Three myths of Pakistani politics
‘Imminent’ rise of the religious political parties that would capture popular spaces through electoral politics a myth
The writer is a professor of political science at LUMS, Lahore. His recent book is Imagining Pakistan: Modernism, State and the Politics of Islamic Revival (Lexington Books, 2017)
Myths are just myths, a mixture of stories, falsehood and popular beliefs that dominate the perceptions about politics. Myths matter because they serve as a substitute for empirical evidence in societies where search for truth is often shunned for beliefs. Sometimes, when it is done and counter-evidence is offered, the believers in conventional political ‘wisdom’ find it inconvenient and summarily reject it. There are many such myths about Pakistani politics, but I would like to focus on three important ones.
The first is about the ‘imminent’ rise of the religious political parties that would capture the popular spaces through electoral politics. It would be their one-way ticket to democracy; thereafter, they impose Islamic law and rule forever. On that account, there are some concerns in the Western policy and academic circles and within Pakistan as well about the ‘mainstreaming’ of some religious groups that have been apparently involved in Jihadi endeavours in Afghanistan and the India-occupied Kashmir. Disregard for this controversy, which raises moral and difficult political questions about their involvement with violence, all shades of the religious have a constitutional right to participate in popular politics.
The myth is about their growing political constituency and social capacity to win mass support. Looking backwards into the electoral outcomes of ten general elections from 1970 to 2013, evidence suggests, the popular support measured in terms of popular vote percentage has been on the decline, with the exception or regional surge confined to the Pashtun-dominated areas in the 2002 elections. Some groups and parties, like the Jamaat-e-Islami, are more organised cadre parties with strong ideological moorings, but have shown diminishing public support at the polls. There are reasons of class, abstract ideology, proclivity to violence and the not so shining characters doing politics in the name of Islam. Each successive election consolidating democracy is likely to see more critical questioning use of Islam as a vehicle of power by the religious parties. However they would remain a powerful conservative influence on laws, policies and social institutions.
The second myth is dynastic politics — the game of electables — is a static, never changing political character of Pakistani politics. It is true; the dynastic political families in rural constituencies of the country have a dominant influence over who wins, and their switching of sides has also determined the fortunes of political parties. But this common understanding or proposition need to be subjected to some close scrutiny. First, look at the number of political aspirants in each constituency in the 2018 elections, both having been awarded tickets and denied. It is manifold greater than the political families that dominated electoral politics in the first four decades of independence. There have emerged new challengers that are often labelled as feudal, but they are just prosperous landowners or drawn from the middle class. While the numbers of old class of feudal politicians has declined, that of middle-class professionals, and middle-sized landowners has increased. Second, with the expansion of urban constituencies, landownership doesn’t play any role; it is the party label that matters. This group of parliamentarians is likely to increase with the assertion of power by the middle class, urbanisation and role of media.
The third myth is that the dynastic political parties cannot be challenged. There are laws of social dynamics, not precise like science. The essence of democracy — and one of the true measures — is resistance to the dominance of old parties. This comes in the form of new social forces, the Arab spring and new leadership and parties. It is a long process of dying and rebirth of new politics. We see the dominant major parties on decline and new ones emerging. The laws of political change have a universal application; Pakistan cannot be an exception.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 27th, 2018.
The first is about the ‘imminent’ rise of the religious political parties that would capture the popular spaces through electoral politics. It would be their one-way ticket to democracy; thereafter, they impose Islamic law and rule forever. On that account, there are some concerns in the Western policy and academic circles and within Pakistan as well about the ‘mainstreaming’ of some religious groups that have been apparently involved in Jihadi endeavours in Afghanistan and the India-occupied Kashmir. Disregard for this controversy, which raises moral and difficult political questions about their involvement with violence, all shades of the religious have a constitutional right to participate in popular politics.
The myth is about their growing political constituency and social capacity to win mass support. Looking backwards into the electoral outcomes of ten general elections from 1970 to 2013, evidence suggests, the popular support measured in terms of popular vote percentage has been on the decline, with the exception or regional surge confined to the Pashtun-dominated areas in the 2002 elections. Some groups and parties, like the Jamaat-e-Islami, are more organised cadre parties with strong ideological moorings, but have shown diminishing public support at the polls. There are reasons of class, abstract ideology, proclivity to violence and the not so shining characters doing politics in the name of Islam. Each successive election consolidating democracy is likely to see more critical questioning use of Islam as a vehicle of power by the religious parties. However they would remain a powerful conservative influence on laws, policies and social institutions.
The second myth is dynastic politics — the game of electables — is a static, never changing political character of Pakistani politics. It is true; the dynastic political families in rural constituencies of the country have a dominant influence over who wins, and their switching of sides has also determined the fortunes of political parties. But this common understanding or proposition need to be subjected to some close scrutiny. First, look at the number of political aspirants in each constituency in the 2018 elections, both having been awarded tickets and denied. It is manifold greater than the political families that dominated electoral politics in the first four decades of independence. There have emerged new challengers that are often labelled as feudal, but they are just prosperous landowners or drawn from the middle class. While the numbers of old class of feudal politicians has declined, that of middle-class professionals, and middle-sized landowners has increased. Second, with the expansion of urban constituencies, landownership doesn’t play any role; it is the party label that matters. This group of parliamentarians is likely to increase with the assertion of power by the middle class, urbanisation and role of media.
The third myth is that the dynastic political parties cannot be challenged. There are laws of social dynamics, not precise like science. The essence of democracy — and one of the true measures — is resistance to the dominance of old parties. This comes in the form of new social forces, the Arab spring and new leadership and parties. It is a long process of dying and rebirth of new politics. We see the dominant major parties on decline and new ones emerging. The laws of political change have a universal application; Pakistan cannot be an exception.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 27th, 2018.