Countries should commit to no-first-use policy. PHOTO: FILE
It would be ideal for world peace if countries with nuclear weapons commit mutually to a no-first-use policy and eventually get rid off their nuke arsenals over the next few decades.
Ground realities dictate Pakistan and India have a discussion on the nuclear tension in the subcontinent and that is not possible without addressing the Kashmir dispute. Experts expressed these views during the final sessions of the three-day “Nuclear Deterrence and Emerging Dynamics in South Asia” conference. The conference was organised by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University.
Lt Gen. (retd) Raza Muhammad Khan, a former National Defence University (NDU) president, said rationality, the main principle of deterrence, should be considered in the use of tactical weapons. Pakistan and India “cannot sustain the long-term costs of their nuclear weapons systems.”
Dr Vladimir Kozin, a Russian expert said it was his desire that all nuclear armed countries “announce mutual commitment to no first use.” The no-first-use policy states that a nuclear power will not use nuclear weapons against another country unless it is attacked first.
Kozin said nuclear states should also follow the US and Russia in nuclear reduction talks. As a final target, he said, all nuclear powers should work towards a final target date to destroy, dismantle and replace their nuclear weapons arsenals.
In his official capacity as the head of advisers to the director of the state-run Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Kozin said no country including Russia and the US, have ever had any bilateral or multilateral talks on tactical nuclear weapons.
Talks by other speakers centered on tactical weapons and nuclear deterrence in the South Asian context. Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, director of Quaid-i-Azam University’s School of Politics and International Relations, said arms control is between equal states. “India might call itself Pakistan’s equal but the world’s treatment of India belies this equality.” India has a bloodletting strategy, he added.
SASSI University Director General Maria Sultan said the rules of deterrence are the same for tactical and strategic weapons: the ability to penetrate the enemy’s defence, maintain survivability of own assets and enhancing capability to strike the enemy.
“Nuclear deterrence is only credible if you clearly communicate that this is our capability, this is our national resolve and this is how we will retaliate if we are attacked,” Sultan said, responding to a question on the credibility of deterrence measures.
Maiza Hameed, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz parliamentarian, said economic stability should also factor in a discussion about Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Economic stability is more important for Pakistan, so that the country is stronger economically to put its cards on the negotiation table, she added.
Zulfiqar Khan, head of NDU’s Strategic and Nuclear Studies department, said disarmament is not on the Indian agenda. India is energy- starved and needs to meet demand created by economic growth. It might look to cooperate with other regional countries and regional relations might evolve, he added.
Jaspal also said deterrence is not a stated concept. It evolves with time, he said. “The number of weapons understood by the term minimum deterrence level might vary.”
Published in The Express Tribune, May 16th, 2014.
COMMENTS (8)
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ
1713904359-0/burn-(1)1713904359-0-270x192.webp)
A reply to "Unbelievable" May 16, 7:10 PM: Putin did not cancell the NFU policy - it is is stiill valid. See current Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (available in the Internet). Russia will respond by nuclear weapons if it is attacked. Russia does not pursue the policy of 'offensive' nuclear deterrence, but rather a 'defensive' nuclear deterrence. Russia does not deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the other states (the USA does in Europe and Turkey). Russia does not have a strategy of 'preventive' and preemptive' nuclear strikes. Russian nuclear potential is not supported by ballistic missile defense fielded in foreign countries, while the USA nuclear arsenals in Europe are backed by the US missile defense assets. The idea of NFU policy by all nuclear states has been proposed by the Soviet Union a long time ago, but Western nuclear powers decided not to support it. Moscow initiated and signed on billateral basis de-targeting agreements with the USA, France and the UK for indefinite term. Russia and the PRC have commited to NFU policy in a number political declarations.
It is simplistic to dismiss “no first use” as merely declaratory, easily ignored in war time. A universal no-first-use policy by all nine nuclear-armed states would have considerable practical import with flow-on requirements for nuclear force posture and deployment, for example, de-alerting (taking warheads off hair-trigger alert), de-mating (separating warheads from delivery systems), and de-targeting. China is already a good exemplar on this point.
Dr Vladimir Kozin, a Russian expert said it was his desire that all nuclear armed countries “announce mutual commitment to no first use.” . He should save that speech for Putin who announced cancellation of the "no first use" policy when it became obvious that the West had superior technology/conventional power. The reality is that any country that has nukes will likely use them in the event that their conventional weapons are defeated. No first use is a nice public relations gesture .. doesn't mean that nukes wont' be used.
Nuclear weapons were invented to cope with Germany, used to defeat Japan, and deployed most extensively against the Soviet Union. Their primary strategic rationale disappeared with the end of the Cold War. The very fact that nuclear weapons have not been used again since 1945 is powerful evidence that their sheer destructiveness makes them virtually unusable.It is simplistic to dismiss “no first use” as merely declaratory, easily ignored in war time. A universal no-first-use policy by all nine nuclear-armed states would have considerable practical import with flow-on requirements for nuclear force posture and deployment, for example, de-alerting (taking warheads off hair-trigger alert), de-mating (separating warheads from delivery systems), and de-targeting. China is already a good exemplar on this point.
States possessing nuclear weapons must be clear in their policies towards the use of nuclear weapons. In the cold war era, presence of nuclear weapons were a major threat to the security of the states but later on same weapons became the reason for deterrence against any aggression. I personally think that numbers of nuclear weapons doesn't matter as long as the concept of deterrence is credible enough. Execution of no first use policy depends on the threats it have, like in case of Pakistan it cannot adhere to the no first use policy because of Indian day by day developments, its superiority in conventional forces are all making Pakistan to go First Use policy.
Things take quite a reverse turn when we talk about nuclear. The ultimate reality is this that it is state’s national interest to have nuclear and it is of collective interest to have disarmament. States should stick to NFU policy despite of any change of political administration. How much successful the arms reduction between US and Russia is evident to every one? We can be successful only when states got security about their statehood and prevalence of trust. Nuclear is not an individual business of a state, any single handed mistake can bring havoc to the world. There is a need to take practical steps to reduce number of nukes rather proposing treaties in black and white all the time.
I think opting global no first use will never eventually lead to complete disarmament. Though, nuclear states adhere to complete elimination of nukes but a fixed time period lacks. 2ndly the nuclear policy of 1st use or no first use actually depends upon security model as well as threat perception of that states. A weaker nuclear states have only one way that is use or lose. Hence in such conditions global no first use policy is unacceptable for weaker states.