Pursuing calculated disarmament
Recently, more than 120 countries backed the first-ever treaty to eliminate the nuclear weapons around the globe
The writer is an MPhil scholar at the Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. He tweets @hasanehtishamb1
Recently, more than 120 countries backed the first-ever treaty to eliminate the nuclear weapons around the globe, despite a boycott by all nuclear-armed nations. By ratifying the treaty, each state party undertakes not to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 6 of the treaty, urges all the nuclear weapons states to initiate the process towards total elimination of nuclear weapons.
It is a rational expectation that a blanket ban on nuclear weapons is nearly impossible. The push to eliminate nukes by any international treaty without taking nuclear-armed states on board reminds one of the Geneva Conventions ‘banning’ cluster munitions. That convention lost effectiveness when it was adopted by only those countries, which possess no cluster munitions. Therefore, a treaty to ban nukes without the consent of nuclear-armed states will produce zero results.
The agenda behind the disarmament treaty is more likely to achieve ‘total elimination’ of nuclear weapons. Whereas, state parties to the treaty have taken a wrong turn by forcing an absolute ban on nuclear weapons, while disregarding the calculated disarmament initiatives, especially arms control. It is critical to discuss the logic of each concept, nonetheless, discloses key variances amid disarmament and arms control.
Total disarmament may encompass the abolition of a country’s entire nuclear weapons capacity, whereas calculated disarmament is somehow a realistic approach to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons through arms-control agreements, among the states. Traditionally, bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements between nuclear states were based on mutual interest and trust. It would be more appropriate that this time non-nuclear weapons states give mandate of stockpile reduction standards.
There is no doubt that non-nuclear weapons states fundamentally have no power over the nuclear-armed states. Henceforth, the former should exert pressure on the latter to negotiate calculated disarmament and arms control agreements, with respect to nuclear weapons.
Now the question is why non-nuclear weapons states should put a great amount of exertion, when they clearly realise the settlement would not quickly make nuclear-armed states surrender their stockpiles? In reference to this regard, retired British Royal Navy commander Rob Green, co-director of the Peace Foundation’s Disarmament and Security Centre, views that “the heart of this treaty was the prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons.” It is a misplaced priority in a world where the will to use nuclear weapons first is considered as a deterrent against conventional and nuclear aggressions from a hostile state.
Instead of wasting energy on a futile universal treaty, non-nuclear weapons states should pressurise nuclear-armed states to accelerate their efforts for non-discriminatory nuclear arms control measures. A comprehensive review is needed on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) with respect to the three de facto nuclear-weapon states that are outside it: Israel, India and Pakistan. NPT is facing numerous challenges and the only option is to redesign it.
The non-nuclear weapons states must devise formal plans to push nuclear-armed states for a universal Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In which, pre-existing stockpiles of fissile materials should be included in the draft of the FMCT, before negotiations because few nuclear weapons states have accumulated the fissile material for thousands of nuclear weapons. For instance, research carried at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs postulated that India is a non-NPT state, which has accumulated fissile material to produce over 2,600 weapons.
It is too early to dwell upon the future prospects of this new treaty. The decision-makers should take note because it could be exceptionally helpful for the P5 states. We must not consider it a settlement that will affect nuclear-armed states, consider it as an approach to get more legitimate means against nuclear threshold states.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 17th, 2017.
It is a rational expectation that a blanket ban on nuclear weapons is nearly impossible. The push to eliminate nukes by any international treaty without taking nuclear-armed states on board reminds one of the Geneva Conventions ‘banning’ cluster munitions. That convention lost effectiveness when it was adopted by only those countries, which possess no cluster munitions. Therefore, a treaty to ban nukes without the consent of nuclear-armed states will produce zero results.
The agenda behind the disarmament treaty is more likely to achieve ‘total elimination’ of nuclear weapons. Whereas, state parties to the treaty have taken a wrong turn by forcing an absolute ban on nuclear weapons, while disregarding the calculated disarmament initiatives, especially arms control. It is critical to discuss the logic of each concept, nonetheless, discloses key variances amid disarmament and arms control.
Total disarmament may encompass the abolition of a country’s entire nuclear weapons capacity, whereas calculated disarmament is somehow a realistic approach to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons through arms-control agreements, among the states. Traditionally, bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements between nuclear states were based on mutual interest and trust. It would be more appropriate that this time non-nuclear weapons states give mandate of stockpile reduction standards.
There is no doubt that non-nuclear weapons states fundamentally have no power over the nuclear-armed states. Henceforth, the former should exert pressure on the latter to negotiate calculated disarmament and arms control agreements, with respect to nuclear weapons.
Now the question is why non-nuclear weapons states should put a great amount of exertion, when they clearly realise the settlement would not quickly make nuclear-armed states surrender their stockpiles? In reference to this regard, retired British Royal Navy commander Rob Green, co-director of the Peace Foundation’s Disarmament and Security Centre, views that “the heart of this treaty was the prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons.” It is a misplaced priority in a world where the will to use nuclear weapons first is considered as a deterrent against conventional and nuclear aggressions from a hostile state.
Instead of wasting energy on a futile universal treaty, non-nuclear weapons states should pressurise nuclear-armed states to accelerate their efforts for non-discriminatory nuclear arms control measures. A comprehensive review is needed on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) with respect to the three de facto nuclear-weapon states that are outside it: Israel, India and Pakistan. NPT is facing numerous challenges and the only option is to redesign it.
The non-nuclear weapons states must devise formal plans to push nuclear-armed states for a universal Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In which, pre-existing stockpiles of fissile materials should be included in the draft of the FMCT, before negotiations because few nuclear weapons states have accumulated the fissile material for thousands of nuclear weapons. For instance, research carried at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs postulated that India is a non-NPT state, which has accumulated fissile material to produce over 2,600 weapons.
It is too early to dwell upon the future prospects of this new treaty. The decision-makers should take note because it could be exceptionally helpful for the P5 states. We must not consider it a settlement that will affect nuclear-armed states, consider it as an approach to get more legitimate means against nuclear threshold states.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 17th, 2017.