Not making the report public is itself part of a pattern: the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, looking into what was undoubtedly our darkest hour, could not be shared with the people of this country for decades till it was leaked by an Indian magazine, India Today, in 2000. Twenty-five years on, we still do not have the Ojhri camp report telling us what happened and who was responsible for the blowing up of an ammunition dump in the environs of Rawalpindi and raining missiles on the city as well as on Islamabad. Prime Minster Junejo was shown the door by General Ziaul Haq for wanting to make that report public. And now, more than a year after the Abbottabad Commission completed its work, with no indication of when the report might be released, we have Al Jazeera providing us access to something that our own government should have been able to do, well before now.
The reluctance to share the findings of the report may have to do with the fact that it does not cover any of the relevant parties with glory. But then, a report of this nature is not meant to do so. It is not, after all, a PR release. It should seek to present to the public the immediate, as well as long-term and systemic reasons, as to why a grave act of omission or commission came to pass. In this case, even though the Commission does not fix responsibility for the events surrounding the killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) in Abbottabad on any particular institution or individual, it has done a commendable job of identifying the lapses as well as indicating where responsibility rests.
And that brings us to the key question of how did OBL remain undetected for so long. We need a closer look at this, particularly in order to comprehend the existing institutional arrangements which, if they continue as before, will leave us largely undefended against the menace of terrorism that manifests itself on a near-daily basis.
The lack of coordination among the military and civil intelligence agencies emerges as a major issue underlying the ‘intelligence-security failure’ identified by the Commission. Consider the fact that in January 2011, the Bali bomber, Umar Patek, was arrested in Hazara district. The report of his interrogation after arrest was not shared with the provincial authorities. The residence of Abu Faraj alLibbi had been raided at a distance of not much more than a kilometre from the OBL compound, with the civilian agencies remaining unaware. In a telling statement with regard to May 1/2, the DIG police informed the commission that his men were “pushed aside” that night “by a more powerful and capable agency”.
Apart from the issue of collaboration, a key question with serious implications for the nation’s well-being is, who has primary responsibility for counterterrorism? Going by the report, the ISI assumed these responsibilities because no other agency seemed capable of carrying out the task, and not because the government had ever asked it to do so. But how, in any case, can any one agency perform this formidable task without having a close collaborative relationship with other intelligence agencies, including the local police? The OBL case is an illustration of the pitfalls of an arrangement that does not provide for intelligence-sharing as a matter of routine and that requires information to be shared only on a ‘need to know’ basis. It is not clear how the determination of such need is made and at what level.
Eventually, such an arrangement assumes the form of a vicious cycle that mars our ability to develop an effective counterterrorism apparatus: the civilian agencies are ignored, denied resources and politicised; as a result, they have serious capacity issues and this strengthens the argument for not involving them, but the more this happens, the less capable they become and then we are back with the problem of counterterrorism not being something that can be addressed by a single agency, which, in any case, it is not primarily geared for. Meanwhile, in the context of politicisation of civilian agencies, a serious allegation of police complicity in the attack on Ahmadis in Lahore in 2010 certainly needs to be investigated.
So far, as the Commission has noted, the effort to make something of the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) has come to naught. This has to change. Whatever its name, structure and form, there must be a national or interprovincial platform for the coordination of counterterrorism and intelligence work, at different levels and across provinces. And, it must conform to the principle of civilian supremacy.
What the Commission cites from Ahmad Faruqi’s book should serve as a useful reminder of how we need to define national security in our context: “National security does not reside solely in the military’s combat effectiveness ... the non-military dimensions are political leadership, social cohesion, economic vitality and a strong foreign policy.” In a strategic conflict, military assets are not enough. The four non-military dimensions “may in fact be the decisive ones”.
Postscript: Starting with the many profound insights and implicit policy recommendations made by the Munir report (Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953), there have been few exceptions to the rule of ignoring all such reports completely. We will know soon enough if anything has changed even as we stand close to the precipice.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 24th, 2013.
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COMMENTS (18)
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@Sexton Blake, I really hate posting from my phone. The combination of out of control spell check and condensed screen do detract from my efforts. Despite that I think we can agree you are a confirmed skeptic. It seems you believe nothing except that everything is a lie.
@Concerned: Dear Concerned, Due to spelling and grammatical errors I am not quite sure what you were trying to say except that I am a disbeliever of some kind. For a change you are partially correct, but for the wrong reasons. I do like reasonable evidence in regard to events, but am quite ready to believe a well stated explanation. Unfortunately, the inhabitants of Washington have told so many outrageous lies, or obfuscated the issue at hand with a view to confuse so many times over the last 13 years or so that I rarely, if ever, believe them. In particular, if anyone believes that the most wanted man in history was picked up and his body dropped into the sea, so that there was no proof it ever happened, they could quite rightly be accused of believing in the tooth fairy. However, I am not alone as a disbeliever. Apparently the majority of Americans do not believe or do not trust the US Government or the Supreme Court either. You and numbers should consider this as an option instead of blindly believing people who are obviously telling lies, or trying to confuse.
The author has asked many of the right questions and his conclusions should be troubling to his readers and those running Pakistan. There should be a public government response to the content of the leaked report and the missing page and decent should be made public.
@Sexton Blake, doesn't seem you will believe anything unless you see it and touch it for yourself. This takes away from the value of your comments since you we're unlikely to be invited on the Abattabad raid, been present on the US carrier where the post-Morton was performed, or the funeral held, and mores the pity, you were not invites to interview OlLs wives and children. Although you cannot offer any evidence yourself, you mind issue up and nothing can change it.
@Sexton Blake: Lets see, we have the Al Jazeera released Abbottabad Commission report on the OBL affair in Abbottabad where the interviews of the OBL family members were noted. We also have the government interviews made public (and printed in ET) after the raid where the OBL family members were questioned about their stay in the compound with OBL! Now just what references has @Sexton Blake to offer in rebuttal?????
@numbersnumbers: "OBL's family interviewed" Dear numbers, Where you present during the family interview, what is even more important where you present when OBL was supposedly executed, and what is your source of information?
@Sexton Blake: That was a question, since his (OBLs) family was extensively interviewed by Pakistani authorities about his living in Abbottabad for the past many years! Do you still claim that he was never there????
@numbersnumbers: "his family never saw him" Dear Numbers, For once we are in agreement. The first intelligent thing I recall you ever writing, although, as usual, you did not get it quite right.
@Sexton Blake: But of course his family (and entourage) in his Abbottabad compound never saw him all those years he lived there!!!!
Obl commission has a fake story just to play in a straw.so far we did not find any solution to the problem.media is the worst of all subjected by foreign media.is it the system whch cannot investigate the matter?then for what reason these security agencies.they should go home.
We seem to have thousands of words written about Abbottabad, but I would just like to see the smallest piece of scientific evidence from a post-mortem, or a forensic anthropologist, examination, which is the only way that OBL's capture and subsequent demise can be vindicated. Anything else is just so much paper, and will be totally unsatisfactory. But then, the Americans have a habit of making outrageous statements without proof, but only when it suits them. I am at a loss to know why Pakistan is taking the matter seriously? To my knowledge , not one Pakistani has sighted OBL's body, and I am not sure that any Americans have either?
"the civilian agencies are ignored, denied resources and politicised; as a result, they have serious capacity issues and this strengthens the argument for not involving them, but the more this happens, the less capable they become and then we are back with the problem" A fair and balanced Op Ed and the above lines say it all. In most Western countries a cop makes several times more money than a soldier or even Jr. army officers. Average doctor makes about the same money and has status as a general. In Pakistan it is the other way around. No wonder our poor cops cannot dare stop any rich and powerful. Unless this inequality changes nothing good can happen. We have a country for army enterprise.
The Abbotabad Commission report is the closest thing in acknowledging the existence of "State within State". That the Commission simply refused to fix responsibility but preferred to pass the busk around to everybody, is irrefutable proof. That the Police cannot even take command over a crime spot(applies to BB case as well) and were kept away from inquiry is not just damning but also very revealing(wheels within wheels). How can they be held responsible for Law and Order in that case. When the Police are prevented from doing their duty, are they reporting it to their superiors and the Government or are they so scared of the power of the Agencies, they will not even report it ?
While Pakistan refuses to accept or acknowledge the "State within State" reality, the deleterious effect on Foreign policy is very evident. Nobody takes what the PM, President or Foreign Minister says and talks seriously, even in neighboring countries, looking at their pronouncements as those of a Parrot that can repeat but not think for itself. Their ability to deliver on anything promised is absolutely non existent. No wonder every visiting foreign dignitary wants to go meet the COAS, not acceptable in any democratic country.
LOL.....Terrorists are preparing terror report for themselve. is not it nonsense?
What about the Kargil Report? India had completed, published and shared the report with everyone. We are still waiting for the Pakistani version of Kargil!!!
Collaboration is possible between two parties - ISI and police, if both are willing to. Here one party not only refuses to but blames the other. One agency appropriates all information and then ensures failure of the other. Last, you really think no one in the military knew about OBL hiding under their nose, is like believing AQKhan was smuggling nuke materials all on his own on PAF planes!
It never discusses the vital question. Did Musharraf help OBL to escape and re-locate him in Pakistan?
In Pakistan, reports such as Hamoodur Rehman or Abbotabad Commission are not published (they are sold) because they implicate the military top brass and ISI and they have the power to demoralise the civilians. Army is in charge of US and India policies and demand budgets to match their inflated ego. Civilians can make policies on Gibraltar or the Vatican. The civilian governments of all hues and colours have been totally inept. This has been a systemic problem for a long time. Is there any one in Pakistan who has the will, skills and the courage to fix it? If not, wait for the next episode.