Taking stock: PML-N power dynamics, a ‘league’ of their own

To understand what makes PML-N unique requires a look back at the history of the various Pakistan Muslim Leagues.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) is about to complete a remarkable two-decade long full circle with this election. With the last solitary Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) MNA from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) on the verge of defecting to join the party for this election, the PML-N has gone from an establishment proxy party to one which faced the full wrath of Musharraf’s rule to being on the brink of power again despite strong opposition.

To understand what makes the PML-N unique requires a look back at the history of the various Pakistan Muslim Leagues (PML) since independence. It was standard practice from General Ayub Khan onwards that any dictator who came to power would set up a ‘Muslim League’ as a political cover for their actions. So in Ayub Khan’s time there was the Pakistan Muslim League convention, in Yahya’s time, the PML-Q under Qayyum Khan was closely patronised and during Zia’s era, there was the PML under Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo.



The common factor of all these PML factions was their swift disintegration while out of power. The politicians rallied were largely united by a combination of carrot – in the form of ministries and patronage – and stick through the threat of their acts of omission and commission being drudged up.

Nawaz Sharif was chosen in much the same way, groomed by then Governor of Punjab General Jilani. At the time the then little known Nawaz Sharif was chosen for being the antithesis of the Bhutto clan.



Based on this, Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister in 1990 but rather than behave in a way that was as utterly pliant as expected, he swiftly started to consolidate his power within the country. These differences ultimately culminated in a single act of defiance when Nawaz Sharif made his speech on PTV against Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In the speech, he spoke about how ‘he did not accept dictation’. That and his subsequent resignation catapulted the then-unassuming Nawaz Sharif into popular imagination as a national leader.

Despite losing the 1993 election, the PML-N polled more votes than the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). In an instant, the power dynamics of Pakistan shifted away from the 1970’s and 1980’s politics so defined by PPP and anti-PPP forces to one defined by the PPP versus the PML-N.

This was nowhere more obvious than in K-P where the PML-N went from polling the largest number of votes and national assembly seats in 1993 to their rout in 2002 where they polled the least. In 1993, the PML-N polled 546,000 votes compared to the PPP’s 323,000. Despite this, the party’s key provincial leaders lost their seats and due to the Awami National Party’s (ANP) objections and the main frontrunner to become chief minister, Sardar Mehtab, was dropped for a then junior PML-N leader called Pir Sabir Shah. This short-lived government lasted only a few months when the PPP’s opposition engineered a split and replaced the government, with Aftab Sherpao as the new chief minister.

The PML-N repeated their electoral victory in 1997’s election where they again polled the largest number of votes at 648,000 compared to runner up and alliance partner ANP’s 345,000, pushing the PPP to third. In addition, this time they won a plurality of seats in the provincial assembly and Sardar Mehtab Abbasi became chief minister finally with the backing of the ANP.

Fast forward to Pervez Musharraf’s time and the party was effectively crippled with the so-called ‘likeminded’ PML taking Muslim League. Outside the province, the party was through ‘carrot and stick’ shorn of all its candidates and electables. The PML-N was in ruins, lacking candidates, Nawaz Sharif was in exile, the leadership in prison. The party surprised people by polling approximately 9.4% of the national vote, when conventional logic dictated the party would have been wiped out. This reinforced one basic point - the PML-N votebank existed irrespective of whether candidates were available, a feat which previous PML factions were unable to achieve. This legacy ensured that with a weakened Musharraf, following the lawyers movement, the party would be back and decisively so when it won the largest number of seats from Punjab.

Now, once again, the party is on the brink of possible victory once. While it was taken aback by the arrival of Imran Khan and the brief scene-stealing attempts by Tahirul Qadri, the top leadership has patiently bided its time. It has avoided confrontation with extremist groups ,where needed when needed, either being silent about attacks against others, or when needed, striking electoral alliances. Similarly in K-P, Nawaz Sharif has attracted former PML-Q electables like Amir Muqam while reaching out to the JUI-F and, in Sindh, to the PML-Functional.

In Balochistan, Nawaz himself maintains a cordial relationship with the Baloch and Pukhtun nationalists. This goes hand-in-hand with the party, systematically preparing winning candidates in the Punjab while counterattacking against Imran Khan’s PTI, both on the streets and on social media. It has manoeuvred well in national and provincial politics while avoiding key issues like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), Balochistan or extremism. This policy of avoiding the big issues of the country, whether Fata, Balochistan or extremism, could be the PML-N’s real Achilles heel. So the 2013 election may well decide if the PML-N will be a league of its own or a league on their own.

The writer is the founder of http://www.qissa-khwani.com He co-manages the twitter account @qissakhwani

Published in The Express Tribune, March 19^th, 2013.