Pakistan’s nuclear security
We need to deny adversaries diplomatic leverage against our nuclear capability and rebuild the military's credibility.
The issue of Pakistan’s nuclear security is once again generating headlines. Our public reiterations that our military facilities cannot be attacked may not be able to provide desired assurances to the public after the PNS Mehran attack.
The majority of Pakistan’s analysts are of the opinion that recent incidents of terrorism are part of a well thought out strategy to discredit the military and build a case for the international custody of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The evolving situation therefore merits serious review with an objective to restore confidence in Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and in the military.
The important question is — can the US really take over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? While US military capability may not be in doubt, their knowledge of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their locations is.
With reportedly wide dispersal, terrain strength and strong terminal defences, the US would indeed be on a suicidal mission, which would most likely evolve into a truly ‘MAD’ (mutually assured destruction) scenario.
What is more likely is that a terrorist attack on any nuclear installation could provide an opportunity for the US and its allies to build a case for international oversight or the custody of Pakistan’s nuclear assets through a UNSC forum.
There is, therefore, a need to deny adversaries the diplomatic leverage against our nuclear capability; and to rebuild the credibility of our military by recapturing space for national sovereignty that is shrinking due to an increasing number of terrorist attacks and due to coercive diplomacy by our ‘allies’.
It is imperative that we review our overall strategy and reset engagement parameters with both ‘allies’ and adversaries. Some of the possible measures that we could contemplate under the current environment are: (1) Bring out evidence of foreign involvement, especially India, in sponsoring terrorist attacks in Pakistan. (2) Launch a diplomatic offensive to expose external elements involved in domestic destabilisation. (3) If India could threaten Pakistan with surgical strikes after the Mumbai incident, Pakistan can do the same in Afghanistan — provided we are able to build an effective case. (4) Resort to controlled escalation of our troops to demonstrate the seriousness of our intent. (5) Similarly, a blockade of Nato logistics in Pakistan, the slowing down of intelligence cooperation, expulsion of CIA agents, etc provides plenty of leverage to Pakistan. (6) Supplement military potential through nuclear deterrents. Earlier statements by senior decision-makers provide for such a caveat; Pakistan could contemplate the use of nuclear weapons ‘if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake’. (7) Build public opinion and confidence through the media.
The proposed course of action that may entail controlled escalation could help regain national pride, bring back credibility to the armed forces and restore confidence in the nation’s nuclear deterrent. It may generate international criticism, but maintaining the status quo is not an option any more.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 10th, 2011.
The majority of Pakistan’s analysts are of the opinion that recent incidents of terrorism are part of a well thought out strategy to discredit the military and build a case for the international custody of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The evolving situation therefore merits serious review with an objective to restore confidence in Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and in the military.
The important question is — can the US really take over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? While US military capability may not be in doubt, their knowledge of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their locations is.
With reportedly wide dispersal, terrain strength and strong terminal defences, the US would indeed be on a suicidal mission, which would most likely evolve into a truly ‘MAD’ (mutually assured destruction) scenario.
What is more likely is that a terrorist attack on any nuclear installation could provide an opportunity for the US and its allies to build a case for international oversight or the custody of Pakistan’s nuclear assets through a UNSC forum.
There is, therefore, a need to deny adversaries the diplomatic leverage against our nuclear capability; and to rebuild the credibility of our military by recapturing space for national sovereignty that is shrinking due to an increasing number of terrorist attacks and due to coercive diplomacy by our ‘allies’.
It is imperative that we review our overall strategy and reset engagement parameters with both ‘allies’ and adversaries. Some of the possible measures that we could contemplate under the current environment are: (1) Bring out evidence of foreign involvement, especially India, in sponsoring terrorist attacks in Pakistan. (2) Launch a diplomatic offensive to expose external elements involved in domestic destabilisation. (3) If India could threaten Pakistan with surgical strikes after the Mumbai incident, Pakistan can do the same in Afghanistan — provided we are able to build an effective case. (4) Resort to controlled escalation of our troops to demonstrate the seriousness of our intent. (5) Similarly, a blockade of Nato logistics in Pakistan, the slowing down of intelligence cooperation, expulsion of CIA agents, etc provides plenty of leverage to Pakistan. (6) Supplement military potential through nuclear deterrents. Earlier statements by senior decision-makers provide for such a caveat; Pakistan could contemplate the use of nuclear weapons ‘if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake’. (7) Build public opinion and confidence through the media.
The proposed course of action that may entail controlled escalation could help regain national pride, bring back credibility to the armed forces and restore confidence in the nation’s nuclear deterrent. It may generate international criticism, but maintaining the status quo is not an option any more.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 10th, 2011.