Should Pakistan hand over the baton of peace?

The latest round of talks between the USA and Iran, as a follow-up to an MoU between them, is being held in Doha, Qatar. The MoU, or the Islamabad Agreement, whatever you prefer to call it, had taken an intense round of diplomacy over two months to bring it into effect. What was initially conceived on April 11/12 in Islamabad as the framework for peace was signed in Paris, Tehran and Islamabad as the Memorandum of Understanding on 17 June, and formalised in Burgenstock by senior representatives of all nations on June 21. The Prime Minister of Pakistan was the primary host, while the Qatari PM was present as the co-host.

Much before April 11/12, when the ceasefire was announced, and till the delegations met in Burgenstock in the third week of June, the entire focus of the Pakistani top leadership had been to reconcile the unending elements of discord between the two warring sides to commit their ceasefire agreement to paper. The MoU was thus a vehicle to that end. It was also meant to create the space for talks on the more intractable issues of sanctions and nuclear disarmament. There was an unrestrained global cry to open the Straits to normal functioning. Pakistan delivered Hormuz as the first tangible dividend of the Agreement, other than bringing a conditional closure to the war. If the Chinese were anyway included in advising their principal ally, Pakistan, on the process, that would have been the most vehement Chinese demand of their partners to effect as the first order of business.

During this process of indirect mediation between the US and Iran, another aspirational partner emerged: Qatar. It was never one of the principal four that had got together to forge a way out of what was bedevilling the region; each using its influence with the principal participants in the war. Yet Qatar found an entry. Never a country out of the scene in most matters in the Gulf, it sits right across Tehran and shares the world's largest gas field with Iran. It is also an important but neutrally oriented member of the GCC. It has its own list of issues with the UAE and Bahrain, but the overwhelming presence of Saudi Arabia in the mix has helped paper over these fissures. In a happy rivalry with its two rich neighbours, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, it must earn its petrodollars through the Straits of Hormuz, which Iran now claims to mind. It must thus appear as a useful helping hand. It is also a useful conduit for some of Iran's frozen funds to channel through. That it also has a strong American and Western orientation – the US has its largest airbase in the region in Doha, along with the CENTCOM forward HQ – may also deliver unsaid leverage to the US in the process. These are enough reasons for most to prefer keeping Qatar engaged.

As a member of the GCC, which Iran viewed as a direct supporter of the US during the last two conflicts – the use of Qatari facilities by US forces during the June 2025 war and Qatar's handling of Hamas assassinations in Doha in September 2025 – leaves much for Iran to ponder. On the other hand, public opinion in Pakistan tended to favour Iran heavily, possibly clouding perceptions elsewhere despite Pakistan officially acting, conducting and exhibiting strict neutrality. This divergence kept increasing with time. Israel openly challenged Pakistan's neutrality. Only President Trump's personal belief and trust in Pakistan's senior-most leadership gave Pakistan the centrality to lead and forge a common framework for negotiations. Pakistan's months of legwork, thousands of miles travelled and countless hours of diplomacy were conveniently forsaken. Ill-thought populism on Iran laid waste to a very deliberate diplomatic effort that was well-considered, a game-changer in image-building, and served Pakistan's long-term strategic interest.

Did Pakistan give it away too easily? The peace initiative had placed Pakistan front and centre in the global spotlight. From a peripheral middle country, it had become a nation of consequence. Did domestic public opinion and flagrantly aggressive Iranian diplomacy turn Pakistan into a suspect arbiter? Did it put distance between Pakistan and the US? Did Pakistan, passively, give way under the pressure of tremendous dissonance at home? Or was it the 'allies' of the US that asked to shelve Pakistan away from the centrality it had gained? After all, they had all met in Paris just recently for the G-7. Was Pakistan's long-term benefit sacrificed at the altar of short-term political consideration? Who was at the back of stirring such relentless domestic argument, discolouring the perception of neutrality?

Can Pakistan retain strategic ownership of an initiative it helped conceive and nurture? Pakistan must not let the opportunity to establish itself as a nation of consequence slip by under any circumstances. The fourteen-point process appears to address many of Iran's principal concerns. The completion of the process into a final agreement would be an enduring strategic achievement and a foundation for a long-term mutually beneficial relationship with an important neighbour of significant consequence. Most of those points in the agreement are amenable to negotiated resolution, notwithstanding the inevitable early-stage bargaining to maximise negotiated gains. Keeping the two to a strict schedule without letting anyone derail the process is the key to progress. Persistent diplomacy and careful political persuasion will help. We should not let this important influence in the two capitals wane for speculative short-termism. Pakistan is well placed to deliver the final document. All it now needs is to detail the events and attach dates to them for progressive implementation on both sides. Pakistan has enough diplomatic capital to convert the opportunity into a long-term gain for the region and the world.

As Pakistan becomes consequential in West Asia, leading the peace process forward from among the four-nation group, it sets into motion a geopolitical architecture where Pakistan's position is established, compatible with its size and potential. It generates its own dynamics in South Asia, of which it remains a conjoined and binding partner. For South Asia, then, connecting with the evolving forces of power, prosperity and connectivity in the larger Eurasian region becomes incumbent. With so much happening in West Asia, South Asia can ill afford to be a bystander. It shall want in. It will open the doors to a wider repair to heal what has ailed this region for decades. The attendant benefits are far too many not to push Pakistan to take the process to its intended end. The strategic repositioning and the gains for Pakistan are obvious. Pakistan must reclaim the lead in the strategic process it helped create.