Pakistan’s nuclear policy dilemmas

On September 27, Pakistan became the new chair of the UN nuclear watchdog's governing body, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This comes a week after Pakistan expressed its resolve to block all talks proposing a treaty to ban production of fissile material used as fuel for nuclear weapons. The refusal to negotiate on this issue has been justified on the basis of maintaining a power balance in the region with a deterrence strategy.

Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva argues that India’s strategy of proliferation of nuclear technology poses an unfair advantage with bigger fissile material stockpiles and raises concerns about the “discriminatory” nuclear cooperation deals with the US. Pakistan has come to rely on its nuclear weapons and their dispersal to prevent Indian preemption.

Pakistan continues to block UN talks to ban fissile material contending that this would put it at a permanent disadvantage to its nuclear rival. It has also not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) along with Israel and Iran. For these reasons, along with accusations of smuggling nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea, the world perceives the selection of Pakistan as the chair of the IAEA as problematic.

The most sinister concern, however, lies in the assertion of nuclear terrorism emerging out of Pakistan. While such a danger may exist, there is reason to believe its repeated assurances that adequate security measures are in place to keep its nuclear technology safe.

The former director of IAEA Mohamed ElBaradei noted in 2009 that nuclear terrorism is ‘the most serious danger the world is facing’. Although nuclear weapons remain within the hands of states, non-state actors could attempt to make an improvised nuclear device (called INDs). Mobility of such devices is simple and can be delivered to their targets along the same routes that bring drugs, illegal immigrants and legal goods to major cities of the world. Transnational terrorist networks have facilitated the internationalisation of terrorism and the acquisition of new techniques of terror and associated technology. Furthermore the geographically dispersed nature of such networks makes the possibility of nuclear terrorism even more poignant. The most significant factor that deters states from aggressive nuclear attacks on other states is the threat of a counter attack. Yet this deterrence strategy is dislodged in the case of spread out terrorist networks that cannot be targeted and are not accountable to civilian populations.

Arguably, if the world continued on its current trajectory the possibility of a successful nuclear or biological terrorist attack somewhere in the world in the next 10 years is not remote. It has been suggested that nuclear terrorism can only be averted through disarmament and heightened security measures that would enable access to such technology impossible to non-state actors. The UN Security Council Resolution 1887 calls upon member states to raise the standards of nuclear security aiming to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Pakistan finds itself in a conundrum as its nuclear strategy must be constructed in view of its neighbouring adversary and internal and transnational insurgents. The decision between disarmament versus proliferation is becoming increasingly complex and an integrated strategy is required to address security concerns. For now, if Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT treaty and attend UN disarmament talks, it should enforce domestic legislation upgrading anti-terrorist safeguards and physical security systems for facilities and materials. Additionally, tough penalties and sentences need to be enacted to those convicted of nuclear related smuggling theft and blackmail.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 4^th, 2010.