The legacy of United Pakistan
Still haunts the minds of those who had experienced the tragedy of their country’s dismemberment
The writer is a professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences at KU. He can be reached at amoonis@hotmail.com
East Pakistan became Bangladesh on December 16, 1971. Jinnah’s Pakistan disappeared from the map of the world with the break-up of the first post-colonial state. Yet, the legacy of united Pakistan still haunts the minds of those who had experienced the tragedy of their country’s dismemberment because of the mishandling of a crisis which emanated after the holding of Pakistan’s first general elections in December 1970.
GW Choudhry, who was a central minister in the cabinet of President General Yahya Khan from March 1969 to early 1971, explains in his book The Last Days of United Pakistan that “It is a tragic history. Of all the provinces which made up Pakistan, it was Bengal which gave the most solid support to Jinnah in his struggle for the establishment of a separate Muslim state in the subcontinent. Yet, within a very short period, the Bengalis found themselves in an unfortunate situation, which made them have second thoughts about the creation of a state in which they had joined the Muslims of other parts of the subcontinent in the north, separated by a thousand miles of foreign country.”
Never in modern history is there any example that the majority province of a country seceded. If there were lingual, cultural, geographical, political and economic causes along with external involvement which led to the disintegration of Jinnah’s Pakistan, lack of political will and the determination to keep the country together on the part of those who were at the helm of affairs also led to a great tragedy uprooting hundreds and thousands of people.
Forty-seven years have passed since Jinnah’s Pakistan ceased to exist and the majority province transformed as the state of Bangladesh but the legacy of 1971 still persists. More than Pakistan, it is in Bangladesh, even after half a century that strong feelings exist about how and why their country separated from Pakistan. Was the separation imposed on the Bengalis or was it by design planned by hardline Bengali nationalists of the then East Pakistan with support from India? Why in the present-day Pakistan, does the legacy of united Pakistan still haunt those who see ethnic and linguistic polarisation a continuation of failure of national integration?
The legacy of united Pakistan may be muted in the present-day Pakistan but it still shapes the discourse in Bangladesh because of two main reasons. First, the Awami League regime, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has shaped anti-Pakistan rhetoric particularly during her second term. Exploiting the events shaped by the military operation from March-December 1971 which led to the emergence of Bangladesh, the Awami League leaves no opportunity to malign Pakistan. All the three days like the language day of February 22, the Independence Day of March 25 and the victory day of December 16, which since the independence of Bangladesh are officially celebrated, are directed against Pakistan. Second, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by former prime minister Khaleda Zia, is not pro-Pakistan, but it is neither anti-Pakistan. Unlike the Awami League, which pursues a policy of Pakistan-bashing, the BNP has advocated a policy of reconciliation by not becoming hostage to the past and wishing better relations with Pakistan.
Unlike Pakistan where anti-Bangladesh feelings are muffled, it is in Bangladesh where strong anti-Pakistan emotions are deliberately promoted for political purposes particularly when the Awami League is in power. If the legacy of united Pakistan, particularly the events of 1971, still influences the minds of the people of Bangladesh, in Pakistan it is perceived by the majority of people as a failed experience of national integration.
Rounaq Jahan, an eminent Bangladeshi political scientist in her book Pakistan: Failure in national integration, argues, “The most formidable problem of nation-building in Pakistan after the state’s inception was the integration of the Bengali sub-nation. The urgency of this problem is underscored by the fact that the Bengalis were not merely the largest ethno-cultural subgroup of Pakistan but actually constituted a majority of the country’s total population. The Bengalese had little representation in the civil-military bureaucracy, the professions, or the entrepreneurial class.” The issue of national integration, which since the inception of Pakistan remained unresolved, deepened the feelings of Bengali nationalism ultimately leading to the breakup of the country.
Ironically, the legacy of united Pakistan has failed to shape a discourse focusing on nation building and human development instead of state building. In the post-1971 Pakistan, the issues which triggered the process of country’s disintegration are least resolved. Over-centralised state structures which were unacceptable to six points of the Awami League are still advocated to deal with centrifugal forces. If the loyalty of Bengalis was suspected in united Pakistan, one can observe more or less a similar approach pursued in the present-day Pakistan where the slogans of sub-nationalism are termed a threat to the integrity of the country.
Those who wield power in contemporary Pakistan are facing the daunting task of promoting Pakistani nationalism while at the same time tolerating and accepting ethnic and linguistic identities. In case of Bangladesh, a strange transformation took place in that country when a counter-narrative was presented to Bengali nationalism in the form of Bangladeshi nationalism. While Bengali nationalism advocated by the Awami League became the basis of its struggle against West Pakistan, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the founder of Bangladesh, in a military coup on August 15, 1975, the concept of Bangladeshi nationalism was promoted by then president of Bangladesh Ziaur Rehman and his BNP. The BNP argued for Bangladeshi nationalism representing the whole country instead of just the Bangla-speaking population. Furthermore, Bangladeshi nationalism also included Islamic characteristics so as to differentiate between Muslim and Hindu Bengalis. Had Bengali nationalism been the criterion of freedom movement in 1971, it would have led to the unification of Bengal, but Bangladesh maintained its separate identity on religious grounds. It means the legacy of united Pakistan in which Islam was a major component remains a major factor in Bangladeshi politics even after 1971. Anti-Indian feelings still shape the popular discourse in Bangladesh as the common people in that country strongly resent the deep-rooted Indian influence in shaping their country’s policies particularly during the reign of the Awami League.
The legacy of united Pakistan thus has its impact on Bangladesh and Pakistan but for different reasons. In case of Bangladesh, Bengalis saw its struggle for provincial autonomy being suppressed by the West Pakistan-dominated central government. The results of the 1970 general elections were not a referendum for Bangladesh but for provincial autonomy. It was only when the regime of Yahya Khan refused to accept election results and launched military operation, it culminated into the emergence of Bangladesh. Likewise, in the present-day Pakistan, the failure of state to deal with issues which cause sense of deprivation in smaller provinces is somehow related to the legacy of united Pakistan because during those days the failure of national integration and just distribution of resources augmented the influence of ultra-nationalist forces.
If Islamabad is mindful of ground realities which shape nationalistic feelings, particularly among smaller provinces, it is time for all stakeholders to come on board so that power is shared.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 21st, 2018.
GW Choudhry, who was a central minister in the cabinet of President General Yahya Khan from March 1969 to early 1971, explains in his book The Last Days of United Pakistan that “It is a tragic history. Of all the provinces which made up Pakistan, it was Bengal which gave the most solid support to Jinnah in his struggle for the establishment of a separate Muslim state in the subcontinent. Yet, within a very short period, the Bengalis found themselves in an unfortunate situation, which made them have second thoughts about the creation of a state in which they had joined the Muslims of other parts of the subcontinent in the north, separated by a thousand miles of foreign country.”
Never in modern history is there any example that the majority province of a country seceded. If there were lingual, cultural, geographical, political and economic causes along with external involvement which led to the disintegration of Jinnah’s Pakistan, lack of political will and the determination to keep the country together on the part of those who were at the helm of affairs also led to a great tragedy uprooting hundreds and thousands of people.
Forty-seven years have passed since Jinnah’s Pakistan ceased to exist and the majority province transformed as the state of Bangladesh but the legacy of 1971 still persists. More than Pakistan, it is in Bangladesh, even after half a century that strong feelings exist about how and why their country separated from Pakistan. Was the separation imposed on the Bengalis or was it by design planned by hardline Bengali nationalists of the then East Pakistan with support from India? Why in the present-day Pakistan, does the legacy of united Pakistan still haunt those who see ethnic and linguistic polarisation a continuation of failure of national integration?
The legacy of united Pakistan may be muted in the present-day Pakistan but it still shapes the discourse in Bangladesh because of two main reasons. First, the Awami League regime, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has shaped anti-Pakistan rhetoric particularly during her second term. Exploiting the events shaped by the military operation from March-December 1971 which led to the emergence of Bangladesh, the Awami League leaves no opportunity to malign Pakistan. All the three days like the language day of February 22, the Independence Day of March 25 and the victory day of December 16, which since the independence of Bangladesh are officially celebrated, are directed against Pakistan. Second, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by former prime minister Khaleda Zia, is not pro-Pakistan, but it is neither anti-Pakistan. Unlike the Awami League, which pursues a policy of Pakistan-bashing, the BNP has advocated a policy of reconciliation by not becoming hostage to the past and wishing better relations with Pakistan.
Unlike Pakistan where anti-Bangladesh feelings are muffled, it is in Bangladesh where strong anti-Pakistan emotions are deliberately promoted for political purposes particularly when the Awami League is in power. If the legacy of united Pakistan, particularly the events of 1971, still influences the minds of the people of Bangladesh, in Pakistan it is perceived by the majority of people as a failed experience of national integration.
Rounaq Jahan, an eminent Bangladeshi political scientist in her book Pakistan: Failure in national integration, argues, “The most formidable problem of nation-building in Pakistan after the state’s inception was the integration of the Bengali sub-nation. The urgency of this problem is underscored by the fact that the Bengalis were not merely the largest ethno-cultural subgroup of Pakistan but actually constituted a majority of the country’s total population. The Bengalese had little representation in the civil-military bureaucracy, the professions, or the entrepreneurial class.” The issue of national integration, which since the inception of Pakistan remained unresolved, deepened the feelings of Bengali nationalism ultimately leading to the breakup of the country.
Ironically, the legacy of united Pakistan has failed to shape a discourse focusing on nation building and human development instead of state building. In the post-1971 Pakistan, the issues which triggered the process of country’s disintegration are least resolved. Over-centralised state structures which were unacceptable to six points of the Awami League are still advocated to deal with centrifugal forces. If the loyalty of Bengalis was suspected in united Pakistan, one can observe more or less a similar approach pursued in the present-day Pakistan where the slogans of sub-nationalism are termed a threat to the integrity of the country.
Those who wield power in contemporary Pakistan are facing the daunting task of promoting Pakistani nationalism while at the same time tolerating and accepting ethnic and linguistic identities. In case of Bangladesh, a strange transformation took place in that country when a counter-narrative was presented to Bengali nationalism in the form of Bangladeshi nationalism. While Bengali nationalism advocated by the Awami League became the basis of its struggle against West Pakistan, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the founder of Bangladesh, in a military coup on August 15, 1975, the concept of Bangladeshi nationalism was promoted by then president of Bangladesh Ziaur Rehman and his BNP. The BNP argued for Bangladeshi nationalism representing the whole country instead of just the Bangla-speaking population. Furthermore, Bangladeshi nationalism also included Islamic characteristics so as to differentiate between Muslim and Hindu Bengalis. Had Bengali nationalism been the criterion of freedom movement in 1971, it would have led to the unification of Bengal, but Bangladesh maintained its separate identity on religious grounds. It means the legacy of united Pakistan in which Islam was a major component remains a major factor in Bangladeshi politics even after 1971. Anti-Indian feelings still shape the popular discourse in Bangladesh as the common people in that country strongly resent the deep-rooted Indian influence in shaping their country’s policies particularly during the reign of the Awami League.
The legacy of united Pakistan thus has its impact on Bangladesh and Pakistan but for different reasons. In case of Bangladesh, Bengalis saw its struggle for provincial autonomy being suppressed by the West Pakistan-dominated central government. The results of the 1970 general elections were not a referendum for Bangladesh but for provincial autonomy. It was only when the regime of Yahya Khan refused to accept election results and launched military operation, it culminated into the emergence of Bangladesh. Likewise, in the present-day Pakistan, the failure of state to deal with issues which cause sense of deprivation in smaller provinces is somehow related to the legacy of united Pakistan because during those days the failure of national integration and just distribution of resources augmented the influence of ultra-nationalist forces.
If Islamabad is mindful of ground realities which shape nationalistic feelings, particularly among smaller provinces, it is time for all stakeholders to come on board so that power is shared.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 21st, 2018.