Restructuring the ISI
The problem is not in lack of ‘intelligence’, but of sustained experience and continuity.
I find it essential to begin with a response to a controversy generated by my previous article discussing an extension for the current ISI chief. I did not, at any stage, imply that a serving or retired general must head the ISI. In fact, far from it; I emphasised that most three-star officers took over as novices, to hand over to novices, and so on; pointing out that this is an assignment for a special breed of person. My issue was merely with the duration of the assignment of the ISI chief, whoever he/she might be.
First of all, the ISI has no business being called by that acronym. It never was intended to be, nor is, an organisation for the ‘inter services’. Constitutionally, it functions for and under the chief executive of the country. Perhaps the name was chosen due to the fact that it was initially staffed primarily by personnel drawn from the three military services, but the very name provides the first erroneous impression and, inevitably, leads to the erroneous conclusion that it functions under GHQ/JSHQ; this impression is compounded by the fact that it is invariably headed by a serving three-star officer and, all its divisions, by two-star officers. It should, at the earliest, be given another title, for example, National Intelligence Organisation, CIA or whatever.
Secondly, as I have pointed out, the intelligence business is a very special one, requiring special characteristics. There is little doubt that many serving/retired military personnel do possess the required characteristics, however, I am equally certain that there are many civilians who will also fill the bill; in fact, I could name a few bureaucrats and diplomats who would have been better utilised in intelligence rather than the assignments they held.
For a couple of decades now, the army inducts qualified volunteers into the intelligence corps and, whatever their initial affiliation, they spend their remaining service exclusively in intelligence. These are an invaluable asset and must continue to form the hard core of any premier intelligence agency, alongside their civilian counterparts, who are also selected for their special characteristics and qualifications.
Over the period of time and, particularly in the last 10 years or so, an increasing number of young, intelligent, and gifted civilians have been enrolled in intelligence organisations, including the ISI, but I would like to see them increase in numbers purely on merit. What is more, I am of the conviction that those who rise to command the divisions of the ISI should be elevated from this hard core.
Unquestionably, those selected by the three services to head these divisions are intelligent, aspiring officers who perform commendably, within their limitations! Once again, these limitations are an outcome of their background experience and limited tenure. All serving military officers aspire to command; units, brigades, divisions and corps. Their tenure with the ISI is a stepping stone to that end.
The CIA might not be the best intelligence organisation in the world, but it will suffice as an example. Its director is a political appointee chosen for his qualifications for the said assignment. Presently, General Petraeus is being considered for this assignment after he retires. Despite the prestige and extended tenure that goes with this assignment, several US newspapers reported that Petraeus was “disappointed” since he was “hoping to take over from Admiral Mike Mullen as CJCS”. If Petraeus is selected for this assignment, he won’t be the first ex-soldier to have become director CIA, but he will replace a civilian, and not the first one. In fact, George H W Bush (the senior one; the one who did have some intellect!) served as director CIA many years ago, before becoming the forty-first president of the US!
However, the two deputy directors of the CIA — who look after plans and operations — are hardcore professionals, usually with a lifetime in intelligence (though they have frequently served some time in any of the numerous other intelligence agencies in the US). They can only aspire to a possible political selection as director CIA or post-retirement re-employment heading CIA or another intelligence agency. They are not amateurs, however gifted or intelligent, who serve two- to three-year terms, as a stepping stone in the career of their choice!
Although I have never served, even for a day, in any intelligence organisation, I have lots of friends and students who have, and they were at the highest level. Let me state unequivocally that most of them were ideally suited to commanding the ISI division assigned to them, though there were a fair number who were highly unsuited as well. However, my point is that those suited to their respective assignments should have continued in those assignments. It would be only fair that they be suitably compensated monetarily, and by way of perquisites (perks), but their services must be fully utilised IF they are suitable for the job and they MUST serve long enough to contribute meaningfully.
Intelligence has always been the forward-most line of defence of any nation. In today’s modern world, with increasingly complicated and threatening issues surfacing, it is increasing in importance every day. Rightly or wrongly, intelligence organisations in general, and the ISI in particular, are considered responsible for all our problems and yet, when it is suggested that the incompetence, if incompetence there is, is due to a systemic flaw, we do not seem willing to correct it.
The problem is not of extensions but of tenure. The problem is not just the acronym, ISI, or what it stands for, but the implications that accompany this title. The problem is not in any lack of ‘intelligence’ amongst senior representatives of the ISI, but of sustained experience and continuity which, when coupled with intelligence and swift responses (which figure prominently in the characteristics of intelligence officers of decision-making seniority), provides the ingenuity and instinct that is the flash of genius among high-ranking intelligence officers.
We cannot improve upon our politicians; let us, at least, improve on those who provide them critical input for decision-making!
Published in The Express Tribune, April 14th, 2011.
First of all, the ISI has no business being called by that acronym. It never was intended to be, nor is, an organisation for the ‘inter services’. Constitutionally, it functions for and under the chief executive of the country. Perhaps the name was chosen due to the fact that it was initially staffed primarily by personnel drawn from the three military services, but the very name provides the first erroneous impression and, inevitably, leads to the erroneous conclusion that it functions under GHQ/JSHQ; this impression is compounded by the fact that it is invariably headed by a serving three-star officer and, all its divisions, by two-star officers. It should, at the earliest, be given another title, for example, National Intelligence Organisation, CIA or whatever.
Secondly, as I have pointed out, the intelligence business is a very special one, requiring special characteristics. There is little doubt that many serving/retired military personnel do possess the required characteristics, however, I am equally certain that there are many civilians who will also fill the bill; in fact, I could name a few bureaucrats and diplomats who would have been better utilised in intelligence rather than the assignments they held.
For a couple of decades now, the army inducts qualified volunteers into the intelligence corps and, whatever their initial affiliation, they spend their remaining service exclusively in intelligence. These are an invaluable asset and must continue to form the hard core of any premier intelligence agency, alongside their civilian counterparts, who are also selected for their special characteristics and qualifications.
Over the period of time and, particularly in the last 10 years or so, an increasing number of young, intelligent, and gifted civilians have been enrolled in intelligence organisations, including the ISI, but I would like to see them increase in numbers purely on merit. What is more, I am of the conviction that those who rise to command the divisions of the ISI should be elevated from this hard core.
Unquestionably, those selected by the three services to head these divisions are intelligent, aspiring officers who perform commendably, within their limitations! Once again, these limitations are an outcome of their background experience and limited tenure. All serving military officers aspire to command; units, brigades, divisions and corps. Their tenure with the ISI is a stepping stone to that end.
The CIA might not be the best intelligence organisation in the world, but it will suffice as an example. Its director is a political appointee chosen for his qualifications for the said assignment. Presently, General Petraeus is being considered for this assignment after he retires. Despite the prestige and extended tenure that goes with this assignment, several US newspapers reported that Petraeus was “disappointed” since he was “hoping to take over from Admiral Mike Mullen as CJCS”. If Petraeus is selected for this assignment, he won’t be the first ex-soldier to have become director CIA, but he will replace a civilian, and not the first one. In fact, George H W Bush (the senior one; the one who did have some intellect!) served as director CIA many years ago, before becoming the forty-first president of the US!
However, the two deputy directors of the CIA — who look after plans and operations — are hardcore professionals, usually with a lifetime in intelligence (though they have frequently served some time in any of the numerous other intelligence agencies in the US). They can only aspire to a possible political selection as director CIA or post-retirement re-employment heading CIA or another intelligence agency. They are not amateurs, however gifted or intelligent, who serve two- to three-year terms, as a stepping stone in the career of their choice!
Although I have never served, even for a day, in any intelligence organisation, I have lots of friends and students who have, and they were at the highest level. Let me state unequivocally that most of them were ideally suited to commanding the ISI division assigned to them, though there were a fair number who were highly unsuited as well. However, my point is that those suited to their respective assignments should have continued in those assignments. It would be only fair that they be suitably compensated monetarily, and by way of perquisites (perks), but their services must be fully utilised IF they are suitable for the job and they MUST serve long enough to contribute meaningfully.
Intelligence has always been the forward-most line of defence of any nation. In today’s modern world, with increasingly complicated and threatening issues surfacing, it is increasing in importance every day. Rightly or wrongly, intelligence organisations in general, and the ISI in particular, are considered responsible for all our problems and yet, when it is suggested that the incompetence, if incompetence there is, is due to a systemic flaw, we do not seem willing to correct it.
The problem is not of extensions but of tenure. The problem is not just the acronym, ISI, or what it stands for, but the implications that accompany this title. The problem is not in any lack of ‘intelligence’ amongst senior representatives of the ISI, but of sustained experience and continuity which, when coupled with intelligence and swift responses (which figure prominently in the characteristics of intelligence officers of decision-making seniority), provides the ingenuity and instinct that is the flash of genius among high-ranking intelligence officers.
We cannot improve upon our politicians; let us, at least, improve on those who provide them critical input for decision-making!
Published in The Express Tribune, April 14th, 2011.