The battle for Waziristan
Operation Zarb-e-Azb marked a paradigm shift in thinking and approach of establishment and the civilian leadership
The writer is an author and a former interior secretary. He teaches at the Lahore University of Management Sciences
A three-day sojourn some weeks ago into the length and breadth of Waziristan was a unique and a fairly engaging experience for me, notwithstanding the tiring drive from Lahore.On arrival, the first impression one got was that the one-time no-go area was now treading steadily back to normalcy. One could see a well-planned homecoming for the IDPs both in the north and the south. To an outsider, the vast expanses, the captivating hillocks and the chilling silence all around hardly conveyed the impression that the place had been soiled with bloody mayhem and destruction in the recent past. Irrespective of the deadly blows of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a sense of disquiet could still be felt for good reasons. interaction with the locals brought this question quite poignantly to the fore: what next?
It was a rare opportunity to visit the area and see things on the ground in the post-Zarb-e-Azb phase.The battle for Shawal, decisive in the chain of events, at long last was also over. It resulted in the flushing out of the last sanctuary of the TTP and their affiliates. Newly built, widened, carpeted roads now connected all key points both in the north and the south, and hold out a lot of promise for speedy movement from the security point of view as well as when it comes to greater trade and business opportunities for the locals. Life pulsates far beyond the roadside, across the deep ridges and onto the steep mountains, in the valleys and isolated hamlets on the hills. The drawdown of the military is on the cards and the local people are living in the hope that a minimum critical mass will continue to stay on a permanent basis to deter the extremists and inimical elements from rearing their heads again.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb, in hindsight, marked a paradigm shift in the thinking and approach of the establishment as well as the civilian leadership, which till the recent past, instead of taking the lead role, held divergent perceptions about the existential threat we face. This myopic view resulted in enormous loss of life and property over the years. The battle for Waziristan needs to be viewed in the backdrop of flawed policies initiated and pursued during President Musharraf’s time. This policy of avowed engagement with the TTP only led to their muscular and lethal power increasing as they got more breathing space, enabling them to expand and use Waziristan as a base for springing deadly assaults all over Pakistan. The policy was based on the premise that a high-level engagement would soften these hostile elements. No one in the establishment was prepared to read as to what was deep inside the minds of the militants. Deals were struck with the TTP leadership in April 2004 and November 2006, in South and North Waziristan, respectively. Special amnesty was extended to foreign warriors to stay in the area on the promise of good behaviour. Following the deals, the government obliged the militants, lowered its guards, packed up check posts and the troops came back to the barracks. This was a clear signal to the TTP to buy time, strengthen their position and escalate their suicidal missions. These forces were not only able to extend their outreach to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and urban Sindh, but were also in a dominating position to coerce and subjugate the local population to act as conduits and facilitators for their designs. That was the time when the footprints of every suicide bombing could be traced back to Waziristan. Nurseries of fidais were proliferating in the huge, mud-walled compounds in Waziristan. Success of the Swat operation was not capitalised upon and the operation’s scope wasn’t extended. The time and initiative that had been wrested was lost, followed by more deadly attacks on civilians and military installations.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been a bold and decisive move. More than its military dimension, it is the political dimension that stands out distinctly. Political leaders and clerics who had been looking at the whole problem through their myopic lenses had no choice but to rally around the new initiative. This has been a commendable achievement. Dissenting voices have been muffled in the light of the results on the ground throughout Pakistan.
The battle of Waziristan was by no means a straightforward operation, considering the topographical frictions of the battleground. A pitched battle raged at every conceivable point before the forces could secure it. The use of artillery and air power made the key difference. The local population, at the same time, had to be reassured of security and a resultant normal life in order to elicit their support for banishing extremist forces in their midst. The TTP had operated in the area while capitalising on beliefs, norms and the time-honoured tribal code. With little resistance from the state and the conceptual muddle at that level, the TTP and their affiliates were able to hold effortless sway. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has not only repulsed these elements from their strongholds, it has also severed the source of their manpower and logistics. While driving through the bumpy tracks further inside the area, one comes across huge, abandoned courtyards with high-rise observatory posts, which were used as transiting camps by the militants. Some of these are now being used by the stationed troops guarding various key points. Open grounds adjacent to population clusters were often used as phansi gah for the execution of derelicts by the militants. Basic facilities like health and education are now in operation but at a less than the optimal level.
I got the chance to visit a madrassa and spent some time with the instructors and the students. It was humming with the presence of both male and female students. The madrassa had the facilities for an improvised boarding school. On my query, I was told that it was run on charity with donations coming from Punjab and Karachi. The existence of the female section with boarding facility was a testimony to the kind of faith the local parents had in the institution.
Availability of potable water is still a problem area. The only plausible option is to rely on gravity base water supply schemes. The interaction with the tribals was very instructive. During discussions, some of them argued that when the call for jihad was given by the TTP, it was taken by most of the locals as a sacred duty. They did not question the intent of the callers till such time they started committing deadly acts. It was too late by then to counter them, with no one having the will or the capacity to do so. An elderly tribal said that it was not the strength of the Taliban, but the abject surrender on the part of the state that gave them the audacity to escalate their lethal attacks. There was no administration, which had just disappeared.
I still feel the resonance of a lament from a tribal who maintained that given a choice, he would not have allowed the militants to put their feet on his land. He further added that ideally he would not wish the military to station itself in the tribal areas either. However, now that the military is here, he felt that it must not leave the tribal areas without finishing its job first. This sentiment explained the dilemma of Waziristan where every other person is caught between hope and a lurking fear.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2016.
It was a rare opportunity to visit the area and see things on the ground in the post-Zarb-e-Azb phase.The battle for Shawal, decisive in the chain of events, at long last was also over. It resulted in the flushing out of the last sanctuary of the TTP and their affiliates. Newly built, widened, carpeted roads now connected all key points both in the north and the south, and hold out a lot of promise for speedy movement from the security point of view as well as when it comes to greater trade and business opportunities for the locals. Life pulsates far beyond the roadside, across the deep ridges and onto the steep mountains, in the valleys and isolated hamlets on the hills. The drawdown of the military is on the cards and the local people are living in the hope that a minimum critical mass will continue to stay on a permanent basis to deter the extremists and inimical elements from rearing their heads again.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb, in hindsight, marked a paradigm shift in the thinking and approach of the establishment as well as the civilian leadership, which till the recent past, instead of taking the lead role, held divergent perceptions about the existential threat we face. This myopic view resulted in enormous loss of life and property over the years. The battle for Waziristan needs to be viewed in the backdrop of flawed policies initiated and pursued during President Musharraf’s time. This policy of avowed engagement with the TTP only led to their muscular and lethal power increasing as they got more breathing space, enabling them to expand and use Waziristan as a base for springing deadly assaults all over Pakistan. The policy was based on the premise that a high-level engagement would soften these hostile elements. No one in the establishment was prepared to read as to what was deep inside the minds of the militants. Deals were struck with the TTP leadership in April 2004 and November 2006, in South and North Waziristan, respectively. Special amnesty was extended to foreign warriors to stay in the area on the promise of good behaviour. Following the deals, the government obliged the militants, lowered its guards, packed up check posts and the troops came back to the barracks. This was a clear signal to the TTP to buy time, strengthen their position and escalate their suicidal missions. These forces were not only able to extend their outreach to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and urban Sindh, but were also in a dominating position to coerce and subjugate the local population to act as conduits and facilitators for their designs. That was the time when the footprints of every suicide bombing could be traced back to Waziristan. Nurseries of fidais were proliferating in the huge, mud-walled compounds in Waziristan. Success of the Swat operation was not capitalised upon and the operation’s scope wasn’t extended. The time and initiative that had been wrested was lost, followed by more deadly attacks on civilians and military installations.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been a bold and decisive move. More than its military dimension, it is the political dimension that stands out distinctly. Political leaders and clerics who had been looking at the whole problem through their myopic lenses had no choice but to rally around the new initiative. This has been a commendable achievement. Dissenting voices have been muffled in the light of the results on the ground throughout Pakistan.
The battle of Waziristan was by no means a straightforward operation, considering the topographical frictions of the battleground. A pitched battle raged at every conceivable point before the forces could secure it. The use of artillery and air power made the key difference. The local population, at the same time, had to be reassured of security and a resultant normal life in order to elicit their support for banishing extremist forces in their midst. The TTP had operated in the area while capitalising on beliefs, norms and the time-honoured tribal code. With little resistance from the state and the conceptual muddle at that level, the TTP and their affiliates were able to hold effortless sway. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has not only repulsed these elements from their strongholds, it has also severed the source of their manpower and logistics. While driving through the bumpy tracks further inside the area, one comes across huge, abandoned courtyards with high-rise observatory posts, which were used as transiting camps by the militants. Some of these are now being used by the stationed troops guarding various key points. Open grounds adjacent to population clusters were often used as phansi gah for the execution of derelicts by the militants. Basic facilities like health and education are now in operation but at a less than the optimal level.
I got the chance to visit a madrassa and spent some time with the instructors and the students. It was humming with the presence of both male and female students. The madrassa had the facilities for an improvised boarding school. On my query, I was told that it was run on charity with donations coming from Punjab and Karachi. The existence of the female section with boarding facility was a testimony to the kind of faith the local parents had in the institution.
Availability of potable water is still a problem area. The only plausible option is to rely on gravity base water supply schemes. The interaction with the tribals was very instructive. During discussions, some of them argued that when the call for jihad was given by the TTP, it was taken by most of the locals as a sacred duty. They did not question the intent of the callers till such time they started committing deadly acts. It was too late by then to counter them, with no one having the will or the capacity to do so. An elderly tribal said that it was not the strength of the Taliban, but the abject surrender on the part of the state that gave them the audacity to escalate their lethal attacks. There was no administration, which had just disappeared.
I still feel the resonance of a lament from a tribal who maintained that given a choice, he would not have allowed the militants to put their feet on his land. He further added that ideally he would not wish the military to station itself in the tribal areas either. However, now that the military is here, he felt that it must not leave the tribal areas without finishing its job first. This sentiment explained the dilemma of Waziristan where every other person is caught between hope and a lurking fear.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2016.