Shegara — IEA and the collapsed peace talks in Istanbul

During the last two weeks, given the October skirmish between Pakistan and Afghanistan, we discussed IEA's covert and demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan, which remains unjustifiable from sociological (Pashtunwali), Islamic fraternity and/or good neighbourly standpoints. That this acrimony is in sheer violation of the basic tenet of Pashtunwali, that is shegara (or khegara) — doing good and returning good with good. That militarily Pakistan can fight a '1.5 Front' Indo-Afghan aggression, a scenario best avoided. That Afghanistan and CARs are not of any 'outsized and overwhelming' geo-strategic and economic relevance, except energy; for which other inexpensive alternatives also exit.

After outlining the Doha Agreement, as reported, and the prospects of parleys in Istanbul, I surmised that continued IEA obduracy, gender apartheid and human rights abuses are gravitating the main national, international and regional stakeholders towards a possible regime change. The Afghan-based terrorism is hardening attitudes, because behind the smokescreen of Haqqani-hosted TTP; the IEA is also and perhaps more complicit. The incendiary statement by Afghan interior ministry spokesperson Abdul Mateen Qani, made during an interview with Ariana News, speaks for it and will not be helpful.

The actual reasons for the collapse of the Istanbul talks after crucial and intense negotiations are yet to be known; however, as per my construct, the composition of the negotiating team speaks a lot about the lack of clarity, confusion and internal fault-lines within the IEA, in addition to the ongoing Afghan-based anti-Pakistan terrorism. Some pointers are in order.

First, the IEA changed its interlocutors and those fielded during the Istanbul Round ostensibly enjoyed little confidence in Qandahar and had limited mandate. Inter-state relations, among 'normal states' are regulated by the foreign ministries the world over, until specifics are discussed. In case of Pakistan (a normal state) and Afghanistan (a motely crowd of tribal militants), the talks in Doha were shifted by the IEA from Muttaqi's interim foreign ministry to Afghan defence ministry under Mulla Yaqub, the son of venerated Mulla Umer.

Because FM Muttaqi, given his anti-Pakistan diatribes during his Indian yatra, was 'ostensibly' persona non grata. And then again in Istanbul, Rahmatullah Najib, a Sulemankhel Pashtun from Paktia, is leading the Afghan side as deputy interior minister. The deflection from foreign to defence to interior ministry is telling and betrays confusion and fault-lines within the IEA.

Second, TTP is hosted in the Loya Paktia under Haqqani suzerainty, and they are in subservient 'hamsaya' status in the three provinces of Khowst, Paktia and Paktika that comprise the Loya Paktia. Haqqani Network (HQN) was not forcibly incorporated into the IEA like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar et al, and they are 'alliance partners' within the IEA, maintaining their independent and individual position within the Emirate. Haqqanis differ with puritanical Qandahar on some policy issues like female right to education and employment, social liberties, relations with Pakistan, etc.

HQN, as bedrock of resistance against the USSR and then the NATO-US Combine, kept the jihad alive in 2009, when IEA's Qandahari leadership, in exile, had seriously considered laying down arms. That offer was rejected by Doanld Rumsfeld, the then US Secretary Defense.

HQN, as openly known, maintains its second line of defence in Pakistan's North Waziristan District, where most of its leadership has filial ties and properties, including their largest seminary near Miramshah. Hence in the 'potential' jockeying for power inside Afghanistan, HQN - the IEA's military strategist - is compelled to maintain TTP as its mlatar (proxy) force, a force-in-being for internecine fighting, that Afghanistan is accustomed to.

Zadran Haqqanis, understandably, were extensively wired into the Pakistani vortex, and are perceived as such by suspecting Ahmadzai/ Muhammadzai Qandahar. So, the HQN protégé, Rahmatullah Najib was sent to Istanbul to sort out problem with Pakistan, their erstwhile benefactor, but with restricted mandate. The talks seem to have failed primarily because of IEA's inability to provide guarantee to Pakistan about zero anti-Pakistan terrorism from Afghan soil.

Third, given the over 70 per cent Afghan signature in the recent 'TTP' attacks and the fact that most slain terrorists belonged to provinces like Wardak, Zabul, Qandahar, etc, outside HQN's Loya Paktia, point to the direct involvement of IEA in the spike in violence against Pakistan. So, in changed percepts about the IEA's inability and unwillingness to rein in terrorism, the scale is now more tilted towards 'unwillingness'. TTP is just a smokescreen.

Fourth, IEA finds terrorism useful as an instrument of policy to: a) keep Islamabad under pressure; b) solicit Indian support including logistics, finances, training and interlocution; c) keep its internal militant cadre busy and occupied; and d) deplete the TTP rank and file by continuous infiltrations, consequent killing by the Pakistani military, etc. Not all entities within the TTP, the motley grouping of over 13 constituents with different aims and objectives, are on the same page with HQN.

Therefore, Qandahar's manipulation of TTP cannot be ignored, as it serves Qandahar's interests by keeping HQN under pressure, paint them in bad light with their former handlers in Pakistan, and deplete their military/ mlatar strength through operational losses. However, the present tashkeels (militants' grouping) against Pakistan are still 'ostensibly' under the TTP banner. This is what I call the 'Haqqani Complexity'. This complexity begets resolution for sustained peace in Afghankhwa (Afghanistan, erstwhile FATA, KPK, Balochistan). TTP et al is a bone stuck in HQN's neck, and Qandahar skillfully manipulates their predicament.

Following on from the above, IEA cannot and will not give guarantees as sought by Pakistan; and the wily IEA will continue to persist in error in the foreseeable future. Private conversations with Afghan interlocutors are still full of effusive pleasantries, desire for brotherly ties evocation of clichés; but on the ground, their jihad continues. The world be damned. So, sadly a peaceful Afghanistan is only a pliant Afghanistan and vice versa.

Qandahar needs to realise that Pakistan is more important than its anti-Pakistan proxies, or its adventurous and bored youth. Mentoring a 12-year-old boy, when his venerated father dies, helping him ascend to become defence minister in the service of his country and people, is shegara, plain and simple, and it begets shegara... no strings attached.

Afghan outlook next week.