Beginning the endgame

Ongoing crisis of confidence between Islamabad and Washington has developed while the mission is still in progress.

Hillary Clinton has been a prominent name in US politics for almost two decades. She could very well be the first woman president the US didn’t have. But the gutsy lawyer and former first lady has made her mark at home and abroad as the most important member of US President Obama’s administration, after Vice-President Joe Biden.

Hillary Clinton also enjoys the distinction of being well-versed in the subcontinent’s affairs. She has demonstrated her confidence in people from the subcontinent by keeping Huma Abedine the daughter of an Indo-Pakistani couple, as her close personal aide for years. So when someone like Clinton leaves our urbane foreign minister wounded in ‘friendly fire’ on account of Raymond Davis, warns that a terror attack against the US originating from Pakistan would lead to dire consequences, makes a dash to Islamabad to put out fires burning post-Osama and drops a big hint about Pakistan-US relations being at a turning point, no one should take her frustration lightly.


Clinton’s remonstrations tell us that though individual friendships can make the conduct of international relations more pleasant, they cannot stand in the way of higher state interests. The Bush-Mush bonhomie could not stand the pressure of the cold reality that the game was over for the general. But Musharraf was only the latest of our military rulers courted by the US. That was fine with Washington as long as we were allies against common threats. A downturn was quick to follow every time America’s mission at hand was accomplished. In a departure from that tradition, the ongoing crisis of confidence between Islamabad and Washington has developed while the mission is still in progress. America’s AfPak plans having failed to produce desired results, Washington is showing signs of exasperation with Musharraf’s successor in Rawalpindi. General Kayani and his fellow commanders may find it particularly hard to accept that while the US is talking about negotiations while fighting the Afghan Taliban, it wants the Pakistan Army to bludgeon those in North Waziristan. Washington’s renewed ‘do more’ calls to an army nonplussed by a unilateral US raid in Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden have complicated matters. It is rather strange that the Americans never talk about the death and destruction that would ensue if a full-fledged military offensive is launched in a highly restless area. Or it may be not so strange because we have not heard many apologies for killing civilians in drone raids either.

Clinton’s Pakistani interlocutors will appreciate it if she keeps in mind that the present AfPak mess is basically a result of America’s own assessments and actions. Of all their actions, the most fateful was the extension of operations by the US and allied forces to the south and east of Afghanistan from 2006, which caused an escalation of the war on terror into Pakistan. The US would do well to review its ‘forward’ policy reminiscent of colonial times. The US and Pakistan should now work together to devise a methodology to discourage the spread of militancy. Reducing the US footprint in the Afghan regions bordering Pakistan and minimising drone attacks in Waziristan could be important features of that approach. The endgame in Afghanistan should begin with a phased rollback of foreign forces from areas in Afghanistan close to Pakistan’s frontiers.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 23rd, 2011.
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