Stabilising Afghanistan
Evidence from history would lead to the conclusion that Pakistan has a fundamental interest in stabilising Afghanistan
The writer is a professor of political science at LUMS
Pakistan has a fundamental interest in stabilising Afghanistan. I believe this is our major national security interest. Every piece of practical reasoning and evidence from history of the various Afghan wars, ancient and modern, would lead to this conclusion. The debris of the two longest wars fought in this region by the great powers has badly affected Pakistani society and the national security environment. Oddly, we have been part of both the wars, playing a direct part in the first one waged by anti-Soviet Mujahideen, and indirectly in the longer 14-year war, which has yet to see a peaceful end. The complexities that led local, national and international actors to get sucked into Afghanistan left hardly any room for Pakistan to isolate itself from the events taking place in its western neighbourhood.
Afghanistan is a strategic necessity for Pakistan, more than a choice. All this is due to negative factors, such as the largest refugee population in the world living in Pakistan for the longest of periods, the inflow and outflow of militant groups, the borderless conflict zones and the deadliest of conflicts launched by two superpowers. These conflicts have had a strong, adverse impact on Pakistan. However, deciding what the best strategy is for Pakistan to end the conflict in Afghanistan is debatable — knowing well that in whatever way the conflict ends, if it ever does, Pakistan will face adverse consequences. The real problem on both sides of the ‘border’ has been the absence of empathy and statesmanship. The leaderships, installed, elected or manufactured, have neither personal standing nor any insight into the history of these peoples and cannot look beyond current events.
We are two nations — equal, separate, somewhat sovereign with multiple layers of common history, shared conflicts, interwoven tribal and ethnic communities and open borders, both for ordinary people as well as violent groups. We are physically, culturally and by any standard of common interest, very close. Yet, we are distant, distrusting of each other, and often clash on several issues. Conflict more than cooperation has shaped the history of relations between the two countries. We must understand why this is the case in order to shape a better future for the future generations of this region.
There are two simplistic explanations of why things have been so bad, one from the Pakistan side and the other from the Afghanistan side, although the list of allegations, counter-allegations, and countless episodes of conflict over the past six decades may cover hundreds of pages. Interference and intervention is the consistent accusation that Afghanistan has regularly levelled against Pakistan for the last three-and-a-half decades. Pakistan ostensibly indulged in interference in order to gain ‘strategic depth’, a very subjective construct which is hard to lend any meaning. The Pakistani side believes that the weak Afghan state has created many vulnerabilities that are easily exploited by powers adversarial to Pakistan. The weakness of the Afghan state has been used to turn Pakistan into a common threat in order to secure economic and military assistance.
On either side of the ‘border’, we can go on and on complaining, maligning and accusing each other, as is often the case when we meet Afghans and their local supporters in seminars. There is a wise, practical and rational choice in even in the worst of circumstances, but one must be cool-headed enough to know what that would be. The biggest challenge for all stakeholders, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the great powers and the world at large, is to end the war. We have all failed so far in meeting this challenge.
Afghan reconciliation must be the central objective. The four-state framework — Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US — is a good starting point to bring an end to the decades-long conflict. However, there has to be a common interest and a shared responsibility.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 30th, 2015.
Afghanistan is a strategic necessity for Pakistan, more than a choice. All this is due to negative factors, such as the largest refugee population in the world living in Pakistan for the longest of periods, the inflow and outflow of militant groups, the borderless conflict zones and the deadliest of conflicts launched by two superpowers. These conflicts have had a strong, adverse impact on Pakistan. However, deciding what the best strategy is for Pakistan to end the conflict in Afghanistan is debatable — knowing well that in whatever way the conflict ends, if it ever does, Pakistan will face adverse consequences. The real problem on both sides of the ‘border’ has been the absence of empathy and statesmanship. The leaderships, installed, elected or manufactured, have neither personal standing nor any insight into the history of these peoples and cannot look beyond current events.
We are two nations — equal, separate, somewhat sovereign with multiple layers of common history, shared conflicts, interwoven tribal and ethnic communities and open borders, both for ordinary people as well as violent groups. We are physically, culturally and by any standard of common interest, very close. Yet, we are distant, distrusting of each other, and often clash on several issues. Conflict more than cooperation has shaped the history of relations between the two countries. We must understand why this is the case in order to shape a better future for the future generations of this region.
There are two simplistic explanations of why things have been so bad, one from the Pakistan side and the other from the Afghanistan side, although the list of allegations, counter-allegations, and countless episodes of conflict over the past six decades may cover hundreds of pages. Interference and intervention is the consistent accusation that Afghanistan has regularly levelled against Pakistan for the last three-and-a-half decades. Pakistan ostensibly indulged in interference in order to gain ‘strategic depth’, a very subjective construct which is hard to lend any meaning. The Pakistani side believes that the weak Afghan state has created many vulnerabilities that are easily exploited by powers adversarial to Pakistan. The weakness of the Afghan state has been used to turn Pakistan into a common threat in order to secure economic and military assistance.
On either side of the ‘border’, we can go on and on complaining, maligning and accusing each other, as is often the case when we meet Afghans and their local supporters in seminars. There is a wise, practical and rational choice in even in the worst of circumstances, but one must be cool-headed enough to know what that would be. The biggest challenge for all stakeholders, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the great powers and the world at large, is to end the war. We have all failed so far in meeting this challenge.
Afghan reconciliation must be the central objective. The four-state framework — Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US — is a good starting point to bring an end to the decades-long conflict. However, there has to be a common interest and a shared responsibility.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 30th, 2015.