Karabakh — an epoch in the making
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
Azerbaijan’s military victory in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh — as the Armenians call it — is unprecedented. It is a first in modern military history that Muslim forces have prevailed in the battlefield so convincingly. It alters the balance of power in the Caucasus and the conflict demonstrated employment of inexpensive newer technologies.
Previously in this space, we discussed the “Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh” on 15 October 15, 2020, while the conflict was raging. Nagorno-Karabakh is a legacy conflict between Muslim Azerbaijan and Christian Armenia since the Turko-Persian Seljuk Empire (1060-1307 AD); when Seljuk armies repeatedly fought to capture the mountain citadels of Armenia or Armen — as Seljuk Nama (c.1175) refers to the area.
The recent war raged for nearly six weeks (September 27-November 10, 2020), when Russia ended it through a tense truce signed on November 9. The armistice agreement was signed by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President Putin; and enforced by heavily armed Russian troops. The immediate geo-strategic windfall was a resuscitation of the Russian influence in its erstwhile Soviet backyard in the broader Caucasus region. Three earlier ceasefires brokered by France, the US and Russia had failed to hold.
Mr Putin reportedly threatened Russia’s military intervention in forcing concessions from both sides. Moscow told Armenia that their mutual defense alliance did not apply to Nagorno-Karabakh. And ceasefire, after the Armenian capitulation on the battlefield, brought Armenia firmly into the Russian orbit without alienating Azerbaijan. The war was a harsh reminder for the West-leaning Armenia about Russian significance to its security.
Putin’s personal ties to President Aliyev and an ultimatum to cease hostilities after the capture of Shusha, backed by a mysterious missile strike in Baku on the night of November 9, paid immediate dividends. The 2,000-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent ex-15th Motor Rifle Brigade is icing on the cake. This force will remain deployed for a minimum of five years, extendable. It is tasked to protect the Lachin corridor, linking Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Turkey as a key Azeri supporter agreed with Russia to establish a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center in Azerbaijan, without Turkish peacekeepers entering Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan, as a clear winner, gained control of five cities including the second largest city of Nagorno-Karabakh, Shusha (or Shushi), four towns, some 286 villages, and its complete border with Iran. Azerbaijan retains the territorial gains under the truce deal in addition to all Armenian-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also granted direct land access including infrastructure construction — through a corridor via Armenia’s Syunik province — to its exclave of Nakhchivan.
The armistice unblocks all economic and transport links in the region with Armenia guaranteeing safe passage between western Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Both parties are to ensure unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions with Russian Border Service (FSB) exercising control over the transport communication.
Following the ceasefire agreement, angry mobs in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, stormed the parliament. Ethnic Armenians — in the areas acquired by Azerbaijan — were reported to have burnt, destroyed and/or carried all properties on evacuation to Armenia proper, before the November 25 deadline.
In Azerbaijan, large-scale celebrations erupted, especially in capital Baku, with Turkish and Pakistani flags on prominent display. Reportedly, Azerbaijan intends on claiming damages for the Armenian occupation of its territories, and may get more territorial gains as compensation.
Militarily, the Azeri operational strategy entailed effective deployment of precision killer drones, much superior to the Armenian ones; besides employment of sensors, long-range heavy artillery and missile strikes.
Defeat and territorial loss in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) was never lost on Azerbaijan; which consistently allocated a higher military budget, thanks to its oil revenues. Azeri acquisitions of advanced weapon systems like superior tanks, armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles from Israel, Russia and Turkey gave her a decided edge. Israeli and Turkish-supplied drones were an indispensable force multiplier. Azeri artillery had a quantitative advantage especially in self-propelled guns and long-range multiple rocket launchers. Armenia had a minor advantage in tactical ballistic missiles. Air force employment was negligible given the robust air defence systems possessed by both sides.
In military organisation, while the Armenian army had better officer corps, agile leadership, and motivated rank and file; the Azeri army had the will to fight and die for liberation of their territory. Armenia inexplicably failed to mobilise optimally and deploy mobilised personnel to the conflict zone.
Wars introduce newer weapon systems. The Economist described Azerbaijan’s highly skilful use of drones and sensors, as a “new, more affordable type of air power” making future low-level conflicts potentially more deadly. The Azeri employment of tactical drones helped it acquire better intelligence about Armenian troop-positions and weapon locations. Azeri military used notably the Bayraktar TB2 and Turkish-made STM Kargu drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes; whereas close air support was provided by specialised suicide drones, such as IAI Harop. These systems rendered tanks vulnerable, forcing a rethink in the employment doctrine of armoured forces.
Today, non-availability of jamming capabilities, gun-based self-propelled air-defence systems and radars with “plot-fusion” (ability to combine radar echoes from multiple radars) makes tracking loitering munitions and small drones extremely complex for most militaries.
The petroleum industry in Azerbaijan was concerned about the potential targeting of the oil pipelines. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline carrying about 80% of the country’s oil exports is one of the several pipelines emanating from Baku that Armenia reportedly targeted or attempted to target.
Video footage of kills by Azeri drones, and high-resolution footage of missiles striking Armenian soldiers, tanks, and other materiel, displayed on digital billboards across Baku was effectively used as part of the Azerbaijani propaganda campaign.
In cyber warfare, hackers from both countries and their allied countries targeted government websites. Creation of new social media accounts and posting of specific contents spiked. Content control — from authentic and unauthentic sources — was exercised by both sides. Mainstream official media and social media networks were essential tools of the online information warfare. Misinformation through fake news and older footages was rampant.
In sum, in this limited war, a Muslim country — using force successfully — righted a wrong done to it. The conflict also skewed the regional balance of power towards Russia. It threw in open certain military dogmas, dictated by inexpensive newer technologies, with profound implications.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 10th, 2020.
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