Who is winning in Afghanistan?
ISAF and the Afghan government it supports are losing the war
The writer served as executive editor of The Express Tribune from 2009 to 2014
Intriguingly, no group has claimed responsibility for Wednesday’s terror attack in Kabul’s city centre which has taken the lives of over 90 people and left nearly 350 injured. The Taliban have denied involvement and so far ISIS has maintained a mysterious silence. But Afghanistan’s intelligence agency blamed the Taliban-allied Haqqani Network for the attack. And by association the Kabul government passed the blame directly on to Pakistan. And Pakistan, on its part, has vehemently denied the charge. Clearly, no one seems to have any clue about the identity of the perpetrators.
Lately, our war-torn neighbour has continued to suffer from suicide attacks with increasing frequency. The coalition government in Kabul seems to have no idea how to control the menace while the 350,000-strong government troops trained and equipped by the US have so far proved to be no match to the rag-tag terror groups that roam the country- side unchecked, challenging the writ of Kabul regime all over.
So are the Taliban winning the war in Afghanistan? The Kabul government seems to have virtually surrendered. But that leads one to the most basic question: is the world’s sole superpower losing war in Afghanistan? Unthinkable? But the way Washington has been handling this over 15-year long war that has cost it so far billions and billions of dollars makes it almost impossible to believe that it is winning the war. Perhaps the US has virtually lost the war and is currently only trying to save face by discussing the pros and cons of sending more troops.
Two experts on Afghanistan, Andrew Shaver and Joshua Madrigal, in an article published in the Sept 22, 2016 edition of Foreign Affairs state that by a variety of indicators, ‘ISAF and the Afghan government it supports are losing the war’.
Quoting data recently released by the Pentagon to one of the authors, the article maintains that the violence in Afghanistan following Obama’s 2009 troop surge had remained at levels vastly exceeding those observed during the initial years of the war.
“Meanwhile, measures of insurgent activity, from kidnappings to weapons sales, have remained at levels at or above those observed when the United States “surged” troops into the country. Perhaps most alarmingly, since 2010, when ISAF began tracking combat outcomes on a consistent basis, the number of insurgent attacks resulting in the deaths of Afghan police officers and soldiers have continued to steadily climb.
“These trends call into question the logic of further extending the presence of US troops in Afghanistan. For years, available evidence has suggested that decisive victory over the Taliban is not possible. Outside of permanently stationing forces in Afghanistan, it is unclear that the United States can prevent the Taliban’s eventual forceful reclamation of large swathes of Afghan territory. Although the costs associated with a complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan are potentially quite high, they may be unavoidable. Furthermore, there are additional costs associated with remaining engaged. Even as the prospects of a victory in Afghanistan have waned, the United States and its partners have continued to fight, and it appears that ISAF is now fighting to avoid ultimate failure. Yet this too is surely a losing proposition. It is time to engage seriously with the question of whether the benefits of delaying a withdrawal outweigh the costs of doing so.”
Indeed, what can another 3,000-5,000 US troops do in such a situation? Sameer Lalwani, another Afghan expert, discussing this question in a column published in the May 25, 2017 edition of the same magazine, proposes state building, reconciliation, containment, and basing. In the opinion of Lalwani each strategy contains distinct goals, its own theory of victory, and unique costs and risks.
“State building, reconciliation, and basing all put the United States on course to potentially commit hundreds of billions to the Afghanistan project over the next decade…Thus, even if Trump approves of the increased American military presence in Afghanistan, there remains plenty of debate to be had over the strategy for which these troops are used.”
Published in The Express Tribune, June 3rd, 2017.
Lately, our war-torn neighbour has continued to suffer from suicide attacks with increasing frequency. The coalition government in Kabul seems to have no idea how to control the menace while the 350,000-strong government troops trained and equipped by the US have so far proved to be no match to the rag-tag terror groups that roam the country- side unchecked, challenging the writ of Kabul regime all over.
So are the Taliban winning the war in Afghanistan? The Kabul government seems to have virtually surrendered. But that leads one to the most basic question: is the world’s sole superpower losing war in Afghanistan? Unthinkable? But the way Washington has been handling this over 15-year long war that has cost it so far billions and billions of dollars makes it almost impossible to believe that it is winning the war. Perhaps the US has virtually lost the war and is currently only trying to save face by discussing the pros and cons of sending more troops.
Two experts on Afghanistan, Andrew Shaver and Joshua Madrigal, in an article published in the Sept 22, 2016 edition of Foreign Affairs state that by a variety of indicators, ‘ISAF and the Afghan government it supports are losing the war’.
Quoting data recently released by the Pentagon to one of the authors, the article maintains that the violence in Afghanistan following Obama’s 2009 troop surge had remained at levels vastly exceeding those observed during the initial years of the war.
“Meanwhile, measures of insurgent activity, from kidnappings to weapons sales, have remained at levels at or above those observed when the United States “surged” troops into the country. Perhaps most alarmingly, since 2010, when ISAF began tracking combat outcomes on a consistent basis, the number of insurgent attacks resulting in the deaths of Afghan police officers and soldiers have continued to steadily climb.
“These trends call into question the logic of further extending the presence of US troops in Afghanistan. For years, available evidence has suggested that decisive victory over the Taliban is not possible. Outside of permanently stationing forces in Afghanistan, it is unclear that the United States can prevent the Taliban’s eventual forceful reclamation of large swathes of Afghan territory. Although the costs associated with a complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan are potentially quite high, they may be unavoidable. Furthermore, there are additional costs associated with remaining engaged. Even as the prospects of a victory in Afghanistan have waned, the United States and its partners have continued to fight, and it appears that ISAF is now fighting to avoid ultimate failure. Yet this too is surely a losing proposition. It is time to engage seriously with the question of whether the benefits of delaying a withdrawal outweigh the costs of doing so.”
Indeed, what can another 3,000-5,000 US troops do in such a situation? Sameer Lalwani, another Afghan expert, discussing this question in a column published in the May 25, 2017 edition of the same magazine, proposes state building, reconciliation, containment, and basing. In the opinion of Lalwani each strategy contains distinct goals, its own theory of victory, and unique costs and risks.
“State building, reconciliation, and basing all put the United States on course to potentially commit hundreds of billions to the Afghanistan project over the next decade…Thus, even if Trump approves of the increased American military presence in Afghanistan, there remains plenty of debate to be had over the strategy for which these troops are used.”
Published in The Express Tribune, June 3rd, 2017.