The role of the ‘biradri’ in winning elections
Substantive evidence is now available to prove that factionalism largely determined the electoral process
The writer is a social activist who is the National Coordinator for Pattan Development Organisation. The views expressed here are his own
Local government (LG) polls have appeared to prove what Hamza Alavi (1921- 2003) — a renowned Marxist academic and activist — had argued decades ago about factionalism (dharray bandi) in rural Punjab. Substantive evidence is now available to prove that dharray bandi largely determined the electoral process (from the declaring of candidature, panel formation, canvassing to voting behaviour) in all three phases of the LG polls in Punjab. Party loyalties evaporated like water under the sun. The heat of local dynamics hit even the most known loyalists of contesting parties. Interestingly, party leaders preferred to look the other way because they could not afford to annoy factional leaders or electables. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the roots and role of primordial networks — dharray bandi — in electoral politics and local development.
When we talk about politics in Pakistan, it is always about politicians and hardly about political parties. This differentiation carries vital importance due to its implications on democratic governance. Despite the enormous explosion of electronic and social media and the coverage given to politicians, the peoples’ alienation from political leaders continues to rise. Political parties are meant to establish party chapters at all levels in order to engage with the public, helping to reduce alienation. But most parties in our country care little for this. A vote bank is very often guaranteed by the leaders of local factions — biradris, clans and sects. Such factions exist in some form or the other everywhere in Punjab. The leaders of the networks are easily accessible to their members as they live in the same vicinity, interact with them and respond to their needs. They aggregate and articulate their collective needs and negotiate with politicians and government officials on behalf of their members.
Though these factions play an important role at the local level in the absence of parties, it is extremely dangerous to promote competition amongst them, as this hinders societal progress and allows bigotry and misogyny to thrive. In the absence of non-partisan civil society organisations at the local level, the significance of primordial factions is heightened in electoral politics and governance. Most officials do not care even if actions of factions go against the objectives of public policy. For instance, while the National Action Plan strives to eliminate extremism and sectarianism, many politicians continue to cultivate sectarian factions. In Jhang, for instance, the ruling party stalwarts collaborated with a banned outfit in local polls.
What makes these primordial networks so popular amongst politicians? The ‘proximity model’ developed by some Western scholars can help us understand this. The proponents of this model argue that ‘voters prefer candidates closer to them’. Though the model is useful in understanding voter behaviour in our country, the context here is different from the one prevalent in Western societies. We don’t have political parties making contact at neighbourhood level. Instead, we have primordial factions that do this job. A network leader, who would most likely be very close to the heads of the families residing in his vicinity, will have a strong following and firm grip over the voters. He would demand little else from them other than their support in the form of votes. Despite this relationship, the network leader doesn’t take the people for granted. Very often, prior to declaring his candidature or support to a particular party/candidate, a wise factional leader would go through a consultative process and obtain the consent of the communities. Very often, the whole process is diligently manipulated. During general elections, most factional leaders would support nominees of political parties, but in local elections they would prefer to contest as candidates themselves. No wonder we had more independent candidates in the LG polls than those nominated by parties.
A traditional politician invests heavily in factional leaders because they can guarantee him a certain vote bank. In the recently held LG polls, this ground reality pushed most (if not all) incumbent MPs and party affiliates to rebel against party decisions and contest the elections as independent candidates if they weren’t issued a ticket by their party. Independents candidates won 53 per cent of the general seats in the LG polls, while capturing 46 per cent of all seats in Punjab. In the constituencies where collaboration existed between a political party and a local factional leader, the party hierarchy remained united and the likelihood of victory was higher. As the PML-N diligently adopted this approach in most places, a large majority of its candidates won. Similarly, as the PTI was split between its ideological followers and traditional politicians, it lost in most constituencies. In short, no political party can match the mobilisation potential of the primordial networks due to their proximity and reciprocity with the local people.
Interestingly, the bureaucracy, too, heavily relies on factional heads, and during elections, local administration and the police also prefer to support them. As a result, a nexus is being developed between politicians, the civil administration and heads of primordial factions. This nexus also promotes certain cultural norms such as the reinforcement of power structures and subordination. No wonder state officials often violate rules and laws to appease heads of the factions. This tendency increases during polling, as the election commission staff, instead of upholding the code of conduct, submits to the needs of the factional heads and government officials. Any politician whose politics is heavily dependent on heads of primordial networks would not mind sacrificing laws and the code of conduct. It was this nexus that failed almost all reforms and helped foster political dynasties in most districts. With each election, the primordial networks grew stronger and political parties weaker. Consider this — in the general elections from 1970 until 1997, the term ‘electable’ was rarely used. From 2002 onwards, it has gradually become a norm.
Political leaders should understand that the electable dynasties (based on primordial networks) cannot be an alternative to political parties as the former pose a great threat to reforms. Social cohesion is also under threat because of primordial factionalism and sectarianism. The political leadership must evolve a strategy to transform these networks into formal political institutions. This could be started by motivating local councillors to join parties, not just for the sake of electing mayors and chairmen, but also for strengthening a culture of party politics in the country. This, of course, would need a sustained effort — launching a membership campaign, holding party elections at all levels on a regular basis, establishing party offices, convening party conventions every year, and so on. This will help transform the primordial factions and networks into modern political institutions. A political party interested in reform, the elimination of gender disparities, and the deepening of democracy and good governance will learn a lot from the heads of factions whose strength lies in their proximity and reciprocity to the people. But foundations of the proximity and reciprocity must be transformed from primordial to such that are able to serve all.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 9th, 2016.
When we talk about politics in Pakistan, it is always about politicians and hardly about political parties. This differentiation carries vital importance due to its implications on democratic governance. Despite the enormous explosion of electronic and social media and the coverage given to politicians, the peoples’ alienation from political leaders continues to rise. Political parties are meant to establish party chapters at all levels in order to engage with the public, helping to reduce alienation. But most parties in our country care little for this. A vote bank is very often guaranteed by the leaders of local factions — biradris, clans and sects. Such factions exist in some form or the other everywhere in Punjab. The leaders of the networks are easily accessible to their members as they live in the same vicinity, interact with them and respond to their needs. They aggregate and articulate their collective needs and negotiate with politicians and government officials on behalf of their members.
Though these factions play an important role at the local level in the absence of parties, it is extremely dangerous to promote competition amongst them, as this hinders societal progress and allows bigotry and misogyny to thrive. In the absence of non-partisan civil society organisations at the local level, the significance of primordial factions is heightened in electoral politics and governance. Most officials do not care even if actions of factions go against the objectives of public policy. For instance, while the National Action Plan strives to eliminate extremism and sectarianism, many politicians continue to cultivate sectarian factions. In Jhang, for instance, the ruling party stalwarts collaborated with a banned outfit in local polls.
What makes these primordial networks so popular amongst politicians? The ‘proximity model’ developed by some Western scholars can help us understand this. The proponents of this model argue that ‘voters prefer candidates closer to them’. Though the model is useful in understanding voter behaviour in our country, the context here is different from the one prevalent in Western societies. We don’t have political parties making contact at neighbourhood level. Instead, we have primordial factions that do this job. A network leader, who would most likely be very close to the heads of the families residing in his vicinity, will have a strong following and firm grip over the voters. He would demand little else from them other than their support in the form of votes. Despite this relationship, the network leader doesn’t take the people for granted. Very often, prior to declaring his candidature or support to a particular party/candidate, a wise factional leader would go through a consultative process and obtain the consent of the communities. Very often, the whole process is diligently manipulated. During general elections, most factional leaders would support nominees of political parties, but in local elections they would prefer to contest as candidates themselves. No wonder we had more independent candidates in the LG polls than those nominated by parties.
A traditional politician invests heavily in factional leaders because they can guarantee him a certain vote bank. In the recently held LG polls, this ground reality pushed most (if not all) incumbent MPs and party affiliates to rebel against party decisions and contest the elections as independent candidates if they weren’t issued a ticket by their party. Independents candidates won 53 per cent of the general seats in the LG polls, while capturing 46 per cent of all seats in Punjab. In the constituencies where collaboration existed between a political party and a local factional leader, the party hierarchy remained united and the likelihood of victory was higher. As the PML-N diligently adopted this approach in most places, a large majority of its candidates won. Similarly, as the PTI was split between its ideological followers and traditional politicians, it lost in most constituencies. In short, no political party can match the mobilisation potential of the primordial networks due to their proximity and reciprocity with the local people.
Interestingly, the bureaucracy, too, heavily relies on factional heads, and during elections, local administration and the police also prefer to support them. As a result, a nexus is being developed between politicians, the civil administration and heads of primordial factions. This nexus also promotes certain cultural norms such as the reinforcement of power structures and subordination. No wonder state officials often violate rules and laws to appease heads of the factions. This tendency increases during polling, as the election commission staff, instead of upholding the code of conduct, submits to the needs of the factional heads and government officials. Any politician whose politics is heavily dependent on heads of primordial networks would not mind sacrificing laws and the code of conduct. It was this nexus that failed almost all reforms and helped foster political dynasties in most districts. With each election, the primordial networks grew stronger and political parties weaker. Consider this — in the general elections from 1970 until 1997, the term ‘electable’ was rarely used. From 2002 onwards, it has gradually become a norm.
Political leaders should understand that the electable dynasties (based on primordial networks) cannot be an alternative to political parties as the former pose a great threat to reforms. Social cohesion is also under threat because of primordial factionalism and sectarianism. The political leadership must evolve a strategy to transform these networks into formal political institutions. This could be started by motivating local councillors to join parties, not just for the sake of electing mayors and chairmen, but also for strengthening a culture of party politics in the country. This, of course, would need a sustained effort — launching a membership campaign, holding party elections at all levels on a regular basis, establishing party offices, convening party conventions every year, and so on. This will help transform the primordial factions and networks into modern political institutions. A political party interested in reform, the elimination of gender disparities, and the deepening of democracy and good governance will learn a lot from the heads of factions whose strength lies in their proximity and reciprocity to the people. But foundations of the proximity and reciprocity must be transformed from primordial to such that are able to serve all.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 9th, 2016.