Who can mediate the US-Iran war?

Pakistan's diplomatic image-building peaked when a 300-member US delegation and a 71-member Iranian delegation arrived in Pakistan on 11 April 2026 to seek a resolution to the US-Iran war. The sudden shift from being seen as a dangerous or hard country to becoming a vital peacemaker on the global stage was indeed a great achievement for Pakistan. The 21-hour 'Islamabad Peace Talks' that resulted in the 'Islamabad MoU' were brokered by Pakistan and facilitated by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. The resulting ceasefire and a 60-day deadline for the US and Iran to negotiate a final deal were a big diplomatic achievement. However, the ceasefire ended on 8 July as Iran attacked commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, and the US responded by striking Iranian territory. Today we are well past 17 August, the 60-day deadline for Iran and the US to negotiate a final deal, and given the recent commencement of more frequent strikes, this war seems to be taking on a momentum of its own, giving little impression that mediation in any form survives.

History tells us that there is nothing such as an ideal mediator, and in a given conflict the continuous involvement of a mediator may not even be necessary. Pakistan is in the American bloc, and Iran is known for its anti-Americanism; still, the Iranians believed in Pakistan's impartiality on the issue and also believed that Pakistan would deliver on the negotiating table. Egyptians also accepted the American mediation with the Israelis, on similar beliefs, which ended in the Camp David Accords in 1978. Mediators work on different motivations. History reveals that the motives and results of mediation differ when it is undertaken by great powers rather than medium or ordinary powers. Mediation by small and middle powers is often driven by a combination of commercial, strategic and reputational interests, whereas great-power mediation is more likely to combine diplomatic prestige with the ability to offer rewards or impose costs. Pakistan's role in facilitating the US-China opening in 1971 enhanced its strategic value to Washington and influenced the broader context in which the US responded to the India-Pakistan crisis.

Another lesson from history is that if a mediator fails to bring the two parties to a stage where they are still willing to compromise, then something is wrong in the assessment and selection of the ripe or vital moment for mediation. Either it has come at a stage when the two parties are still reflecting on their attitudinal changes and seriously seeking settlement, or it comes too late, when a deal may jeopardise the domestic position of the two parties' leaders. In both cases, history judges the mediator more as a facilitator playing a limited role than a mediator who promoted the settlement of the conflict. Oman facilitated Iran and the US in holding secret bilateral meetings between them in 2012, which directly paved the way for the broader multilateral negotiations involving P5+1 (the US, the UK, France, Russia, China - plus Germany) and the European Union, culminating in the historic 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pakistan repeatedly tried to broker a peace deal with the Taliban during the American invasion of Afghanistan but failed. Qatar, on the other hand, facilitated, under different circumstances, the Doha Peace Process that created the conditions for the ultimate withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2020.

History also shows that when major powers mediate, they enable the process with the prospect of rewards or the threat of punishment. The US resolved the 1956 Suez Crisis by exerting severe financial pressure and threatening economic sanctions that forced Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt. When the US mediated the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, Israel received $3 billion from Washington as concessional loans to fund the building of new airfields in the Negev to compensate for the ones they would have to surrender in Sinai. Egypt, on the other hand, by 1980-81, the year following the peace treaty, became the top recipient of US official development assistance.

When we look at the mediation efforts of the great or major powers, they enjoyed an absolute monopoly over mediation until the twentieth century. The diffusion of power associated with the emerging multipolar order has expanded the number of states capable of offering mediation, facilitation and diplomatic good offices. The notion of multiparty mediation is built on the notion that ideological contests ended with the end of the bipolar world and the emergence of inter-state conflicts for multiple reasons, with the levels and cycles of violence that rise and fall. A mediator during one cycle of conflict or stage of mediation may not be relevant for another stage. An example is the attempt to mediate a settlement between Israel and Syria. A process initiated by the US in 2000 was taken over by Switzerland from 2004 to 2007, and finally by Turkey in 2008. France, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, played a meaningful role in the early stage of the Sino-American rapprochement in 1969. De Gaulle enjoyed tremendous international respect, and his reassurances were trusted, so he brought the parties to a stage where they were willing to compromise, before Pakistan in 1971 helped drive the negotiations forward.

History also shows that if the mediator seeks more profit or political favours than prestige, the parties to a mediation may find incentive to dispense with such a mediator. For decades, the US acted as the primary, indispensable mediator in the Middle East Peace Process. However, in late 2017, the US unilaterally recognised Jerusalem as Israel's capital and subsequently cut funding to Palestinian refugee agencies. This was widely viewed as a move to secure domestic political favours and impose a one-sided solution rather than maintaining the prestige of neutral mediation. The Palestinian Authority declared that the US had disqualified itself as a mediator, refused to participate in US-led talks, and shifted to seeking multiparty and multilateral mediation frameworks to bypass Washington entirely.

In a multipolar world, multiparty and multilateral mediation is a reality. As the Iran War enters a new stage, many states may compete as rival brokers to earn the contract of mediating between the US and Iran. In 2017, Iran's President Rouhani stated publicly that at least ten countries had offered to mediate in the dangerous feud between his country and Saudi Arabia. Only in March 2023 did China successfully broker the restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. China may therefore emerge as one of the few actors capable of combining relationships with both sides with sufficient economic and diplomatic leverage to attempt a broader settlement. The future of mediation may therefore belong not to a single ideal mediator, but to many mediators whose relevance changes as the conflict evolves.