Taliban talks are a complex, long-term process

Specialists in conflict, terrorism and negotiation weigh in on Pakistan’s options for talks with the TTP.

KARACHI: Talking peace with the Taliban has probably been the most divisive topic in Pakistani politics today. Complex issues regarding strategy, counter-insurgency, radicalism, civil-military relations and negotiations have essentially been condensed to a singular question:

To talk or not to talk?

With the government once again reaching out to Maulana Samiul Haq to break the ice for talks with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the debate over how to handle Pakistan’s militancy problem – probably the most divisive topic in the country – has resurfaced again.

That question is problematic enough. The PML-N was vocal during the election campaign in its policy of pursuing a peaceful, negotiated settlement with the TTP, while Imran Khan’s PTI has been the most vocal proponent of extending the olive branch to militants. Both these parties’ policies were vindicated in a landmark All-Parties Conference in September that unanimously adopted a resolution to pursue a negotiated settlement.

Following the APC, however, things have hardly gone according to plan. First, a series of terrorist attacks in Peshawar in September, including the bombing of a church and the assassination of a senior army general, prompted serious doubt over the Taliban’s willingness to reciprocate to the government’s overtures. The initial consensus has also disintegrated, and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the PPP chief has publicly gone on an offensive against the militants. Conversely, Imran Khan has accused the PML-N of not moving quickly enough on the resolution. Both cases have compromised the initial consensus that the political establishment had sought over the issue.

Then, on 1^st November, Hakimullah Mehsud, the TTP’s leader was killed in an American drone strike. This not only prompted the TTP to reverse its previous openness to talks, it also compelled the government to shelve their plans indefinitely. It didn’t help that the TTP chose Mullah Fazlullah, known for terrorizing Swat and ordering Malala Yousafzai’s assassination, an established hard liner as the TTP’s next leader. Hence, it did not come as a surprise that Fazlullah affirmed that the TTP is not interested in having peace talks at present.

The government’s resolve has not been shaken, though. By December 20^th, the security establishment continued to discuss restarting the nascent peace process. Still, violent flare-ups in the tribal areas have compelled the military to take action against alleged militants, most recently on 19^th December in Miranli, North Waziristan. Despite the army denial, the TTP has accused the Pakistani military of preparing for a concerted military operation. After the fighting, Maulana Fazlul Rahman of JUI-F has urged the military to stop and let supplies in. Hence, there still may be some disagreement between civilian and military camps regarding what the best strategy may be in dealing with the militant threat.

Yet the government’s move of approaching Maulana Samiullah to “break the ice” has seen the effort come back on the tracks.



A Conversation with experts

The Express Tribune spoke to four experts that specialize in radicalism, counter-terrorism, and Pakistani politics to shed light on, among other things, the state of militancy in Pakistan today, the status and prospects of peace talks with the TTP, and other actions that the government can take to curb the terrorist threat. The interviews revealed an academic community that itself is divided over what route to take. While they hardly formed a consensus, a couple of factors seemed to ring true across the board: Pakistan cannot kill its way to victory. And conversely, there is hardly any guarantee that peace talks would succeed. Ultimately, deep structural reforms in the judiciary, police and education systems need to be made, which may even take 20 years before any credible results may be observed. The road to peace is dangerous and undetermined.



Should talks even be considered?



Tom Parker is the former director for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Policy at Amnesty International. He is currently an independent consultant. “I think there’s always merit to negotiations. There’s that great Churchill saying: “Jaw-jaw is always better than war-war” and I think there’s a lot of truth to that. Purely from an intelligence point of view, talking to people is a great way to find out what they’re thinking. You don’t need James Bond; you just sit down and ask them,” he said.



Others also showed reserved optimism. “But the situation is much worse for Pakistan because Mullah Fazlullah is the leader. But still, if we have to keep some optimism, he did engage in peace talks back in 2008 when he was trying to take over Swat and the Pakistani government was also a part of those peace talks. So of course it isn’t completely impossible to talk to a person like Mullah Fazlullah,” said Mona Sheikh, an academic working at the Danish Institute for International Studies, specializing in radicalism, focusing particularly on the TTP.

However, both Michael Kugelman and Daniel Markey, Pakistan fellows at the Wilson Centre and Council on Foreign Relations respectively, disagreed. As Markey saw it, the government ought to pursue to talks “with the expectation that they would fail”. The tactic, then, would ensure that “you’d have a broader swathe of the Pakistani public behind you to support a more aggressive military campaign afterwards.”

Kugelman made a similar argument. “If talks are pursued and they fail, then it would be much easier for the military and political leadership of Pakistan to get support from the public for some type of new expanded operation against the TTP.”



An inconclusive look at history



There is reason for both proponents and opponents of peace talks to look to history to substantiate their arguments. Parker refers to IRA. He says, “The reality is you make peace with the people you fight. If you look at Northern Ireland, what happens is you can bring very violent people into the peace process. The deputy prime minister of Northern Ireland used to be the head of the IRA’s security and the head of the General Army Council. Now he worries about garbage routes and the national curriculum for the schools.”

The obvious, more localized counter-example mentioned was the failure of the Nizam-i-Adl, the peace deal between the then provincial government and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) – then led by the current TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah, which effectively handed over control of Swat to the Taliban faction. The deal hardly stuck, and very soon Fazlullah unleashed a reign of tyranny that ended with a military operation that cleared out the region. (Fazlullah also ordered Malala Yousafzai’s assassination while she was a schoolgirl there.)

But Sheikh also gave local examples of where negotiations worked. She mentions the Gul Bahadur Faction, an ostensible part of the TTP that negotiated a peace deal with the army that has been remarkably durable. Others also point out to the alleged peace deals that elements within Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s party has conducted with militant groups that have led Punjab to have been relatively unscathed from the terrorist attacks engulfing the rest of the country.

Ultimately, Sheikh says, the success or failure of peace talks depends a lot on the way the peace talks are conducted. “One reason why the conflict intensified,” she said, referring to the failed Swat deal, “was because there was disagreement over who should act first. The Taliban refused to surrender their arms, and said that the army should withdraw their troops from the valley first.”

“There really wasn’t any clarification on how the process should take place. There was no clear roadmap for what steps should be taken and how it should be done. The Pakistan government should have learned a lot from that experience [failure of the Swat deal]. It should know what it should not do again. It should know what its red lines are. There should be some kind of cooperation between the federal and provincial levels of government. And it should be clear that the aim of the agreement is the disarmament of the Taliban and a detailed roadmap should be in place for how the process should take place. I suspect that that was not there at the previous attempts,” she explained.

Ultimately, one can look at the failed Swat deal as either proof that the Taliban cannot be negotiated with, or as 1. Proof that even Fazlullah can be willing to sit down and talk 2. A failure of the specific talks that took place between the government and the militants rather than an indictment of peace talks as an abstract notion.



The role of the United States



Save a small minority, Pakistanis have almost universally labelled the United States as a saboteur, and worse, an instigator in Pakistan’s troubled security situation. This opinion was perhaps crystallised by Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan’s description of Hakimullah Mehsud’s assassination as a “murder of peace”. So what role should the United States have in assisting Pakistan with its resolve to have peace talks, if any?

Kugelman seemed to confirm most Pakistanis’ suspicions regarding American intentions. “I think privately, behind the scenes the US government has a very strong interest in these potential talks not happening. And it’s really because of the belief among many here in Washington, and also among many analysts including myself that talks with the Taliban, not only would they not work, but in effect they would make the TTP even stronger. Talks would allow the TTP to essentially reload, retool, and have more space and free range to expand its violence.”

Markey, however, highlighted divergent interests. “I don’t think that those inside the US government who are making those decisions are basing it on the TTP or negotiations with the TTP. They are basing it on the broader strategy on degrading the capacity of the Haqqani network to destabilize a post-2014 Afghanistan.”

Parker was even blunter. “I doubt very much that the US is trying to derail anything.” Ultimately he said, “I don’t think they give a damn about Pakistani politics, to be honest.” He said that they have their own targets to go after, and shall do so unilaterally.

Silence may be the best policy. “There’s no reason for the US to be involved with that [peace talks]. The US is such a radioactive force in Pakistan. It really should not do any more than it has to, particularly in an internal matter,” Kugelman said.

In an op-ed for Reuters, Markey argued for a similar non-interventionism so that America’s does not become a scapegoat for Pakistan’s failed efforts at peace. Hakimullah Mehsud’s assassination, however, showed that the US did not listen.



Is military force a good alternative?



Military action itself can be divided crudely into two modes of action that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: an expansive Pakistani military operation with boots on the ground, and a continued CIA-led drone program meant to take out high-value targets – with or without Pakistani consultation.

To everyone interviewed, both seemed problematic. “Putting an army on the streets anywhere in the world is very difficult to do in a way that doesn’t make the situation worse, or at least does not inflame local passions,” Parker said. His words seem to ring true in light of recent retaliation by the Pakistani military in North Waziristan in which many civilians have been killed, according to local witnesses.

Sheikh asserts that the military operations that the Pakistani military has conducted, particularly in South Waziristan, have become part of the problem. “I think it’s very obvious, if you look at what happened since 2003, that military actions didn’t help the situation. The Pakistani Taliban would not have been established as an independent movement within Pakistan if the Pakistani military had not gone into the tribal areas in the way that it did in 2003-2004.” She asserts that the Pakistani military itself is akin to an invading foreign force that is unfamiliar with the local culture and language. Parker seemed to agree “Because when people are wandering around through your neighbourhood dressed in uniform, probably have a different accent, if not speak a different language, and look a little bit different, it’s very hard not to see them as an occupying force, even if they’re there to make your life better.”

There are logistical problems too. North Waziristan is an important location not just for the TTP, but other militant groups as well, some of which are friendly to the Pakistani government, like the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban. “What are you going to do? Are you going to try and target the TTP and no one else? It seems unrealistic.” Kugelman asked, sceptically.

Ultimately, what might work could be a mixture of talks and military engagement. “Try to hit them while they’re down,” Markey suggested. A combination of intelligence work, narrow military operations, continued drone strikes, as well as an offer for talks as a potential way out may be the best way forward, he said.



Pakistan must prepare for the long haul



All experts seem to warn against looking for instantaneous results. It needs “more justice,” said Kugelman. “Don’t let these individuals to operate with such impunity. They should be arrested when they commit attacks. There should be investigations. They should be prosecuted; they should be jailed. These things don’t really happen that much.”

Parker suggested reforms in the education system. “What it really comes down to is education, and what people are brought up to believe. It’s that old Jesuit line “give me the child I’ll give you the man.” It is our education that shapes us, no matter who we are or what society we are in. If you are not providing good schools for everybody in society then somebody else comes along with Saudi money and builds a whole bunch of other schools, people are going to go to them, and it’s really that simple.”

Markey suggested national security reform; more efficient planning and implementation of policy, and better security in major urban centres like Karachi. He also suggested better civil-military coordination. A lot will depend on “their (Nawaz Sharif and Raheel Sharif) ability to try and get out ahead on some of these issues, their ability to push through legal reforms that will make it possible to go after terrorists more effectively, to keep them in jail when they do catch them.”

Talks or a military operation, either way, it seems that Pakistan will continue battling militancy for the long haul.