Pakistan can't maintain its railways. Why are we planning a $62b corridor?

Pakistan Railways runs an annual deficit of 55 billion rupees. Between 45% and 90% of the existing rail infrastructure is obsolete and unusable. The bridges are nearly a century old, the sleepers are collapsing, and operations are suspended nationwide for days at a time because the system can no longer function.

Meanwhile, Pakistan announced CPEC 2.0 in 2024 with a $62 billion budget. The centerpiece is the ML-1 railway project—a $6.7 billion upgrade connecting Karachi to Peshawar. It has been redesigned several times. Chinese planners have submitted feasibility reports. Pakistan has not finalized the plan. Now the Asian Development Bank is expressing interest in funding it.

This is Pakistani infrastructure policy in miniature: we cannot maintain what the British built a century ago, but we confidently announce megaprojects we have no demonstrated capacity to execute.

What we inherited, what we destroyed

At independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited an integrated transportation network. The British had built railways connecting Delhi to Lahore and Jodhpur to Karachi. Road networks extended from Calcutta to Peshawar. Multiple routes connected Pakistan to Afghanistan: the Khyber Pass from Peshawar to Kabul, the Bolan Pass from Quetta to Kandahar, the Gomal Pass from DI Khan to Ghazni, and the Kuram Pass from Parachinar to Khost. Land and sea routes linked Pakistan to Iran through Zahedan, Quetta, and Karachi, with ports at Bandar Abbas, Chahbahar, Gwadar, and Ormara. A British rail route ran from Quetta through Nushki and Nokkundi to Zahedan.

The British understood what Pakistan apparently forgot: efficient transport networks drive commerce, enable resource extraction, and facilitate regional integration. They invested heavily in railway construction, road corridors, and port infrastructure linking South Asia with Central Asia and the Middle East.

Seventy-eight years later, most of these routes are dormant or deteriorated. Pakistan struggles with political instability, security risks, economic crises, high inflation, and poorly planned policies. GDP growth has averaged 3-4% over the last two decades. Inflation stands at 11%. One million professionals have left the country due to a lack of jobs and opportunities. The current account deficit is -2.30% of GDP. Foreign investment remains insufficient. The government borrows from international donors every three to four months to pay salaries. Climate change has cost billions, with ongoing expenses mounting.

No one denies Pakistan's strategic geographic location, bordering China to the north, India to the east, Iran and Afghanistan to the west. This positioning could allow Pakistan to serve as a connector between Central Asia, the Middle East, and China. However, strategic location means nothing without functioning infrastructure and institutional capacity.

The CPEC confusion

China launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 with an initial investment of $160 billion, attracting 70 countries. The initiative aims to connect China with the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, and Africa through land and maritime routes. According to President Xi's philosophy, such routes are essential for building a business and production-based economy.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor became BRI's flagship project. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed the MOU during his April 2015 visit to Pakistan for $46 billion, which was later revised to $62 billion in 2024. The allocation: $35 billion for energy projects including power plants, coal, hydropower, wind, and solar initiatives to address Pakistan's energy crisis; $5.3 billion for construction and upgrading of roads and motorways; $6.7 billion for the ML-1 project connecting Karachi to Peshawar over 1,750 km; and the remainder for Gwadar Port development, industrial cooperation, IT, and agriculture.

The partnership between Pakistan and China is often described as a bond "deeper than the oceans and higher than the Himalayas," encompassing economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation. Both nations recognized the transformative potential of collaboration to address burgeoning populations, rapid industrialization needs, and enhanced regional connectivity.

However, ten years into CPEC, confusion reigns. CPEC 2.0 was launched in 2024, but the specifics of the ML-1 project remain unclear. The railway has been redesigned multiple times. Chinese planners have submitted feasibility reports, but Pakistan has not finalized plans. The Asian Development Bank is now showing interest in funding this upgrade—Pakistan's largest infrastructure project under BRI.

According to recent reports, Pakistan has invited other countries to participate in CPEC investment. The proposal has not yet received mutual acceptance from China and Pakistan.

The capacity question

Pakistan's strategic planners face decisions about whether to align with BRICS, the G7, or the G20. Pakistan is not currently a member of any of these alliances. The BRICS concept was coined by Jim O'Neill in 2001, and the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India, and China met in 2006.

However, these geopolitical considerations miss the fundamental problem: Pakistan cannot maintain basic infrastructure. Before discussing membership in global economic alliances or the execution of $62 billion corridors, Pakistan must prove it can fix its railways.

Regional accessibility and connectivity require a clear National State Vision. The state needs to identify priorities—which modes or projects to prioritize. A uniform national transport policy must be formulated with a clear rationale and empirical data, and aligned with KPIs to enable progress evaluation. The Ministry of Transport should coordinate with all relevant authorities and assign specific tasks, sub-indicators, and clear timelines. The Ministry of Planning and Development should monitor overall progress and report to the Prime Minister to ensure alignment between the National Transportation Policy and the National Strategic Plan.

Pakistan's strategic planners and policymakers need to leverage the country's location to their advantage. Although 78 years have passed since independence, we still struggle to define state priorities and goals. A long-term vision must be established.

What could work (If we execute)

Phase 1 of regional connectivity would ensure regional economic integration, economic uplift for Western and Northern Pakistan, strategic access to Central Asia and Russia, reduced transit times and costs, and strategic leverage for diplomacy.

The PAKAFUZ Railway Project represents progress toward improving trade and travel between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. This project would enhance the Taftan-Zahedan railway, build the Gwadar-Chabahar route, and strengthen Pakistan's role in the North-South Transport Corridor, facilitating the transport of goods to Russia via Iran. Reopening essential trade routes such as Wagah-Attari and Munabao-Khokhrapar would boost trade and cooperation in the region. These projects would improve Western and Northern Pakistan's access to Central Asia and Russia while significantly reducing transit times and costs.

Phase 2 could run parallel with Phase 1, shifting CPEC from infrastructure partnerships to industrialization. Special Economic Zones could drive manufacturing, export processing, and technology development. Completing ML-1 within a specified timeline would increase tonnage capacity to 25 tonnes, raise speed to 160 km/h, and connect Gwadar Port to regional markets including Central Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa. The energy pipeline project with Iran would address energy needs while promoting regional cooperation.

The shift from an infrastructure focus to an industrialization strategy could enhance manufacturing capabilities, boost export processing, foster technological advancement, and drive economic growth. These elements elevate Pakistan's industrial potential and deepen its integration into global supply chains.

The Reality

All of this remains hypothetical until Pakistan demonstrates execution capacity. The country needs a reconstruction phase to identify and address fundamental problems. This requires strategic foresight to understand that a modern connectivity corridor—with its complex network of roads, railways, and energy projects—demands institutional capacity Pakistan currently lacks.

Major infrastructure projects like Gwadar Port and various transportation networks require technological advances and innovations that Pakistan must develop or acquire. We must scrutinize our challenges honestly and, if necessary, start with smaller, achievable projects that prove we can maintain and operate infrastructure before scaling to regional transformation.

Pakistan's strategic location, bordered by China, India, Iran, and Afghanistan, means nothing if we cannot build or maintain anything. The British understood this. China understands this.

We do not need another phase, another corridor, another megaproject announcement. We need to demonstrate that we can maintain a single railway system. Then we can discuss connecting Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.