The Afghan peace agreement
What if things head really south?
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the leader of the Taliban delegation, signs an agreement with Zalmay Khalilzad, US envoy for peace in Afghanistan, at a signing agreement ceremony between members of Afghanistan's Taliban and the US in Doha, Qatar February 29, 2020. PHOTO: REUTERS
There are two of these, a fact which missed notice as many in Pakistan and the region celebrated what Ashraf Ghani most ominously described as “disrupting the status quo”. What was the status-quo? The 18-year-old war between the US, the Afghan forces and the Taliban; and the likes of Ghani and Karzai sitting atop an improvised political structure which held them aloft on American props. That was the status-quo.
The first of these was signed in Doha between the two warring sides, the Taliban and the US; it’s essential aim: to bring closure to a “long and unnecessary” war as President Trump calls it. The US has in all these years expended around a trillion dollars without much to show and would like to cut their losses. They want to leave and probably will. If that can be done with some finesse of an enduring political settlement it will only add to their credibility. But will the need for the latter inhibit their decision to exit, is unlikely; though it just might entail variations to the plan.
The second agreement between the US and the Afghan government was inked by Secretary of Defence Mark Esper in Kabul to commit the Afghan government to the essential elements of peace agreed in Doha. Ghani’s re-election had preceded both the agreements as a possible quid pro quo for Ghani and his government’s undertaking to conform to the agreements through additional protocols and assurances. If there is to be a show stopper to this entire scheme, the fight over Ghani’s claim to the presidency would be central to it. Without the executive power fully known by all sides any attempt at dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government will be meaningless and fickle; hence the importance of the matter to be first settled before a larger peace construct can be engaged in.
But the small print in the Kabul agreement is most interesting because it weans the Afghan government ever so subtly into submitting to the plan of peace and America’s exit as a done deal. As an example, on the issue of “permanent” cease-fire and lasting “political settlement” it links the exchange of prisoners as a conditional enabler even though America commits to playing the arbiter. The post-agreement ire of the US on Ghani’s refusal to comply to the prisoners release is the case in point. The timeline of the withdrawal in particular assumes Afghan obeisance. Of course the agreement sugar-coats the conditions to appease Afghan sensitivity but to defy what should come next by Ghani is crass opportunism. To which then the Taliban have responded with their own qualified rejection, resuming attacks on the Afghan National Security Forces.
If you sense a bit of a double-speak in how the US has approached the issue, that is how it is. One must cut a little rope though to the US to seek convergence on diverse positions. President Trump thinks he can get Ghani around to the broader contours of the agreement given that Ghani, his government and the Afghan economy remain precarious without American support.
The two net-gainers from the deal are the Taliban — balance heavily tilted in their favour (foreign forces leave, which has been their principal demand, and discussions on Afghanistan’s future political make-up will include their input); and the US which under Donald Trump has pledged to move its military out of a futile engagement. Both are likely to realise their objectives. The net loser in this entire case is Ashraf Ghani whose position of political eminence in Kabul is courtesy US presence and when the US leaves, the props that hold Ghani in place will be no more. Even when the US is out and somehow the arrangement holds for at least 14-18 months (the period identified for full withdrawal) Ghani will fall to his lack of constituency and competing political dynamics within Afghanistan which will hold sway. Such interplay will then forge another iteration which may become the abiding political consensus in Afghanistan.
Then there are implicit beneficiaries, and losers too. The region in general and Pakistan in particular may implicitly benefit if peace indeed comes to Afghanistan. A war in Afghanistan extends its malfeasance to Pakistan’s border regions. Its absence will bring about relative calm and soothe “tribal” unease. This helps with improved cohesion and defies the opportunity to those who mean harm to Pakistan through exploiting its fissures. Pakistan also will hugely benefit by peace in Afghanistan by physically extending the spokes of the CPEC into east-west connections to realise the promise associated with the project. Then only CPEC will bring its immense benefits to the country from merely being a north-south connectivity corridor. So will the people of Afghanistan see better days when the immense geographical potential of that country is brought to play as the pivot of prosperity by connecting adjoining regions of Central, West and South Asia.
The implicit losers are mostly regional who thrived in strife and conflict — states such as India and perhaps Iran. Also those within the Afghan society who availed the war into a self-serving heist around rent from foreign presence. India and Iran had their little fingers in the game as long as the war persisted. This will cease when strife and the chance for malice closes. It may be hard for them to give up on their opportunity for the malicious geopolitical interests it served for them. They will thus expend all effort to somehow sustain war and conflict, sadly. The Afghan establishment steeped in similar ways might become a handy conduit for such a losing enterprise. Net and implicit gainers thus have a lot to mind as they move towards tenuous peace. Even more importantly they should avoid falling into the trap of contrived failure by net or implicit losers in their bid to extend their odious pursuits.
Hence, the initial hiccups in the process. It will take some time in settling down to something that all will agree and work on largely around what has been agreed to in the two instruments. The US has still enough skin in the game and will leverage it to effect. After all what will drive it is its own interest vital to a leadership seeking political return. She would additionally save wasteful loss of precious money. In an economy that may be on a slide because of global headwinds it shall be a timely respite. Nature too seems to be conspiring in the region’s and America’s favour.
What if things head really south? Sometime back Trump planned replacing regular forces in Afghanistan with contractors which would only cost one-third. The Pentagon desisted. Perhaps not now. If the need arises, some could be retained under diplomatic cover. That will still cost far less. The strife though will persist. Not good.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2020.
The first of these was signed in Doha between the two warring sides, the Taliban and the US; it’s essential aim: to bring closure to a “long and unnecessary” war as President Trump calls it. The US has in all these years expended around a trillion dollars without much to show and would like to cut their losses. They want to leave and probably will. If that can be done with some finesse of an enduring political settlement it will only add to their credibility. But will the need for the latter inhibit their decision to exit, is unlikely; though it just might entail variations to the plan.
The second agreement between the US and the Afghan government was inked by Secretary of Defence Mark Esper in Kabul to commit the Afghan government to the essential elements of peace agreed in Doha. Ghani’s re-election had preceded both the agreements as a possible quid pro quo for Ghani and his government’s undertaking to conform to the agreements through additional protocols and assurances. If there is to be a show stopper to this entire scheme, the fight over Ghani’s claim to the presidency would be central to it. Without the executive power fully known by all sides any attempt at dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government will be meaningless and fickle; hence the importance of the matter to be first settled before a larger peace construct can be engaged in.
But the small print in the Kabul agreement is most interesting because it weans the Afghan government ever so subtly into submitting to the plan of peace and America’s exit as a done deal. As an example, on the issue of “permanent” cease-fire and lasting “political settlement” it links the exchange of prisoners as a conditional enabler even though America commits to playing the arbiter. The post-agreement ire of the US on Ghani’s refusal to comply to the prisoners release is the case in point. The timeline of the withdrawal in particular assumes Afghan obeisance. Of course the agreement sugar-coats the conditions to appease Afghan sensitivity but to defy what should come next by Ghani is crass opportunism. To which then the Taliban have responded with their own qualified rejection, resuming attacks on the Afghan National Security Forces.
If you sense a bit of a double-speak in how the US has approached the issue, that is how it is. One must cut a little rope though to the US to seek convergence on diverse positions. President Trump thinks he can get Ghani around to the broader contours of the agreement given that Ghani, his government and the Afghan economy remain precarious without American support.
The two net-gainers from the deal are the Taliban — balance heavily tilted in their favour (foreign forces leave, which has been their principal demand, and discussions on Afghanistan’s future political make-up will include their input); and the US which under Donald Trump has pledged to move its military out of a futile engagement. Both are likely to realise their objectives. The net loser in this entire case is Ashraf Ghani whose position of political eminence in Kabul is courtesy US presence and when the US leaves, the props that hold Ghani in place will be no more. Even when the US is out and somehow the arrangement holds for at least 14-18 months (the period identified for full withdrawal) Ghani will fall to his lack of constituency and competing political dynamics within Afghanistan which will hold sway. Such interplay will then forge another iteration which may become the abiding political consensus in Afghanistan.
Then there are implicit beneficiaries, and losers too. The region in general and Pakistan in particular may implicitly benefit if peace indeed comes to Afghanistan. A war in Afghanistan extends its malfeasance to Pakistan’s border regions. Its absence will bring about relative calm and soothe “tribal” unease. This helps with improved cohesion and defies the opportunity to those who mean harm to Pakistan through exploiting its fissures. Pakistan also will hugely benefit by peace in Afghanistan by physically extending the spokes of the CPEC into east-west connections to realise the promise associated with the project. Then only CPEC will bring its immense benefits to the country from merely being a north-south connectivity corridor. So will the people of Afghanistan see better days when the immense geographical potential of that country is brought to play as the pivot of prosperity by connecting adjoining regions of Central, West and South Asia.
The implicit losers are mostly regional who thrived in strife and conflict — states such as India and perhaps Iran. Also those within the Afghan society who availed the war into a self-serving heist around rent from foreign presence. India and Iran had their little fingers in the game as long as the war persisted. This will cease when strife and the chance for malice closes. It may be hard for them to give up on their opportunity for the malicious geopolitical interests it served for them. They will thus expend all effort to somehow sustain war and conflict, sadly. The Afghan establishment steeped in similar ways might become a handy conduit for such a losing enterprise. Net and implicit gainers thus have a lot to mind as they move towards tenuous peace. Even more importantly they should avoid falling into the trap of contrived failure by net or implicit losers in their bid to extend their odious pursuits.
Hence, the initial hiccups in the process. It will take some time in settling down to something that all will agree and work on largely around what has been agreed to in the two instruments. The US has still enough skin in the game and will leverage it to effect. After all what will drive it is its own interest vital to a leadership seeking political return. She would additionally save wasteful loss of precious money. In an economy that may be on a slide because of global headwinds it shall be a timely respite. Nature too seems to be conspiring in the region’s and America’s favour.
What if things head really south? Sometime back Trump planned replacing regular forces in Afghanistan with contractors which would only cost one-third. The Pentagon desisted. Perhaps not now. If the need arises, some could be retained under diplomatic cover. That will still cost far less. The strife though will persist. Not good.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2020.