The death of Colonel Imam
Considering his support for the Taliban, what may have been the reasons for Col Imam's treatment and eventual death?
There are conflicting reports about the cause of death of Colonel Imam, about the place where he died, the groups responsible for his death and even the very manner of his death. A well-known former ISI officer, he was a strong supporter of the cause of the Taliban, idolised their six-year rule and felt proud of his contributions in shaping and organising the Taliban as a force. He openly criticised US intervention in Afghanistan and believed that withdrawal of foreign forces would guarantee peace in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Except for some adverse remarks against the local Taliban, he praised and supported jihadi activities. A man with such a background and credentials should not have been kidnapped and kept captive for almost a year by the forces he supported. What may have been the possible reasons for his treatment and eventual death?
Both parties, the group responsible for his kidnapping as well as the colonel, clearly miscalculated and misread the situation. Colonel Imam most likely overrated his standing among the militants. Since he had been supporting the cause of the Taliban and was always critical of the US, he was confident that extremists, operating in Tribal areas, would welcome him warmly. He was familiar with some areas in Afghanistan, but knew little about the dynamics of Fata, particularly the security environment that emerged post-9/11.
The kidnappers, most probably from a splinter group of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, misjudged the importance of the colonel. They may have heard stories about him, some true, some based on half-truths and most on glorification and fiction. They must have believed the stories run by the western media about retired ISI officers supporting al Qaeda and the Taliban. The demands his captors made for the release of people arrested for attacks on military installations after his capture would suggest that they believed he still worked for the army/ISI and that these institutions would have accepted such demands for his release.
The release of some terrorists by the army, in exchange for soldiers in the custody of Baitullah Mehsud, was also a precedent known to his abductors. However, like most Pakistanis, they were probably not aware that unless a retired officer is formally re-employed, no agency would task him to undertake any assignment.
Another important aspect highlighted by this incident is that there is no central authority of the terrorists operating in Fata. The likely scenario is that there are different cells, with probably variant goals and objectives, operating there and not interfering in each other’s affairs. Had there been a central authority, it could have exercised influence on the culprits to get the colonel released. The other possibility is that the colonel’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban leadership was perhaps not as close as he had claimed it to be.
Question marks on the Haqqani network’s control over North Waziristan also arise. It is likely that Jalaluddin Haqqani would have made all possible efforts for the colonel’s release, given Imam’s involvement in the Afghan jihad, of which Haqqani was a major player. The fact that he died in captivity, indicates that either Haqqani did not make any serious efforts for his release or he is not in a position to dictate terms to other groups operating in the area. The other possibility is that the release of terrorists involved in attacks on the GHQ and the Parade Lane mosque were considered more important than the life of Colonel Imam.
One may not agree with the vision and conviction of Colonel Imam, but the fact is that he was fully committed and dedicated to the cause which, in his opinion, was good for this country. May his soul rest in peace.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 26th, 2011.
Both parties, the group responsible for his kidnapping as well as the colonel, clearly miscalculated and misread the situation. Colonel Imam most likely overrated his standing among the militants. Since he had been supporting the cause of the Taliban and was always critical of the US, he was confident that extremists, operating in Tribal areas, would welcome him warmly. He was familiar with some areas in Afghanistan, but knew little about the dynamics of Fata, particularly the security environment that emerged post-9/11.
The kidnappers, most probably from a splinter group of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, misjudged the importance of the colonel. They may have heard stories about him, some true, some based on half-truths and most on glorification and fiction. They must have believed the stories run by the western media about retired ISI officers supporting al Qaeda and the Taliban. The demands his captors made for the release of people arrested for attacks on military installations after his capture would suggest that they believed he still worked for the army/ISI and that these institutions would have accepted such demands for his release.
The release of some terrorists by the army, in exchange for soldiers in the custody of Baitullah Mehsud, was also a precedent known to his abductors. However, like most Pakistanis, they were probably not aware that unless a retired officer is formally re-employed, no agency would task him to undertake any assignment.
Another important aspect highlighted by this incident is that there is no central authority of the terrorists operating in Fata. The likely scenario is that there are different cells, with probably variant goals and objectives, operating there and not interfering in each other’s affairs. Had there been a central authority, it could have exercised influence on the culprits to get the colonel released. The other possibility is that the colonel’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban leadership was perhaps not as close as he had claimed it to be.
Question marks on the Haqqani network’s control over North Waziristan also arise. It is likely that Jalaluddin Haqqani would have made all possible efforts for the colonel’s release, given Imam’s involvement in the Afghan jihad, of which Haqqani was a major player. The fact that he died in captivity, indicates that either Haqqani did not make any serious efforts for his release or he is not in a position to dictate terms to other groups operating in the area. The other possibility is that the release of terrorists involved in attacks on the GHQ and the Parade Lane mosque were considered more important than the life of Colonel Imam.
One may not agree with the vision and conviction of Colonel Imam, but the fact is that he was fully committed and dedicated to the cause which, in his opinion, was good for this country. May his soul rest in peace.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 26th, 2011.