Pakistan’s political culture — genesis and prognosis
If there is one area that should be focused on it is a massive investment in quality education
The writer is a retired Major General interested in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com
Our beloved country lurches from man-made crises, one after the other. The presence of so much intelligence/IQ, dedication and patriotism often defies any logical explanation for the sorry state of affairs. Prescriptions often fall short. This article would endeavour to sociologically piece together our political culture with possible prognosis.
Barrington Moore Jr (1913-2005) in his classic work, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (1966), undertakes a comparative study of modernisation in different countries including India. His account of India under the Mughals is perhaps the first scientific account of the era from a political scientist. The Mughal System — contrary to common understanding — was based upon exploitation of the peasantry, who used to pay a “lagan” or rent to the landlord or Empire for tilling the land, since the land belonged to the Empire — as was the norm in those times. However, unlike the contemporary Meiji Japan, where the peasant was allowed to keep the surplus, the Indian peasantry would surrender surplus to the exploitative landlords and/or officials, after deducting a paltry per capita share. This left no incentive with the farmers to work harder and grow more; consequently the arable land under the Mughal Empire contracted.
The nexus of landlords, nobles and officials — both civil and military (landlords or “jagirdars” were also ranking officials and providers of soldiers and horses for the Emperor) — continued as the exploitative elite or “ashhrafiyya”. This elite to this day keeps its stranglehold on the state and society in Pakistan and India and manipulates power irrespective of the political system. The ashhrafiyya thrived under the British rule by being part of it and still takes great pride in the colonial titles of ‘”Khan Bahadur” and “Sir”, etc. Survival at any cost; politico-economic dominance; and putting personal interests before national interests have remained their core values, rather than patriotism, principles and morality.
The ashhrafiyya, our baggage from history is the biggest impediment in the development of the Pakistani state and society. Today, the ashhrafiyya monopolises political power through one-family political parties with non-existent or rigged inter-party elections. The Achakzais, Bhuttos, Chaudhrys, Pirs, Sardars, Sharifs, Walis, Zardaris, etc and the cabal of other religious leaders, are a sad continuation of this legacy. The religious right under the chosen few has bolstered its appeal by cleverly mixing religion with politics, menacingly banishing detractors as heretics. The clergy also stands as a bulwark against the forces of modernity; entrenched in its newfound power, privilege and insatiable ambition.
The Ashhrafiyya returns to political power — despite non-deliverance of public service, when in power — partly because of the feudalism at economic and “biradari” or clanship at sociological levels. Biradari is the smaller and narrower cohesive segment of the wider ethnicity. Society in the hinterland of Punjab — where political decisions are made — Sindh and Balochistan, largely remains hostage to the twin influences of feudalism and biradari. In Balochistan “sardars” or tribal chieftains retain the levers of power. Only the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) displays streaks of political egalitarianism and independence. Voting patterns are reflective of this sad reality. I remember a politician from Punjab — when quizzed about the likely voting choice of his electorate during the last elections — scornfully remarked, “who else would these [his voters]…expletive…vote for?” Consequent to the socio-religious cleavages, there are many Pakistans and Islams, living side by side in a time and space differential.
Elections are costly business and require robust financial means. When millions and at times billions are spent in getting elected or buying senate seats, the contender is not merely looking at a flag on his or her car, or a title. A handsome return on investment is sought in all possible ways, to ensure re-election next time around and remaining part of the patronage system. In this war of means, the fittest survive irrespective of talent, aptitude, education, intellect and/or strength of personality. And yes, the underlying desire in this entire enterprise remains the ascendance and dominance of the “khandaan” or family — the kith and kin — within the wider biradari. This proclivity for generational responsibility arises from the Hindu influences and insecurity, as if there is no God tomorrow. What is more disconcerting is the acceptance and continuation of such a political order, that bestows political legitimacy and privilege on the Bilawals, Maryams, Hamzas, Maulanas and many others for no apparent reason other than pedigree and lineage.
Biradari-based polarisation is reinforced by limited opportunities for, and access to quality education. This results in ignorance and seclusion of the miserable masses including womenfolk from the political order and developmental process, causing inequality and a widening urban-rural divide. In these vast seas of struggling humanity, very few are lucky to make a breakthrough. Those who do, bolster their own biradari in order to earn and retain their place in the ashhrafiyya.
Bureaucracy — civil and military — provides opportunity to the talented and lucky non-ashhrafiyya youth for upward mobility. However, this remains limited in scope and effect, as the civil and military cadre is limited in number, and here too a sizeable chunk goes to the wards of the ashhrafiyya. Later the military pursues its own interests in the wider political framework — as it perceives — and the civilian bureaucracy finds it expedient to use political crutches and enrichment through corruption. Thus the politicised backbone of the state machinery performs much below its true potential.
When this privileged elite comes to interact with other powerful players (foreign leaders and politicians), they feel handicapped for the lack of competence and ability, for which they make up through a vassal and subservience attitude. They bend to ridiculous lows to accommodate the “superior [read: white] foreigners” covering up their innate inferiority complex; compromising on vital issues of national interest. This complex is more pronounced when dealing with the West/US, where the Pakistani ashhrafiyya not only becomes “his master’s voice”, it also scares-off one odd leader of substance and courage to the consequences of not doing so.
So to untangle this Gordian knot; if there is one area that should be focused on, it is a massive investment in “quality education” with a performance-based remuneration for teachers and a liberal hire and fire policy. Land reforms are another gutsy step in the right direction that should be taken sooner. Speedy economic development, giving priority to the less developed areas, would ensure economic integration. Together these three measures have the potential to reform and/or eliminate the ashhrafiyya, biradari and the political ambition of the pulpit. The alternative is a demographic tsunami of swelling have-nots, which would rip the system apart, leaving no ashhrafiyya in its aftermath.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 5th, 2019.
Barrington Moore Jr (1913-2005) in his classic work, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (1966), undertakes a comparative study of modernisation in different countries including India. His account of India under the Mughals is perhaps the first scientific account of the era from a political scientist. The Mughal System — contrary to common understanding — was based upon exploitation of the peasantry, who used to pay a “lagan” or rent to the landlord or Empire for tilling the land, since the land belonged to the Empire — as was the norm in those times. However, unlike the contemporary Meiji Japan, where the peasant was allowed to keep the surplus, the Indian peasantry would surrender surplus to the exploitative landlords and/or officials, after deducting a paltry per capita share. This left no incentive with the farmers to work harder and grow more; consequently the arable land under the Mughal Empire contracted.
The nexus of landlords, nobles and officials — both civil and military (landlords or “jagirdars” were also ranking officials and providers of soldiers and horses for the Emperor) — continued as the exploitative elite or “ashhrafiyya”. This elite to this day keeps its stranglehold on the state and society in Pakistan and India and manipulates power irrespective of the political system. The ashhrafiyya thrived under the British rule by being part of it and still takes great pride in the colonial titles of ‘”Khan Bahadur” and “Sir”, etc. Survival at any cost; politico-economic dominance; and putting personal interests before national interests have remained their core values, rather than patriotism, principles and morality.
The ashhrafiyya, our baggage from history is the biggest impediment in the development of the Pakistani state and society. Today, the ashhrafiyya monopolises political power through one-family political parties with non-existent or rigged inter-party elections. The Achakzais, Bhuttos, Chaudhrys, Pirs, Sardars, Sharifs, Walis, Zardaris, etc and the cabal of other religious leaders, are a sad continuation of this legacy. The religious right under the chosen few has bolstered its appeal by cleverly mixing religion with politics, menacingly banishing detractors as heretics. The clergy also stands as a bulwark against the forces of modernity; entrenched in its newfound power, privilege and insatiable ambition.
The Ashhrafiyya returns to political power — despite non-deliverance of public service, when in power — partly because of the feudalism at economic and “biradari” or clanship at sociological levels. Biradari is the smaller and narrower cohesive segment of the wider ethnicity. Society in the hinterland of Punjab — where political decisions are made — Sindh and Balochistan, largely remains hostage to the twin influences of feudalism and biradari. In Balochistan “sardars” or tribal chieftains retain the levers of power. Only the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) displays streaks of political egalitarianism and independence. Voting patterns are reflective of this sad reality. I remember a politician from Punjab — when quizzed about the likely voting choice of his electorate during the last elections — scornfully remarked, “who else would these [his voters]…expletive…vote for?” Consequent to the socio-religious cleavages, there are many Pakistans and Islams, living side by side in a time and space differential.
Elections are costly business and require robust financial means. When millions and at times billions are spent in getting elected or buying senate seats, the contender is not merely looking at a flag on his or her car, or a title. A handsome return on investment is sought in all possible ways, to ensure re-election next time around and remaining part of the patronage system. In this war of means, the fittest survive irrespective of talent, aptitude, education, intellect and/or strength of personality. And yes, the underlying desire in this entire enterprise remains the ascendance and dominance of the “khandaan” or family — the kith and kin — within the wider biradari. This proclivity for generational responsibility arises from the Hindu influences and insecurity, as if there is no God tomorrow. What is more disconcerting is the acceptance and continuation of such a political order, that bestows political legitimacy and privilege on the Bilawals, Maryams, Hamzas, Maulanas and many others for no apparent reason other than pedigree and lineage.
Biradari-based polarisation is reinforced by limited opportunities for, and access to quality education. This results in ignorance and seclusion of the miserable masses including womenfolk from the political order and developmental process, causing inequality and a widening urban-rural divide. In these vast seas of struggling humanity, very few are lucky to make a breakthrough. Those who do, bolster their own biradari in order to earn and retain their place in the ashhrafiyya.
Bureaucracy — civil and military — provides opportunity to the talented and lucky non-ashhrafiyya youth for upward mobility. However, this remains limited in scope and effect, as the civil and military cadre is limited in number, and here too a sizeable chunk goes to the wards of the ashhrafiyya. Later the military pursues its own interests in the wider political framework — as it perceives — and the civilian bureaucracy finds it expedient to use political crutches and enrichment through corruption. Thus the politicised backbone of the state machinery performs much below its true potential.
When this privileged elite comes to interact with other powerful players (foreign leaders and politicians), they feel handicapped for the lack of competence and ability, for which they make up through a vassal and subservience attitude. They bend to ridiculous lows to accommodate the “superior [read: white] foreigners” covering up their innate inferiority complex; compromising on vital issues of national interest. This complex is more pronounced when dealing with the West/US, where the Pakistani ashhrafiyya not only becomes “his master’s voice”, it also scares-off one odd leader of substance and courage to the consequences of not doing so.
So to untangle this Gordian knot; if there is one area that should be focused on, it is a massive investment in “quality education” with a performance-based remuneration for teachers and a liberal hire and fire policy. Land reforms are another gutsy step in the right direction that should be taken sooner. Speedy economic development, giving priority to the less developed areas, would ensure economic integration. Together these three measures have the potential to reform and/or eliminate the ashhrafiyya, biradari and the political ambition of the pulpit. The alternative is a demographic tsunami of swelling have-nots, which would rip the system apart, leaving no ashhrafiyya in its aftermath.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 5th, 2019.