Navigating Imran’s hung revolution
Balochistan Awami Party, a part of the PTI-led coalition, threatened to withdraw support for the PTI’s speaker nominee
The writer is a lawyer and can be reached on Twitter @shahzaibkhan901
Hours before the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly, in what was arguably the most significant election for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, the Balochistan Awami Party, a partner in the brittle PTI-led coalition, threatened to withdraw its support for the PTI’s speaker nominee.
Suddenly Khurshid Shah’s shadow loomed large over on what was supposed to be a certain speakership for Asad Qaiser. As midnight approached, news channels turned excessively, characteristically went berserk as they broke news of BAP’s literal eleventh hour treachery. The BAP had timed it perfectly. Negotiating with the PTI for cabinet positions at the centre and in Balochistan, the BAP had struck to raise the prospect of a damning embarrassment for the PTI at the very beginning of its tenure. Soon however, PTI’s fortunes were in the hand of their golden man. Suddenly, news channels were broadcasting pictures of a late-night visit from a disqualified legislator, coalition builder extraordinaire and the PTI’s unassuming saviour, Jahangir Khan Tareen, to Balochistan House. As Bani Gala held its breath, there was no statement of solidarity from the BAP, which was enough because there wasn’t a contrary statement either. Just a few hours before the election of the Speaker was due, Mr Tareen had selflessly, once again, fastened the fragile coalition he had painstakingly strung together.
In Karachi, right before the elections, the unmatched political machine that was the MQM had splintered, perhaps fatally. The PTI, with the elections on the horizon, looked to take advantage. For the most part, a few weeks ago, the PTI did that. It won parliamentary elections in areas where it would’ve been impossible to entertain the idea of a party other than the MQM winning, only a few years ago. In this, Khan had his victory. He showed that the MQM’s unchallenged reign over the city was no more. It was part of a bigger electoral movement which led the PTI to unearth similarly entrenched players across the country. The PTI’s revolution was here, almost.
In the days following the election, as a euphoric PTI settled down, it found itself facing the prospect of being outmanoeuvered by an unprecedentedly desperate opposition in spite of its rout of the opposition parties. The PTI’s electoral revolution was incomplete, and to salvage this very incomplete, yet invaluable revolution, it knew it had to resort to the anti-revolutionaries, the status quo. Nowhere is this situation more manifest than in the PTI’s unnatural alliance with the MQM-P. The PTI’s mandate in Karachi was a negative one, that is to say, it was anti-MQM. By receiving that mandate from the people of Karachi, the PTI stood validated. It’s hard to imagine how inconvenient it would have been for someone as staunchly opposed to the former MQM as Imran Khan to jet out his team to court the very same party. It’s not just the awkward enmity between the two that will surely lead to unmanageable levels of mistrust, it is also hard to understate the MQM’s commitment issues. Perhaps, finding a peer only in the prolific head of the JUI-F, the MQM-P’s role as the parliament’s yes man is unrivalled. It’s difficult to find a government the MQM-P or otherwise, refuses to be a part of. However, parliament’s go-to coalition buddy is not the most likely to be voted coalition-party-of-the-year, considering the MQM’s history and its numbers in the assembly to force the hand of federal governments favourably. Hence, the unnatural and dangerously-fragile alliance with the MQM-P that Imran Khan has to rely on to ensure he remains the Prime Minister. Hence, the “almost” nature of the revolution.
These fleeting glimpses of the coalition before it formally assumes charge are meaningful enough to discern its general trend, going forward. To his credit, Imran Khan in his speeches leading up to the elections had made clear his distaste for a potentially-hung parliament. He quite accurately voiced the limitations of his proposed revolution in a potentially-hung parliament. So, what will these limitations look like?
For starters, the PTI is finding it hard to come up with a cabinet and parliamentary set-up that complement, in its entirety, its revolution as the party is forced to concede ever increasingly to its coalition partners. The PTI will face similar hurdles as it tries to enact legislations that Khan deems necessary to overhaul Pakistan, considering that a number of these legislations will need parliamentary approval. With a seethingly hostile Senate, even the lower house will be an uphill battle for the PTI as it tries to push important money bills and reforms, including any federal package for Karachi, that threatens to dislodge the vested interests of any of its coalition members. Given that reforms by their very nature are meant to dislodge often vested interests, the paradoxical nature of the coalition in the lower house will become glaring as the bills come to a vote. The Presidential election also promises to be a most critical flashpoint for Imran Khan’s “Naya Pakistan” as an opposition united in its disapproval of the soon-to-be Prime Minister threatens to conjure enough numbers in the Senate and all other assemblies to allow for the possibility of an opposition- nominated President. Often mistaken for a limited “ceremonial” nature, the Presidency, and its handy ordinance making power, is likely to prove crucial as Khan faces mistrust in the lower house, and outright opposition in the Senate.
Speaking of the opposition, it too is, of course, fractured almost to the extent of non-existence. However, opposition often proves to be a significantly more meaningful uniting factor, especially when it means opposing threats to the very existence of a uniquely similar political class that forms the opposition, the same is expected to fight tooth and nail, hand in hand to ensure their own survival. Khan will have to move quickly and decisively then, to ensure that no mistakes are made and that the presidency is comprehensively secured. It will also be useful to make another Tareen-led dash for dissenters from other parties, perhaps help carve out a forward bloc or two, anything to dilute the opposition’s numbers. It will be worthwhile to do the same proactively rather than as a reactionary measure when it becomes dangerously necessary to limit Khan’s exposure to the rinky-dink coalition starring the trusty BAP and MQM-P. The first thing Khan’s revolution needs then is a parliament ready for a revolution.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 17th, 2018.
Suddenly Khurshid Shah’s shadow loomed large over on what was supposed to be a certain speakership for Asad Qaiser. As midnight approached, news channels turned excessively, characteristically went berserk as they broke news of BAP’s literal eleventh hour treachery. The BAP had timed it perfectly. Negotiating with the PTI for cabinet positions at the centre and in Balochistan, the BAP had struck to raise the prospect of a damning embarrassment for the PTI at the very beginning of its tenure. Soon however, PTI’s fortunes were in the hand of their golden man. Suddenly, news channels were broadcasting pictures of a late-night visit from a disqualified legislator, coalition builder extraordinaire and the PTI’s unassuming saviour, Jahangir Khan Tareen, to Balochistan House. As Bani Gala held its breath, there was no statement of solidarity from the BAP, which was enough because there wasn’t a contrary statement either. Just a few hours before the election of the Speaker was due, Mr Tareen had selflessly, once again, fastened the fragile coalition he had painstakingly strung together.
In Karachi, right before the elections, the unmatched political machine that was the MQM had splintered, perhaps fatally. The PTI, with the elections on the horizon, looked to take advantage. For the most part, a few weeks ago, the PTI did that. It won parliamentary elections in areas where it would’ve been impossible to entertain the idea of a party other than the MQM winning, only a few years ago. In this, Khan had his victory. He showed that the MQM’s unchallenged reign over the city was no more. It was part of a bigger electoral movement which led the PTI to unearth similarly entrenched players across the country. The PTI’s revolution was here, almost.
In the days following the election, as a euphoric PTI settled down, it found itself facing the prospect of being outmanoeuvered by an unprecedentedly desperate opposition in spite of its rout of the opposition parties. The PTI’s electoral revolution was incomplete, and to salvage this very incomplete, yet invaluable revolution, it knew it had to resort to the anti-revolutionaries, the status quo. Nowhere is this situation more manifest than in the PTI’s unnatural alliance with the MQM-P. The PTI’s mandate in Karachi was a negative one, that is to say, it was anti-MQM. By receiving that mandate from the people of Karachi, the PTI stood validated. It’s hard to imagine how inconvenient it would have been for someone as staunchly opposed to the former MQM as Imran Khan to jet out his team to court the very same party. It’s not just the awkward enmity between the two that will surely lead to unmanageable levels of mistrust, it is also hard to understate the MQM’s commitment issues. Perhaps, finding a peer only in the prolific head of the JUI-F, the MQM-P’s role as the parliament’s yes man is unrivalled. It’s difficult to find a government the MQM-P or otherwise, refuses to be a part of. However, parliament’s go-to coalition buddy is not the most likely to be voted coalition-party-of-the-year, considering the MQM’s history and its numbers in the assembly to force the hand of federal governments favourably. Hence, the unnatural and dangerously-fragile alliance with the MQM-P that Imran Khan has to rely on to ensure he remains the Prime Minister. Hence, the “almost” nature of the revolution.
These fleeting glimpses of the coalition before it formally assumes charge are meaningful enough to discern its general trend, going forward. To his credit, Imran Khan in his speeches leading up to the elections had made clear his distaste for a potentially-hung parliament. He quite accurately voiced the limitations of his proposed revolution in a potentially-hung parliament. So, what will these limitations look like?
For starters, the PTI is finding it hard to come up with a cabinet and parliamentary set-up that complement, in its entirety, its revolution as the party is forced to concede ever increasingly to its coalition partners. The PTI will face similar hurdles as it tries to enact legislations that Khan deems necessary to overhaul Pakistan, considering that a number of these legislations will need parliamentary approval. With a seethingly hostile Senate, even the lower house will be an uphill battle for the PTI as it tries to push important money bills and reforms, including any federal package for Karachi, that threatens to dislodge the vested interests of any of its coalition members. Given that reforms by their very nature are meant to dislodge often vested interests, the paradoxical nature of the coalition in the lower house will become glaring as the bills come to a vote. The Presidential election also promises to be a most critical flashpoint for Imran Khan’s “Naya Pakistan” as an opposition united in its disapproval of the soon-to-be Prime Minister threatens to conjure enough numbers in the Senate and all other assemblies to allow for the possibility of an opposition- nominated President. Often mistaken for a limited “ceremonial” nature, the Presidency, and its handy ordinance making power, is likely to prove crucial as Khan faces mistrust in the lower house, and outright opposition in the Senate.
Speaking of the opposition, it too is, of course, fractured almost to the extent of non-existence. However, opposition often proves to be a significantly more meaningful uniting factor, especially when it means opposing threats to the very existence of a uniquely similar political class that forms the opposition, the same is expected to fight tooth and nail, hand in hand to ensure their own survival. Khan will have to move quickly and decisively then, to ensure that no mistakes are made and that the presidency is comprehensively secured. It will also be useful to make another Tareen-led dash for dissenters from other parties, perhaps help carve out a forward bloc or two, anything to dilute the opposition’s numbers. It will be worthwhile to do the same proactively rather than as a reactionary measure when it becomes dangerously necessary to limit Khan’s exposure to the rinky-dink coalition starring the trusty BAP and MQM-P. The first thing Khan’s revolution needs then is a parliament ready for a revolution.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 17th, 2018.