Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa - terrorism and politics

Last week after a cursory look at K-P, sociologically and politically, we surmised that in the province's predominant Pakhtun universe, the force of argument, or overwhelming force, play out effectively in resolving conflict. That in governing the lar (lower i.e. K-P/Balochistan) au (and) bar (upper i.e. Afghanistan) Pakhtunkhwa, the British governance model entailing minimal governance, self-rule and inducements was more successful, as compared to the recent US/NATO's Afghanistan model of central authority, pervasive governance and outlandish ideas, that failed. We discuss terrorism and the political mosaic of K- P.

Terrorism first. Having debated TTP's Afghanistan based framework, it is important to understand that terrorism also has a domestic dimension, besides Afghanistan's inspirational swamp. IEA power grab and six years in Kabul provide a lot of motivation to the would-be jihadists. The 'Jihad Enterprise' per se remains a reliable employer, caring even for the families of suicide bombers. Misguided religious notions dub Pakistani state as an impediment to Sharia implementation, and confederation with Afghanistan. Pakistan's military is painted as a non-religious entity by the ranking cadre of IEA and TTP. Afghan Taliban, TTP, al-Qaeda and IS-K find it easy to fish in Pakhtunkhwa's troubled waters, where sociology is supportive to their cause. And lack of economic opportunities especially in the Upper Pakhtunkhwa/Afghanistan provide an ideal environment for ethno-religious terrorism.

IEA, more precisely, Loya Paktia (Haqqanis) and Qandahar reckon that TTP manipulation can be used as an effective residual leverage with Islamabad, even if it is negative. The murky world of international politics, regional interests and spy games make Afghanistan, and by extension the Lower Pakhtunkhwa, a battleground for influence and resources. Mineral riches define the Western interest, Russian recognition and China's quiet diplomacy. Great Game continues with changed players between the US and China, as explained earlier. Pakistan's nuclear weapons attract awe and attention. India vies for contest, control and domination. And from all this power play, limelight and unwanted attention, Pakistan remains affected because Quetta and Peshawar are joined at the hip with Qandahar and Kabul.

There are stakeholders, irrespective of the conspiracy theories, that would like to see instability the operative norm in Pakhtunkhwa, as instability forces both Pakistan and Afghanistan to remain in a so-called vassal status, susceptible to external manipulation. IEA's avoidable obstinacy helps foster such instability.

Putting it all together, sociology, political economy and religion (as practised) acquiesce to and support terrorism in Pakhtunkhwa, under an enduring construct, that would need focused, concentrated and sustained efforts to defeat. Therefore, in a nutshell, terrorism – sponsored or home-grown – is likely to continue and run its full course. This warrants a whole-of-nation approach, with K-P gearing up administratively, employing police and intelligence effectively, and Federal Government deploying the harder hammer of military power, as needed, where needed. K-P cannot do it alone for reasons well known.

Pakistan had achieved significant successes during the last half of previous decade, when around 2015, it was able to flush terrorism out from Waziristan, Kurram, Swat, Bajaur and Mohmand. And after deploying kinetics, the non-kinetic (hearts, minds and development) prongs were employed with focus on relief, rehabilitation and rebuilding. The botched negotiation by the Bajwa-Faiz Combine (2021-2022) under Haqqani facilitation in Kabul resurrected terrorism, beginning from Swat. And once again Pakistan is in the 'Kinetics' Phase, that although theoretically should be 20% of counterterrorism (CT), is essentially first in the sequence, as it creates the conditions and environment for the deployment of non-kinetics, that constitute around 80% of the 'fight'.

Gleaning from the pervasive and relentless IBOs, the realignment of K-P with Centre, and the consequent change in the politics of K-P, one hopes that 'perhaps', the State is over-the-hill in WOT. Erstwhile FATA, reportedly, is weary of the marauding bands of TTP living off-the-land in extortion, burdening villagers for food and shelter, having unwittingly engineered a huge shift in public opinion. The Afghan Taliban realise the sensitivity and dead seriousness of Pakistan, in obliterating the TTP et al, whatever it takes. And Pakistan's diplomatic ascendance, successful alliances and improving economic conditions (despite the oil shocks) create a space for operational tempo to continue and accrue success. Though domestic political scene needs attention, not that it perils Pakistan, but to drown the political noise and keep the focus. So, with the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) coordinated under NACTA, it is hoped that terrorism will be contained and eliminated in K-P in the mid- to long-term. It is good to see the glass 'half full'. As far as the Pak-Afghanistan bilateralism goes, it will get worse before it gets better, under B2B and P2P iterations.

With terrorism as an operative but waning norm, the State finally getting its act together to provide political weight and public support to CT operations, and coordinated consistency displayed by all organs of the State, Pakistan will prevail in WOT and against Baloch insurgency, irrespective of the Afghan swamp, external machinations and domestic noise by a political ideology.

Now politics. K-P's politics is likely to remain more of the same. Amongst the 'constants' of ANP, PTI and PML(N)/PPP Combine, JUI-F remains the only 'variable' wild card. The wily Maulana senses the wind direction, the gains to be made and the Miltablishment's mood like no one else and makes a move. Hence the likely scenario remains one of 'Governor's Rule' and 12-district emergency; which must continue under constitutional and legal provisos till the national elections are due in February 2029.

Elections would entail alliances between the 'constants' and the 'variable', too early to predict. JUI-F, however, has a history of political alliance with ANP. JUI-F's religious credentials and ANP's nationalist outlook suit K-P politics. ANP is strong in the northern districts and marginally in former FATA. JUI-F is popular in southern K-P and to a great extent in the former tribal belt. PML(N) remains ensconced in Hazarajat and some urban areas. PPP is urban based and to some extent in Doaba area (Charsadda etc). PTI represents the pervasive youth bulge and will be closely watched by all political forces. Its tug of war with Miltablishment will decide its fate, and hopefully sanity will trump emotions.

There are still slips up to the lips!

(Concluded)