Small steps towards better relations
If Taliban were to capture power in Afghanistan it would strengthen the hand of the TTP and other militant groups
The writer is a retired lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army and a former federal secretary. He has also served as chairman of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board
Pakistan military’s cooperation with US intelligence agencies that led to the subsequent release of the American-Canadian couple and their three children held hostage by the Haqqani Network earned us the gratitude of both Washington and Ottawa.
The two subsequent tweets by President Trump praising Pakistan’s role in the release was an expression of it — although it would have been better if he had not attributed it to the pressure exerted on Pakistan by his administration. Little does President Trump realise countries big or small, rich or poor, like individuals demand and expect to be treated with dignity. Being a nuclear power, Pakistan also does not like being pushed around. Furthermore, any undue pressure only makes it gravitate further towards China.
That aside, the rescue operation to save the lives of innocent people was indeed a fine demonstration of cooperation between the two countries. And showed that the leaderships of the two states could rise above past differences and prejudices for a higher cause. What indeed would be more defining if these small events open up new possibilities for a better and more cooperative relationship? History bears out that at times small good deeds have altered the relationship between countries.
However, given the current level of distrust and differences in policies, especially as related to Afghanistan and India, it would be premature to expect a major turnaround in Pakistan-US relations. At the same time, the present situation does not serve the interest of either country or the region. And if not corrected it could lead to a further slide.
The Trump administration has assigned a larger role to India in Afghanistan that runs counter to Pakistan and Chinese interests. Will the US be prepared to prevail on India that it does not use Afghanistan soil for engaging in hostile activities towards Pakistan. Will there also be any adjustment in US policy to accommodate the concerns of other Afghan neighbours.
Likewise, is Pakistan willing to accept Washington’s emphatic demand that it stop supporting the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban leadership? Apparently, the high-level US delegations visiting Pakistan in the near future will carry a tough message. American concerns aside, is it not advisable if the military establishment reviews its policy towards these groups in light of the country’s larger and long-term interests? Because apart from allowing its adverse relations with the United States, India, Afghanistan and the international community to further deteriorate it will inadvertently compromise its ability to formulate foreign policy. The non-state actors will continue to sabotage any positive initiative towards reconciliation by committing acts of violence in India or Afghanistan as events over the years suggest.
There remain serious apprehensions about the short- and long-term goals of the US. There is considerable speculation that the US is not going anywhere and has plans of an indefinite stay in Afghanistan. The assumption being that Afghanistan’s ideal location serves Washington to assert its presence in a region that is surrounded by three nuclear powers, two among them being its strategic rivals. Recent huge public works project that brings all embassies and Nato and American military headquarters in the planned expanded Green zone further reinforce that the US will stay beyond 2020s. Moreover, there is a historical pattern that US troops generally continue to stay on in regions where they were once deployed. American troops are still stationed in Europe, Japan and South Korea to name a few. President Trump was initially inclined to pull back troops from Afghanistan and Obama too had planned to do so. But pressure from the military establishment and fears of a total collapse of the Afghan regime without the American prop made them retract from this course.
Adding to US-Pakistan differences is Washington’s hostile attitude toward CPEC. Instead of viewing it as a genuine economic project between China and Pakistan meant to promote the well-being of its people and the region considers it as a threat to its and India’s regional dominance.
More significantly, it fails to appreciate that Pakistan’s security and by extension of the region is largely contingent on its sustained economic growth and political stability. And by all realistic assessment CPEC will indeed provide these elements of national power a major boost.
Equally important is that India too revises its hostile posture towards CPEC and Pakistan in general. Refusing to engage in dialogue and supporting anti-Pakistan militant groups in Afghanistan could be self-defeating, as experience has shown over the years. Its support of Baloch nationalists and the TTP is specifically aimed at disrupting Chinese-Pakistan collaboration and creating major hurdles in the path of Balochistan’s development. Regrettably, it has been using its clout in the US against Pakistan and could further activate its lobbies to subvert any emerging positive shift in Washington towards Pakistan.
Pakistan too as a responsible state should be seen to be complying with its regional and international obligations. Otherwise it provides an easy scapegoat for Washington to blame Pakistan for its failures. Apart from satisfying a major US demand and complying with UN mandated sanctions it will be in Pakistan’s own interest to delink itself from Afghan and Indian focused militant groups. For example, how have our relations with the Taliban helped in gaining the confidence of the Afghan regime, the US and the international community? History bears witness that non–state actors after a few years have invariably turned their guns inwards towards the state that protected and nurtured them. In addition, support of militant organisations has adverse consequences for a nation that professes to build its social and economic structure on modern lines. How have these outfits been useful in hedging India from yielding on Kashmir? To the contrary they have vastly contributed in providing India an alibi to shield its inhuman brutal practices against a genuine Kashmiri movement. Similarly, if the Taliban were to capture power in Afghanistan it would strengthen the hand of the TTP and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 18th, 2017.
The two subsequent tweets by President Trump praising Pakistan’s role in the release was an expression of it — although it would have been better if he had not attributed it to the pressure exerted on Pakistan by his administration. Little does President Trump realise countries big or small, rich or poor, like individuals demand and expect to be treated with dignity. Being a nuclear power, Pakistan also does not like being pushed around. Furthermore, any undue pressure only makes it gravitate further towards China.
That aside, the rescue operation to save the lives of innocent people was indeed a fine demonstration of cooperation between the two countries. And showed that the leaderships of the two states could rise above past differences and prejudices for a higher cause. What indeed would be more defining if these small events open up new possibilities for a better and more cooperative relationship? History bears out that at times small good deeds have altered the relationship between countries.
However, given the current level of distrust and differences in policies, especially as related to Afghanistan and India, it would be premature to expect a major turnaround in Pakistan-US relations. At the same time, the present situation does not serve the interest of either country or the region. And if not corrected it could lead to a further slide.
The Trump administration has assigned a larger role to India in Afghanistan that runs counter to Pakistan and Chinese interests. Will the US be prepared to prevail on India that it does not use Afghanistan soil for engaging in hostile activities towards Pakistan. Will there also be any adjustment in US policy to accommodate the concerns of other Afghan neighbours.
Likewise, is Pakistan willing to accept Washington’s emphatic demand that it stop supporting the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban leadership? Apparently, the high-level US delegations visiting Pakistan in the near future will carry a tough message. American concerns aside, is it not advisable if the military establishment reviews its policy towards these groups in light of the country’s larger and long-term interests? Because apart from allowing its adverse relations with the United States, India, Afghanistan and the international community to further deteriorate it will inadvertently compromise its ability to formulate foreign policy. The non-state actors will continue to sabotage any positive initiative towards reconciliation by committing acts of violence in India or Afghanistan as events over the years suggest.
There remain serious apprehensions about the short- and long-term goals of the US. There is considerable speculation that the US is not going anywhere and has plans of an indefinite stay in Afghanistan. The assumption being that Afghanistan’s ideal location serves Washington to assert its presence in a region that is surrounded by three nuclear powers, two among them being its strategic rivals. Recent huge public works project that brings all embassies and Nato and American military headquarters in the planned expanded Green zone further reinforce that the US will stay beyond 2020s. Moreover, there is a historical pattern that US troops generally continue to stay on in regions where they were once deployed. American troops are still stationed in Europe, Japan and South Korea to name a few. President Trump was initially inclined to pull back troops from Afghanistan and Obama too had planned to do so. But pressure from the military establishment and fears of a total collapse of the Afghan regime without the American prop made them retract from this course.
Adding to US-Pakistan differences is Washington’s hostile attitude toward CPEC. Instead of viewing it as a genuine economic project between China and Pakistan meant to promote the well-being of its people and the region considers it as a threat to its and India’s regional dominance.
More significantly, it fails to appreciate that Pakistan’s security and by extension of the region is largely contingent on its sustained economic growth and political stability. And by all realistic assessment CPEC will indeed provide these elements of national power a major boost.
Equally important is that India too revises its hostile posture towards CPEC and Pakistan in general. Refusing to engage in dialogue and supporting anti-Pakistan militant groups in Afghanistan could be self-defeating, as experience has shown over the years. Its support of Baloch nationalists and the TTP is specifically aimed at disrupting Chinese-Pakistan collaboration and creating major hurdles in the path of Balochistan’s development. Regrettably, it has been using its clout in the US against Pakistan and could further activate its lobbies to subvert any emerging positive shift in Washington towards Pakistan.
Pakistan too as a responsible state should be seen to be complying with its regional and international obligations. Otherwise it provides an easy scapegoat for Washington to blame Pakistan for its failures. Apart from satisfying a major US demand and complying with UN mandated sanctions it will be in Pakistan’s own interest to delink itself from Afghan and Indian focused militant groups. For example, how have our relations with the Taliban helped in gaining the confidence of the Afghan regime, the US and the international community? History bears witness that non–state actors after a few years have invariably turned their guns inwards towards the state that protected and nurtured them. In addition, support of militant organisations has adverse consequences for a nation that professes to build its social and economic structure on modern lines. How have these outfits been useful in hedging India from yielding on Kashmir? To the contrary they have vastly contributed in providing India an alibi to shield its inhuman brutal practices against a genuine Kashmiri movement. Similarly, if the Taliban were to capture power in Afghanistan it would strengthen the hand of the TTP and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 18th, 2017.