A headless neighbour
History is a reminder that Pakistan has never allowed the region to be destabilised to the point of no return
A Reuters image of Narendra Modi.
Normalcy has never remained an active ingredient in South Asia even after overt nuclearisation in 1998 which was expected to add stability to the crisis- and war-prone region. Although Pakistan and India recognised the newly introduced nuclear capabilities as a factor of stability in 2004, the same has not been achieved. The emerging deterrent relationship, where the threat of nuclear use induces caution, has helped avert wars but crises have remained frequent. The reason being non-resolution of outstanding disputes where nuclear capability cannot influence positively other than creating recognition amongst warring parties that non-resolution poses existential risks.
Rationality supposedly forces both sides to exercise caution. However, the understanding that crisis escalation can be controlled runs counter to the logic of deterrence. This approach points in the direction of bounded rationality. Such an approach can have obvious dividends since it allows extremist mindsets to present a notion of muscularity at the domestic level.
Nowhere is this reality more evident than in India’s case. Initially, the Covid-19 health crisis caused a stall in conflicts around the world. This trend, however, could not make it to South Asia where an ultra-nationalist Indian government continued to exploit religious, ethnic, and national fault-lines.
While Muslims in India were already ostracised and draconian measures like CAA and NRC were introduced, the beginning of this pandemic in India was marred by blaming Muslims for the spread.
The ethnically, religiously, and regionally divided Kashmiris in IOK did not receive any relief and the lockdown received a blanket justification through a health disaster. As states looked inwards, the Indian government introduced new domicile laws to facilitate settling non-Kashmiris in Kashmir. This is a clear violation of longstanding international laws that forbid disputing parties from changing the demography of the disputed region.
At the national and strategic level, the supposedly professional Indian military leadership made laughable claims like Pakistan-backed infiltration of Covid-infected terrorists. Later, in an apparent attempt to appease an extremist leadership, former Indian army chief Bipin Rawat claimed to have a plan to capture Azad Kashmir.
Acquisition of state-of-the-art military and strategic hardware cannot ensure an ultimate strategic defence in a nuclearised environment. The risk of escalation and nuclear use strictly demands restraint and caution rather than escalation-dominance and war-fighting strategies. Foreign vendors tend to exacerbate India’s insecurity to sell their military hardware for economic and strategic favours. Notwithstanding the fact that an increased Indian sense of security negatively affects any prospect of peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes.
Pakistan’s responsive acquisition of nuclear weapons has neutralised Indian conventional superiority. Since May 28, 1998, it has averted any conventional wars with India despite Indian threats at various occasions. However, for durable peace, better sense needs to prevail on the Indian side. Pakistan’s ability to act as a stabiliser is constrained by Indian unwillingness to work towards improving the situation.
History is a reminder that Pakistan has never allowed the region to be destabilised to the point of no return. With minimum means, Pakistan has neutralised every Indian attempt to attain invulnerability and nuclear safe havens. The same is likely to follow for the future. The onus of the first move in the direction of regional peace rests with India. A first step could be exercising nuclear and conventional restraint that will undoubtedly invite reciprocity from the Pakistani side and allow both sides to focus on human security rather than staying locked in an endless action-reaction syndrome.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2020.
Rationality supposedly forces both sides to exercise caution. However, the understanding that crisis escalation can be controlled runs counter to the logic of deterrence. This approach points in the direction of bounded rationality. Such an approach can have obvious dividends since it allows extremist mindsets to present a notion of muscularity at the domestic level.
Nowhere is this reality more evident than in India’s case. Initially, the Covid-19 health crisis caused a stall in conflicts around the world. This trend, however, could not make it to South Asia where an ultra-nationalist Indian government continued to exploit religious, ethnic, and national fault-lines.
While Muslims in India were already ostracised and draconian measures like CAA and NRC were introduced, the beginning of this pandemic in India was marred by blaming Muslims for the spread.
The ethnically, religiously, and regionally divided Kashmiris in IOK did not receive any relief and the lockdown received a blanket justification through a health disaster. As states looked inwards, the Indian government introduced new domicile laws to facilitate settling non-Kashmiris in Kashmir. This is a clear violation of longstanding international laws that forbid disputing parties from changing the demography of the disputed region.
At the national and strategic level, the supposedly professional Indian military leadership made laughable claims like Pakistan-backed infiltration of Covid-infected terrorists. Later, in an apparent attempt to appease an extremist leadership, former Indian army chief Bipin Rawat claimed to have a plan to capture Azad Kashmir.
Acquisition of state-of-the-art military and strategic hardware cannot ensure an ultimate strategic defence in a nuclearised environment. The risk of escalation and nuclear use strictly demands restraint and caution rather than escalation-dominance and war-fighting strategies. Foreign vendors tend to exacerbate India’s insecurity to sell their military hardware for economic and strategic favours. Notwithstanding the fact that an increased Indian sense of security negatively affects any prospect of peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes.
Pakistan’s responsive acquisition of nuclear weapons has neutralised Indian conventional superiority. Since May 28, 1998, it has averted any conventional wars with India despite Indian threats at various occasions. However, for durable peace, better sense needs to prevail on the Indian side. Pakistan’s ability to act as a stabiliser is constrained by Indian unwillingness to work towards improving the situation.
History is a reminder that Pakistan has never allowed the region to be destabilised to the point of no return. With minimum means, Pakistan has neutralised every Indian attempt to attain invulnerability and nuclear safe havens. The same is likely to follow for the future. The onus of the first move in the direction of regional peace rests with India. A first step could be exercising nuclear and conventional restraint that will undoubtedly invite reciprocity from the Pakistani side and allow both sides to focus on human security rather than staying locked in an endless action-reaction syndrome.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2020.