A non-discriminatory approach
In 2013, Indian companies’ footprints were found in illicit nuclear trade for Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor
The writer is an MPhil scholar at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad
Amid mounting frustration on mutual relations, the US has slammed Pakistani companies with sanctions over alleged nuclear trade. The move is initiated when IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano recently concluded his visit to Pakistan. During his visit, Amano not only praised Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security measures but also commended its peaceful usage of nuclear energy in medicine and agriculture. Whereas, the Indian media is using this US move to show Pakistan’s nuclear programme in dim light.
The foreign ministry has responded to the story saying that Islamabad’s efforts in the area of export controls and non-proliferation, as well as nuclear safety and security, are in line with internationally established norms. The ministry also urged that there should be no undue restrictions on the access to dual-use items and technologies for peaceful and legitimate purposes.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for identifying seven companies of Pakistan over suspicions that they might engage in nuclear trade. Ironically, the same BIS had established favourable export control policies for India in 2017 and made two significant changes in the US export control policy. First, the bureau proposed a relaxed licensing policy for export of most controlled items to India and second, it introduced an exemption programme for Indian entities with respect to an export licence.
This is utter discrimination, hitting sanctions on half a century old partner and relaxing the export controls for its rival. It is not only unjustifiable but also marks a stark deviation from the US stance on nuclear security measures. The US is losing its control in ensuring global nuclear non-proliferation efforts by lending discriminatory favours to India. It is all happening when Indian companies on many occasions have been sanctioned by the US government, which depicts potential weaknesses in Indian export control measures. In 2010, the BIS itself indicted the US-based Telogy LLC and its Belgian affiliate for attempting to export controlled goods to India.
In 2013, Indian companies’ footprints were found in illicit nuclear trade for Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor. India, on the one hand, pursues mainstreaming in nuclear export control regimes, while at the same time it is involved in an illicit nuclear trade to obtain dual-use items for its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The pitiable execution of national export controls coupled with inexperienced officials, India is far away to prevent illicit exports from domestic companies. Indian companies are not trained to comply with national export laws and government outreach programmes are inadequate.
The US policymakers have turned a blind eye to international reports, which suggest that India has the fastest expanding nuclear programme outside safeguards among any other non-NPT nuclear states.
The US has failed to understand Pakistan’s security compulsions and the critical role of the latter’s nuclear weapons to deal with security risks. The US should adopt a method of simultaneous entry and criteria-based approach for mainstreaming nuclear weapon states outside the NPT. The US has been vocal about India’s nuclear mainstreaming. However, Pakistan’s case for peaceful nuclear technology has not been seen on a par with India’s.
Pakistan has maintained control lists consistent with the guidelines of all regimes but the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is also actively involved in implementing international standards such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, etc.
The US should continue to support efforts for non-discriminatory approach rather than creating a scuffle between India and Pakistan on membership for non-proliferation regimes. Pakistan’s recent adoption of the latest IAEA’s protocols on nuclear trade is an indication that it attaches the highest priority to nuclear safety and security.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 7th, 2018.
The foreign ministry has responded to the story saying that Islamabad’s efforts in the area of export controls and non-proliferation, as well as nuclear safety and security, are in line with internationally established norms. The ministry also urged that there should be no undue restrictions on the access to dual-use items and technologies for peaceful and legitimate purposes.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for identifying seven companies of Pakistan over suspicions that they might engage in nuclear trade. Ironically, the same BIS had established favourable export control policies for India in 2017 and made two significant changes in the US export control policy. First, the bureau proposed a relaxed licensing policy for export of most controlled items to India and second, it introduced an exemption programme for Indian entities with respect to an export licence.
This is utter discrimination, hitting sanctions on half a century old partner and relaxing the export controls for its rival. It is not only unjustifiable but also marks a stark deviation from the US stance on nuclear security measures. The US is losing its control in ensuring global nuclear non-proliferation efforts by lending discriminatory favours to India. It is all happening when Indian companies on many occasions have been sanctioned by the US government, which depicts potential weaknesses in Indian export control measures. In 2010, the BIS itself indicted the US-based Telogy LLC and its Belgian affiliate for attempting to export controlled goods to India.
In 2013, Indian companies’ footprints were found in illicit nuclear trade for Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor. India, on the one hand, pursues mainstreaming in nuclear export control regimes, while at the same time it is involved in an illicit nuclear trade to obtain dual-use items for its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The pitiable execution of national export controls coupled with inexperienced officials, India is far away to prevent illicit exports from domestic companies. Indian companies are not trained to comply with national export laws and government outreach programmes are inadequate.
The US policymakers have turned a blind eye to international reports, which suggest that India has the fastest expanding nuclear programme outside safeguards among any other non-NPT nuclear states.
The US has failed to understand Pakistan’s security compulsions and the critical role of the latter’s nuclear weapons to deal with security risks. The US should adopt a method of simultaneous entry and criteria-based approach for mainstreaming nuclear weapon states outside the NPT. The US has been vocal about India’s nuclear mainstreaming. However, Pakistan’s case for peaceful nuclear technology has not been seen on a par with India’s.
Pakistan has maintained control lists consistent with the guidelines of all regimes but the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is also actively involved in implementing international standards such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, etc.
The US should continue to support efforts for non-discriminatory approach rather than creating a scuffle between India and Pakistan on membership for non-proliferation regimes. Pakistan’s recent adoption of the latest IAEA’s protocols on nuclear trade is an indication that it attaches the highest priority to nuclear safety and security.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 7th, 2018.