The Indian connection
Pakistan can be marginalised if peace process is derailed by continued terrorist attacks targeting Afghan civilians
The writer is a Senior Consultant at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham
The Afghan government blamed the “Pakistan-backed Haqqani network” for the attack on a Sikh Gurdwara in Kabul, last Wednesday, ostensibly in retaliation for the violence against Muslims in India.
The attack was later claimed by the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan — most likely a mixed bag of local and foreign militants with a borrowed label. Intriguingly, an Indian Muslim was named as one of the attackers.
One wonders why the Sikhs were targeted. It is the Hindu BJP that is conducting systematic violence against Muslims as Sikhs arranged langars catering to Muslim protestors in New Delhi. Moreover, the opening of the Kartarpur Corridor won Islamabad some hearts in the Indian Sikh community. So who would benefit from targeting Sikhs in Kabul?
The Afghan government’s response smacks of resentment regarding the US-Taliban deal. Pompeo’s recent threat to slash $1 billion in US aid to Afghanistan shows America’s commitment to withdraw its forces. But a future government that includes a powerful Taliban could be perceived as an existential threat by the present Afghan government.
The Afghans are not the only ones feeling insecure; there are some unhappy people in New Delhi as India remains politically inconsequential in the ongoing Afghan peace process despite spending billions in Afghanistan, while Islamabad continues to play a role.
Intense international focus on Pakistan’s Afghan policy has often obscured the role of the regional big brother, India, and its long-term security interests in Afghanistan and beyond. Consequently, few works interrogate the security angle of India’s investment in Afghan development projects and its proxy warfare in Pakistan through Afghanistan.
A clear-eyed view would demonstrate that New Delhi was never averse to using proxies to secure its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. From 1996 to 2001, India provided military, political and financial aid to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The key objective was to deny Pakistan a peaceful western border.
After 9/11, India engaged Afghan factions through massive investment in development projects. With its own high levels of poverty, this was not out of love for the Afghans but to expand Indian presence to contain Pakistan and obstruct China’s footprint.
With CPEC undermining the Indian maritime strategy of containing China and the possibility of a Taliban-driven peace in Afghanistan challenging India’s anti-Pakistan policy, it is not surprising that India is desperate.
There is evidence that RAW engaged in proxy warfare in K-P, Balochistan and Karachi with help from the Afghan NDS and anti-Pakistan militants in Afghanistan.
The tangled web that the Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies continue to weave can be used to undermine the recent Afghan peace process because the legitimacy given to the Taliban by the US and its allies does not suit New Delhi and Kabul.
Sometime back Pakistan’s ISI was blamed for operating training bases in Afghanistan to foment trouble in IOK. Today, Afghan territory is used by RAW and NDS to train Baloch separatists to stir up insurgency in Pakistan. It is sheer hypocrisy that these activities are not scrutinised by international watchdogs and academics.
Scapegoating Islamabad has worked well since 9/11. Thanks to some of Pakistan’s short-sighted policies, negative narrative-creating was easy. However, a face-saving US military withdrawal in an election year can only materialise with the help of the Afghan Taliban including the Haqqanis. This vindicates Islamabad’s long-held position on the issue.
Of late, Pakistan-bashing has somewhat subsided. Islamabad’s relevance to the peace process cannot be shot down with one-sided articles in US publications.
However, Pakistan can again be marginalised if the peace process is derailed by continued terrorist attacks targeting Afghan civilians. Ajit Doval would love to make this a reality.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 5th, 2020.
The attack was later claimed by the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan — most likely a mixed bag of local and foreign militants with a borrowed label. Intriguingly, an Indian Muslim was named as one of the attackers.
One wonders why the Sikhs were targeted. It is the Hindu BJP that is conducting systematic violence against Muslims as Sikhs arranged langars catering to Muslim protestors in New Delhi. Moreover, the opening of the Kartarpur Corridor won Islamabad some hearts in the Indian Sikh community. So who would benefit from targeting Sikhs in Kabul?
The Afghan government’s response smacks of resentment regarding the US-Taliban deal. Pompeo’s recent threat to slash $1 billion in US aid to Afghanistan shows America’s commitment to withdraw its forces. But a future government that includes a powerful Taliban could be perceived as an existential threat by the present Afghan government.
The Afghans are not the only ones feeling insecure; there are some unhappy people in New Delhi as India remains politically inconsequential in the ongoing Afghan peace process despite spending billions in Afghanistan, while Islamabad continues to play a role.
Intense international focus on Pakistan’s Afghan policy has often obscured the role of the regional big brother, India, and its long-term security interests in Afghanistan and beyond. Consequently, few works interrogate the security angle of India’s investment in Afghan development projects and its proxy warfare in Pakistan through Afghanistan.
A clear-eyed view would demonstrate that New Delhi was never averse to using proxies to secure its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. From 1996 to 2001, India provided military, political and financial aid to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The key objective was to deny Pakistan a peaceful western border.
After 9/11, India engaged Afghan factions through massive investment in development projects. With its own high levels of poverty, this was not out of love for the Afghans but to expand Indian presence to contain Pakistan and obstruct China’s footprint.
With CPEC undermining the Indian maritime strategy of containing China and the possibility of a Taliban-driven peace in Afghanistan challenging India’s anti-Pakistan policy, it is not surprising that India is desperate.
There is evidence that RAW engaged in proxy warfare in K-P, Balochistan and Karachi with help from the Afghan NDS and anti-Pakistan militants in Afghanistan.
The tangled web that the Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies continue to weave can be used to undermine the recent Afghan peace process because the legitimacy given to the Taliban by the US and its allies does not suit New Delhi and Kabul.
Sometime back Pakistan’s ISI was blamed for operating training bases in Afghanistan to foment trouble in IOK. Today, Afghan territory is used by RAW and NDS to train Baloch separatists to stir up insurgency in Pakistan. It is sheer hypocrisy that these activities are not scrutinised by international watchdogs and academics.
Scapegoating Islamabad has worked well since 9/11. Thanks to some of Pakistan’s short-sighted policies, negative narrative-creating was easy. However, a face-saving US military withdrawal in an election year can only materialise with the help of the Afghan Taliban including the Haqqanis. This vindicates Islamabad’s long-held position on the issue.
Of late, Pakistan-bashing has somewhat subsided. Islamabad’s relevance to the peace process cannot be shot down with one-sided articles in US publications.
However, Pakistan can again be marginalised if the peace process is derailed by continued terrorist attacks targeting Afghan civilians. Ajit Doval would love to make this a reality.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 5th, 2020.