SAT-Atlantic joint accountability on 5 years of Taliban rule

Five years of the Afghan Taliban rule is a story of internal unrest, economic failure, restrictions on women's rights and media freedom and diplomatic isolation. The most important and worth mentioning is making the entire region the most unsafe place. These are findings of two major assessments, from the Atlantic Council's South Asia Centre and  South Asia Times (SAT).

Both reports have once again validated Islamabad's stance that since 2021 Afghanistan has become a hub of terrorism, making the region unsafe.

The Atlantic Council's September 2026 assessment states that the Taliban government maintains relationships, alliances or tolerance with more than a dozen armed groups whose main targets are outside Afghanistan. The list documented by the report and UN monitors includes al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM/TIP), Jamaat Ansarullah and several Central Asian jihadist organisations.

Senior Fellow Michael Kugelman, who authored the South Asia section, notes that Afghanistan continues to provide a favourable environment for these groups to recruit, raise funds, produce propaganda and plan operations. Al-Qaeda, while significantly weakened compared to its pre-2001 peak, is using this sanctuary to focus on rebuilding its networks.

The most dangerous immediate spillover, according to the Council, is the TTP. The report concludes that one of the Taliban's most dangerous allies, TTP, is using bases in Afghanistan to carry out sustained attacks inside Pakistan. This creates a dangerous paradox: regime security inside Afghanistan can coexist with worsening insecurity for its neighbours. The Taliban's official claim that Afghan soil is not being used against any other country, the report notes, is not credible.

The SAT report, titled Taliban 2.0: The Five-Year Ledger," goes beyond security and presents a full governance audit of five years.

On diplomacy, it notes that recognition remains fragmented and limited. Russia formally recognised the Islamic Emirate in July 2025, becoming the first major power to do so, but of 65 Afghan overseas missions, only 37 are currently under Taliban control. The rest are still run by diplomats appointed by the former Republic, or are closed. No Western state has recognised the regime.

On governance, the report examines how the Taliban has replaced a civil service-based state with a clerical and security-driven administration. Courts now run on the Taliban's strict interpretation of Sharia, civil service capacity has shrunk, and the justice system relies on harsh corporal punishments.

On the economy, the picture is bleak. The report documents high levels of poverty and malnutrition, a collapsed formal banking sector, and heavy reliance on humanitarian aid. The much-publicised opium ban has been enforced, but the report warns it has been replaced by a rapid rise in the production of synthetic narcotics like methamphetamine, which are harder to track.

On education and society, it highlights two parallel trends: a massive expansion of madrassas and a retreat of modern, secular schooling, and a systematic exclusion of women and minorities from public life, education and employment.

On security, SAT aligns closely with the Atlantic Council and UN monitoring. It maps the presence of regional militant networks across Afghanistan and compares Afghanistan's trajectory to Somalia and Syria, states where central authority exists but does not prevent militant sanctuaries. It also documents the armed resistance since 2021, particularly in Badakhshan and pockets of the north, but concludes that no resistance currently poses an existential threat to the Taliban.

Finally, it assesses foreign relations. Pakistan-Taliban relations have deteriorated sharply over TTP; China and Iran maintain pragmatic security engagement focused on ETIM and border issues; Central Asian states are increasingly alarmed; while India, the Gulf and the West pursue a policy of engagement without recognition.

Both reports reach the same final assessment that Afghanistan is likely to remain an important environment for terrorist activity in the near future.  The international community's hope that territorial control would lead to responsible behaviour has not materialised. The Taliban's counterterrorism is selective, tough on enemies within, tolerant of allies who fight outside. That model may secure Kabul, but it exports insecurity to Pakistan, Central Asia, China and beyond.

In short, UN monitoring and SIGAR reports, recent Atlantic Council &  SAT reports have repeatedly proved with evidence that Afghanistan has become an exporter of terrorism and chaos, and a platform for regional terrorist organisations. But no one has paid any heed. The entire region is bearing the brunt, but Western countries, equally responsible, have limited their role in passing condemnation statements.

This approach indirectly encouraged the Afghan Taliban to continue with the status quo.  Afghan Taliban policies will not change till the world community sincerely and with full command forces them to rein in terror groups and fulfil commitments under the Doha Accord.  Now the question arises whether the world community and regional powers will hold the Afghan Taliban government accountable or will wait for next year's reports.