US-Pakistan: a new beginning?

Comprehensively worded, the joint statement covers the essential parameters of future engagement.

Defining success or the lack of it, following Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington, has become a pervasive occupation with his countrymen. There was far less said by his people before he ventured out and even lesser determinants appeared on any tangible achievements following the visit.

Success must be measured against planned gains. There weren’t any identified. To illustrate, when Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, visited Washington in 2005, he gained an agreement from President Bush on a civil-nuclear deal which has become the single-most strategic game-changer in India-US relations. This was success. A single piece of diplomatic gain that unfurled avenue after avenue of cooperation between the two states on multifarious levels in diverse fields. There wasn’t anything as monumental, not even remote, from Sharif’s visit. In fact, it was satisfying to note that nothing untoward or unsavoury that could have burdened an already beleaguered relationship emerged from this interaction. In difficult times, small mercies count. It also manifests the utter lack of objectivity in planning a visit of this significance that desperately lacked a compass of our intentions. Fore to Washington, then was the cry.

The two intentions that did emerge over the din, however, were to get the US to stop drone operations over Fata; and the populist cause of seeking ‘trade not aid’. Both were abject humbug. The US is still in the midst of a declared war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and will remain so till the end of 2014. It is unlikely to give up on its best weapon in this war. Any other tool would have resulted in sovereignty mauled, not simply violated. ‘Trade not aid’ is a noble notion, but lacks substance, since in an economy that is subsistent in nature, little gets produced to trade with anyone, anyway. There were some complementary initiatives, though, that may eventually add value when implemented.

What has come to the rescue of the Nawaz government, however, is an elaborate joint statement, which if vigorously pursued can offer the framework of a relationship beyond 2014. Comprehensively worded — surely with significant American help — it covers the essential parameters of future engagement. It assures the people and the government of Pakistan that America means well, only if they can bring themselves around to resolving their own contradictions and get serious in seeking a better future.

What should have been, however, even more comprehensively discussed at this meeting was Afghanistan, and America’s lackadaisical approach to a dialogue that just hasn’t found traction beyond intermittence; especially, since it alone can provide the framework for inclusive peace that can sustain after 2014. What has been missing inside Afghanistan is an equally dismal absence of an internal Afghan dialogue to develop a consensus to re-conciliate and reintegrate the Taliban into mainstream Afghan life that will ensure better probability of a peaceful, stable and secure Afghanistan. Only if the US and Afghanistan get on with the business of peace can there be a call on Pakistan to do its bit to encourage some of those elements that it has influence with to give peace a chance.

President Obama should have been told how a peaceful and stable Afghanistan was important to Pakistan’s own stability. We should have demanded a clear blueprint of a process and leveraged all our support in ensuring that such a line of action towards peace is fully implemented. Else, we will stay in a perpetual war, even when the US has left. Also to fight its own internal war, all external wars on Pakistan’s borders must cease. We should have asked the US to do its bit to obviate violence from within Afghanistan, and from around Pakistan’s borders. The statement refers to it only in platitudinal terms. Repeating inanities like ‘Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’ has lost its meaning because of the inherent inaction that belabours the march of events in Afghanistan. It is time we rid ourselves of this silliness and make things happen for our own sake.

Pakistan’s other chief concern is the dismal state of its economy. Its balance of payment is dire and the absence of sufficient energy reserves, especially electricity, means that both production and jobs have taken a bad hit. Pakistan will need buoyancy on both. This needs a short-term injection of capital. Two sources of significance remain; the IMF — which is already provisioned — and the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) arrangement which expires in 2014. Given the urgency to keep the economy’s macro-indicators within reasonable control, Nawaz Sharif would have done well to seek an extension of the KLB facility for another five years. That would have bought time for him and Pakistan to put the medium-to-long term measures in place to resuscitate the economy. Populism trumped realism instead, and he will end up pursuing ‘trade not aid’ without any surplus capacity to trade.

The promising bit in the joint statement is US’s commitment to developing major water reservoirs through funding within KLB allocations. Pakistan and the US have also agreed to explore the possibility of preferential trade and investment. This is worth a shot if indeed America can find the patience to remain engaged with Pakistan. Two aspects in Pakistan’s make-up — a sadly rising trend of radicalism and extremism in society, and Pakistan’s overly-maligned nuclear programme — will keep the US interested. Pakistan must convert these two negative determinants of an engagement into more positive planks of a relationship where sufficient complementarities are factored in to alleviate international concerns. Transparency and cooperation in nuclear issues should be consistent with Pakistan’s own security concerns. If this relationship can progress to the level of co-equals as for India’s accession to the NSG facility, Pakistan must reciprocate with movement on the FMCT.

Most of it remains work in progress. In the meantime, Nawaz Sharif is rolling from one foreign visit into another. Counting the necessary pit stop at London, he was out to Washington for a full week. Visits to Sri Lanka and Thailand via London are next. All are important in their own right and must be made. Just that when he is gone, could he as much as nominate a replacement who may continue the work of his government at home? The talks with the Taliban are yet to begin and the economy is still a shambles.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 2^nd, 2013.

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