Contemplating peace
The challenge for both Pakistan and the US is the degree to which this relationship can sustain its newfound revival
The writer is a political commentator for the South Asia Centre at the London School of Economics
The ongoing peace talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban made some headway earlier this month. An eight-point joint resolution, named the roadmap to peace, confirmed both parties’ commitment towards institutionalising Afghanistan’s Islamic system, encouraging cohesive peace, and inviting zero-interference from regional powers.
But the absence of direct intergovernmental cooperation between Washington and Islamabad has complicated prospects of reaching a September “peace deal”, and evoked periodic skepticism from Kabul. In March, the Trump administration was accused of conspiring against the Ashraf Ghani leadership, and the Pakistani premier was blamed for willful interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. In order to limit future objection, and ensure that the intent of both powers is aligned with the expectations of Kabul, Imran Khan’s meeting with Donald Trump is of great strategic value. The encounter also reiterates the gravity of “respecting Afghan sovereignty” — a core value to which the Afghan government and the Taliban both agree. In fact, it offers a potential basis for future convergence.
Interestingly, agreement on a “political solution” to the Afghan crisis between Khan and Trump has paved the way for a crucial variable: Pakistan’s willingness to talk to the Taliban, and vice-versa. Islamabad’s intent comes in the wake of Washington’s desire to achieve trust surplus with the Taliban — a move construed warmly by Taliban officials this week. The group’s tendency to steer towards stakeholders other than the US — in a bid to welcome facilitation — gives Pakistan important space to exercise its diplomatic leverage over the Taliban, and underline the merits of a ceasefire.
Initial success of facilitation efforts became evident in Pakistan’s release of Mullah Baradar last year, to assist the Doha talks. Given Islamabad’s decade-long familiarity with Taliban’s modus operandi, Washington may find itself in a slightly better position to chalk out counterterrorism assurances, troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire.
However, the key challenge for both Pakistan and the US is the degree to which this relationship can sustain its newfound revival. Some key policy differences appear evident.
Firstly, the US wants to withdraw its troops and end possibilities of a full-scale civil war, primarily to deter Afghanistan from being used as a base for future militancy. Yet, a permanent ceasefire does not necessarily mean that the Taliban would limit their pursuit for greater political control. After all, Taliban’s coexistence with the Afghan government — a key prerequisite to post-withdrawal peace — has been a red line on their end, while its ambitions of consolidating power remain pronounced. This could directly compound Pakistan’s mirage of having a safe and secure neighbourhood, in the aftermath of US military withdrawal.
Similarly, Khan’s three-day visit was based on expectations of a long-term engagement with the US (from peace talks and regional security to trade, defence and energy), instead of the latter’s immediate security objectives. What Islamabad struggles to recognize is that any prospects of economic beneficence from the US would be contingent upon satisfactory progress on the Afghan front. Should Pakistan succeed in getting the Taliban to talk directly to the Afghan government, promising ties seem likely. But the moment a US military withdrawal begins to materialise, it may be difficult to determine what value Washington sees in bolstering cooperation with Pakistan.
In light of these dynamics, the establishment of “post-withdrawal peace” in Afghanistan is far from concrete. Integral to the effort, however, is the degree of strategic common ground achieved between Washington and Islamabad, while maintaining zero interference in Kabul’s national reconciliation process. Whether their proposals would be acceptable to the Afghan government and the Taliban is a crucial determiner, especially when both these parties appear on opposite ends of the diplomatic aisle.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 1st, 2019.
But the absence of direct intergovernmental cooperation between Washington and Islamabad has complicated prospects of reaching a September “peace deal”, and evoked periodic skepticism from Kabul. In March, the Trump administration was accused of conspiring against the Ashraf Ghani leadership, and the Pakistani premier was blamed for willful interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. In order to limit future objection, and ensure that the intent of both powers is aligned with the expectations of Kabul, Imran Khan’s meeting with Donald Trump is of great strategic value. The encounter also reiterates the gravity of “respecting Afghan sovereignty” — a core value to which the Afghan government and the Taliban both agree. In fact, it offers a potential basis for future convergence.
Interestingly, agreement on a “political solution” to the Afghan crisis between Khan and Trump has paved the way for a crucial variable: Pakistan’s willingness to talk to the Taliban, and vice-versa. Islamabad’s intent comes in the wake of Washington’s desire to achieve trust surplus with the Taliban — a move construed warmly by Taliban officials this week. The group’s tendency to steer towards stakeholders other than the US — in a bid to welcome facilitation — gives Pakistan important space to exercise its diplomatic leverage over the Taliban, and underline the merits of a ceasefire.
Initial success of facilitation efforts became evident in Pakistan’s release of Mullah Baradar last year, to assist the Doha talks. Given Islamabad’s decade-long familiarity with Taliban’s modus operandi, Washington may find itself in a slightly better position to chalk out counterterrorism assurances, troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire.
However, the key challenge for both Pakistan and the US is the degree to which this relationship can sustain its newfound revival. Some key policy differences appear evident.
Firstly, the US wants to withdraw its troops and end possibilities of a full-scale civil war, primarily to deter Afghanistan from being used as a base for future militancy. Yet, a permanent ceasefire does not necessarily mean that the Taliban would limit their pursuit for greater political control. After all, Taliban’s coexistence with the Afghan government — a key prerequisite to post-withdrawal peace — has been a red line on their end, while its ambitions of consolidating power remain pronounced. This could directly compound Pakistan’s mirage of having a safe and secure neighbourhood, in the aftermath of US military withdrawal.
Similarly, Khan’s three-day visit was based on expectations of a long-term engagement with the US (from peace talks and regional security to trade, defence and energy), instead of the latter’s immediate security objectives. What Islamabad struggles to recognize is that any prospects of economic beneficence from the US would be contingent upon satisfactory progress on the Afghan front. Should Pakistan succeed in getting the Taliban to talk directly to the Afghan government, promising ties seem likely. But the moment a US military withdrawal begins to materialise, it may be difficult to determine what value Washington sees in bolstering cooperation with Pakistan.
In light of these dynamics, the establishment of “post-withdrawal peace” in Afghanistan is far from concrete. Integral to the effort, however, is the degree of strategic common ground achieved between Washington and Islamabad, while maintaining zero interference in Kabul’s national reconciliation process. Whether their proposals would be acceptable to the Afghan government and the Taliban is a crucial determiner, especially when both these parties appear on opposite ends of the diplomatic aisle.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 1st, 2019.