An interdependent relationship
There are obvious signs of failure of American policy in the region
The writer is a professor of political science at LUMS, Lahore. His recent book is Imagining Pakistan: Modernism, State and the Politics of Islamic Revival (Lexington Books, 2017)
The narrative of our relations with the United States, official or unofficial, takes an excessively self-righteous line: Pakistan has done virtually everything for the US, and the latter has always betrayed, ditched and dumped us when it achieved major goals of its policy towards Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union. This position is also self-degrading for most of the analysts and former policymakers in the military and Foreign Office generally argue that Pakistan has been used. In other words, our rulers, past and present in the civilian or security establishment, knowingly compromised Pakistan’s interests in aligning not once but three times during the past 70 years. This self-indictment is neither factual nor historically correct.
Never were our relationships with the United States or China, the two countries that are ideologically worlds apart, and with whom we had have the best of relationships, driven by any emotion or ideology. Whatever the language and idiom of selling a foreign policy, it is always formulated in the interests of a country, in the given objective conditions of the real world. These are also the interests, perceptions and rankings of foreign policy objectives of the rulers in these conditions that determine the foreign policy choices.
In this respect, many things may go wrong in the choice of a particular foreign policy, setting of objectives or opting for ‘strategic’ partnerships. While no country, big or small can say its history of foreign policy is without big mistakes, Pakistan has perhaps accumulated too many of them, mainly because of the regional imperatives of national security. There are always unintended consequences of foreign policy, as most of the countries, even the great powers fail to achieve what they set as their primary goals. The case in point is Soviet and American policies towards Afghanistan, or for that matter anywhere in the world.
The reason for writing this preface is to contest enduring fallacies in conversation about Pakistan’s relations with the US. All three strategic partnerships with the US have rested on pragmatic calculations of self-interest by both the sides. Their interests converged on working together to achieve stability, security and development during the Cold War, defeating the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, and removing the Taliban regime and defeating the terrorist groups. The first two partnerships ran a natural course of initial understanding, mutual cooperation, maturing and withering off with changes in the world system. The last one has proved to be a quagmire for the US, leaving it wounded, frustrated and even confused about appropriate security framework in the battlefield, political reconstruction of Afghanistan and choices about right mix of power and development.
There are obvious signs of failure of American policy in the region. Having invested so heavily in blood and treasure, Washington is politically unprepared to accept an endgame in Afghanistan which might land the Afghan Taliban back in power. The question is, will such an outcome be in the interest of Pakistan or the region? Not at all. So there is a wide space available to renegotiate roles, redefine interests and bring policies closer to the original common objectives — stability, integrity and peace of Afghanistan.
Obviously, there has been a trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States, and real challenges of harmonising conflicting interests. Fresh efforts are about seeking better understanding of respective positions and getting clarity about what each side can do and must do. As we take stock of the past and present, three ideas may be useful for renewing and strengthening relationship with the US — clarity, transparency and pragmatic convergence of interests.
Tailpiece: The complex questions of war and peace in Afghanistan make the relationship between the US and Pakistan interdependent. Disengagement or antagonising the other would never serve the interests of either party.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 25th, 2017.
Never were our relationships with the United States or China, the two countries that are ideologically worlds apart, and with whom we had have the best of relationships, driven by any emotion or ideology. Whatever the language and idiom of selling a foreign policy, it is always formulated in the interests of a country, in the given objective conditions of the real world. These are also the interests, perceptions and rankings of foreign policy objectives of the rulers in these conditions that determine the foreign policy choices.
In this respect, many things may go wrong in the choice of a particular foreign policy, setting of objectives or opting for ‘strategic’ partnerships. While no country, big or small can say its history of foreign policy is without big mistakes, Pakistan has perhaps accumulated too many of them, mainly because of the regional imperatives of national security. There are always unintended consequences of foreign policy, as most of the countries, even the great powers fail to achieve what they set as their primary goals. The case in point is Soviet and American policies towards Afghanistan, or for that matter anywhere in the world.
The reason for writing this preface is to contest enduring fallacies in conversation about Pakistan’s relations with the US. All three strategic partnerships with the US have rested on pragmatic calculations of self-interest by both the sides. Their interests converged on working together to achieve stability, security and development during the Cold War, defeating the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, and removing the Taliban regime and defeating the terrorist groups. The first two partnerships ran a natural course of initial understanding, mutual cooperation, maturing and withering off with changes in the world system. The last one has proved to be a quagmire for the US, leaving it wounded, frustrated and even confused about appropriate security framework in the battlefield, political reconstruction of Afghanistan and choices about right mix of power and development.
There are obvious signs of failure of American policy in the region. Having invested so heavily in blood and treasure, Washington is politically unprepared to accept an endgame in Afghanistan which might land the Afghan Taliban back in power. The question is, will such an outcome be in the interest of Pakistan or the region? Not at all. So there is a wide space available to renegotiate roles, redefine interests and bring policies closer to the original common objectives — stability, integrity and peace of Afghanistan.
Obviously, there has been a trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States, and real challenges of harmonising conflicting interests. Fresh efforts are about seeking better understanding of respective positions and getting clarity about what each side can do and must do. As we take stock of the past and present, three ideas may be useful for renewing and strengthening relationship with the US — clarity, transparency and pragmatic convergence of interests.
Tailpiece: The complex questions of war and peace in Afghanistan make the relationship between the US and Pakistan interdependent. Disengagement or antagonising the other would never serve the interests of either party.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 25th, 2017.