Harmonising internal & external policies
Of late, the government has come under criticism for its foreign policy weaknesses
Of late, the government has come under criticism for its foreign policy weaknesses that are reflected in strained relations with most of its immediate neighbours. While tensions with India have become a norm, the current level of distrust with the Modi government and the negligible hope for change in the near future are certainly escalations, even from previous standards. According to credible estimates, in Afghanistan the trust level for Pakistan is at its lowest point. Pakistan’s construction of a gate at the Torkham post well within its own territory resulted in exchange of fire, with the border remaining closed for nearly a week. The presence of Kalbhushan Yadav, the Indian spy operating from Iranian soil, has only added to our fears that Iran, with whom we have a settled border, has leanings towards India. The US, the omnipresent ‘neighbour’, persistently accuses us of harbouring the Haqqanis and the Taliban shura and is indifferent towards playing a conciliatory role between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The bright star in this challenging scenario is our enduring and growing strategic partnership with China, strong bonds with Saudi Arabia that remain steadfast, improvement of ties with the Central Asian republics and more robust participation in the SCO and the OIC, as Sartaj Aziz rightly pointed out recently. But can we draw satisfaction from these relationships to the extent that they can compensate and largely neutralise the ill-effects of relations with our immediate neighbours and prevent us from partial isolation?
Moreover, while assessing the state of our foreign relations, we have to factor the evolving strategic shifts and realignments taking place at the regional and global levels that are major determinants in shaping the policies of India and the US. India, under the BJP government, has moved away from its past tradition of neutrality and is partnering with the US in its ‘pivot to Asia’ for countervailing the emerging power of China. It is only natural that these global readjustments are putting pressure on Pakistan to move closer to China with the CPEC as the flagship of this deepening relationship. With US power and influence relatively on the decline, Pakistan sees China as the emerging global player and hence its heavy tilt towards it as serving the country’s future economic and strategic interests. We also should not overlook that during Narendra Modi’s US visit, the media hype generated an inflated impact.
However, despite these developments, Pakistan should avoid pursuing a policy that leads to a zero-sum game. If China and India can maintain close economic and commercial ties despite a strong strategic rivalry, why should India and Pakistan not emulate this example for the common good? The danger in closing avenues of cooperation with India is that the gains made with China will be partly dissipated in further strengthening our military capabilities with attendant adverse consequences on the internal power balance. For India, too, it would mean a two-front military threat and distraction from its focus on rapid economic growth. Hostility in relations directly and indirectly adversely affects the lives of common people in both countries. Regrettably, India and Pakistan have pursued adversarial policies towards each other for so long that those are now accepted as normal.
Pakistan should not allow its relations with the US to become a casualty of its Taliban policy and its strong ties with China. Despite Washington’s heavy tilt toward India, there are still several areas of common interest in the political, economic and education sectors that need to be strengthened.
Of immediate concern has been the rising tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The anger at the construction of the gate at Torkham was merely a symptom of the mistrust that governs the relationship. The gate at Torkham existed even during British days and was functional in 2004 during General (retd) Musharraf’s time. Considering the sensitivities of the Afghan government and how these can be played up by our adversaries, the issue requires deft handling. After the initial hiccup, it seems the two governments are working towards a solution that facilitates movement of Afghan refugees, traders and families astride both sides of the border, while at the same time exercising control over normal travellers through a visa regime or special travel documents. The obsession with the Durand Line will probably fade away as relations improve. In any case, it has no legal or political basis.
The entry of thousands of Afghans into Pakistan also has serious repercussions on Pakistan’s labour market. The Afghan worker is cheaper to hire than his Pakistani counterpart. It is generally not known that the UN is only partially supporting Afghan refugees whereas the Pakistan government is sharing most of the burden. This is also a factor in introducing a more formal visa regime, apart from the various security considerations that resulted in the move. The argument that terrorists are not going to enter through Torkham does not mean that it does not have to be managed.
Our overall foreign policy will be vastly strengthened if we are able to remove structural flaws in the decision-making of our internal power structure. The Foreign Office, when it comes to formulating policies particularly with respect to India, Afghanistan, Iran and the US, remains subservient to the establishment. This has resulted in a greater focus on security and less on economic, commercial and cultural aspects of these relationships. The absence of a foreign minister places us at a disadvantage although for all purposes, Sartaj Aziz, the adviser on foreign affairs, is filling the gap ably. He tries to share his vision with the prime minister and works closely with the establishment, but this cannot be a substitute for the prime minister and the civilian government formulating and implementing policy. The prime minister and his cabinet should harness state resources and give due attention to matters of security and take the lead in harmonising civil and military thinking. In the present arrangement, the government has tried to blend foreign policy with national security as configured by the establishment. There is a general feeling of drift and a lack of focus by the government. Daunting internal and external challenges facing the country demand greater cooperation between institutions and better leadership at all levels.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 22nd, 2016.
The bright star in this challenging scenario is our enduring and growing strategic partnership with China, strong bonds with Saudi Arabia that remain steadfast, improvement of ties with the Central Asian republics and more robust participation in the SCO and the OIC, as Sartaj Aziz rightly pointed out recently. But can we draw satisfaction from these relationships to the extent that they can compensate and largely neutralise the ill-effects of relations with our immediate neighbours and prevent us from partial isolation?
Moreover, while assessing the state of our foreign relations, we have to factor the evolving strategic shifts and realignments taking place at the regional and global levels that are major determinants in shaping the policies of India and the US. India, under the BJP government, has moved away from its past tradition of neutrality and is partnering with the US in its ‘pivot to Asia’ for countervailing the emerging power of China. It is only natural that these global readjustments are putting pressure on Pakistan to move closer to China with the CPEC as the flagship of this deepening relationship. With US power and influence relatively on the decline, Pakistan sees China as the emerging global player and hence its heavy tilt towards it as serving the country’s future economic and strategic interests. We also should not overlook that during Narendra Modi’s US visit, the media hype generated an inflated impact.
However, despite these developments, Pakistan should avoid pursuing a policy that leads to a zero-sum game. If China and India can maintain close economic and commercial ties despite a strong strategic rivalry, why should India and Pakistan not emulate this example for the common good? The danger in closing avenues of cooperation with India is that the gains made with China will be partly dissipated in further strengthening our military capabilities with attendant adverse consequences on the internal power balance. For India, too, it would mean a two-front military threat and distraction from its focus on rapid economic growth. Hostility in relations directly and indirectly adversely affects the lives of common people in both countries. Regrettably, India and Pakistan have pursued adversarial policies towards each other for so long that those are now accepted as normal.
Pakistan should not allow its relations with the US to become a casualty of its Taliban policy and its strong ties with China. Despite Washington’s heavy tilt toward India, there are still several areas of common interest in the political, economic and education sectors that need to be strengthened.
Of immediate concern has been the rising tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The anger at the construction of the gate at Torkham was merely a symptom of the mistrust that governs the relationship. The gate at Torkham existed even during British days and was functional in 2004 during General (retd) Musharraf’s time. Considering the sensitivities of the Afghan government and how these can be played up by our adversaries, the issue requires deft handling. After the initial hiccup, it seems the two governments are working towards a solution that facilitates movement of Afghan refugees, traders and families astride both sides of the border, while at the same time exercising control over normal travellers through a visa regime or special travel documents. The obsession with the Durand Line will probably fade away as relations improve. In any case, it has no legal or political basis.
The entry of thousands of Afghans into Pakistan also has serious repercussions on Pakistan’s labour market. The Afghan worker is cheaper to hire than his Pakistani counterpart. It is generally not known that the UN is only partially supporting Afghan refugees whereas the Pakistan government is sharing most of the burden. This is also a factor in introducing a more formal visa regime, apart from the various security considerations that resulted in the move. The argument that terrorists are not going to enter through Torkham does not mean that it does not have to be managed.
Our overall foreign policy will be vastly strengthened if we are able to remove structural flaws in the decision-making of our internal power structure. The Foreign Office, when it comes to formulating policies particularly with respect to India, Afghanistan, Iran and the US, remains subservient to the establishment. This has resulted in a greater focus on security and less on economic, commercial and cultural aspects of these relationships. The absence of a foreign minister places us at a disadvantage although for all purposes, Sartaj Aziz, the adviser on foreign affairs, is filling the gap ably. He tries to share his vision with the prime minister and works closely with the establishment, but this cannot be a substitute for the prime minister and the civilian government formulating and implementing policy. The prime minister and his cabinet should harness state resources and give due attention to matters of security and take the lead in harmonising civil and military thinking. In the present arrangement, the government has tried to blend foreign policy with national security as configured by the establishment. There is a general feeling of drift and a lack of focus by the government. Daunting internal and external challenges facing the country demand greater cooperation between institutions and better leadership at all levels.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 22nd, 2016.