Power and prerogative

Last week, commenting on the US military's apparent predicament in its war against Iran, we opined that General staff, as professional as USMIL, delivered a weak hand to its politicians in imposing its will on Iran, militarily speaking. Either the Generals said what Team Trump/Hegseth wanted to hear (less likely), or Team Trump ignored military's professional advice (more likely). In either case, the USMIL will continue to share the blame, as they do for similar costly errors of omission and commission in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran (twice), etc. US military's track record in prosecuting wars, in mostly Asian and Muslim context, is not very bright.

In a democracy, the rule of civilian supremacy over the military is well established, wherein politicians as elected leaders set politico-strategic objectives or war aims, and the Generals leading the military, assemble (array) forces and other tools to execute military operations for attaining the assigned political objectives. However, extensive literature also tasks Generalship with providing political advice to their civilian leadership, regarding pros and cons of the operations, including any geopolitical and military limitations. For this, the military leadership must be abreast with the geostrategic, economic, diplomatic and political developments. For run-up to operations, a seamless and continuous civil-military relationship, often tense, is of paramount importance; wherein the civilian side dictates the 'why' and 'when' of war, and the Generals execute the 'how' part through military manoeuvres.

Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) famously said, "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Since all military operations are inherently violent contests for attainment of political goals, the ultimate decision-making must rest with elected politicians. Political scientist Charles Tilly considers state-making and war-making deeply interlinked. Throughout history, governments have extracted resources from populations to pursue war, and that has inherently concentrated power, shaping modern states. Friction in civil-military relations arises when politicians interfere in military matters, or Generals assume strategic decision-making.

Under robust democratic systems, military remains fiercely neutral in partisan politics; subordinate to the civilian authority; and loyal to the government of the day, without holding advice, however unpalatable, in national interest. Since politicians often lack deep operational understanding, they rely heavily on Generals' advice, outlining risks, costs and possible outcomes of military intervention. However, the situation becomes complicated when retired soldiers-turned politicians, especially those retired in lower ranks are employed in essentially higher civilian jobs, overseeing the enormous military bureaucracy.

Besides grinding their axe, these officers tend to interfere in military matters, conduct themselves abrasively and are essentially a liability to their offices. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth is one such example. He served as a 'Major' that too in the US Army National Guards, and now lords over Generals, Admirals and Air Officers. The recent reports of him sidelining capable Star/Flag Officers from promotions because of gender, race or colour have created quite a stir. The USMIL's conduct in Iran, under his overall higher direction of war, leaves many questions about his suitability, ability and capability.

Professional soldiers and Generals believe in the 'justness of cause' when going to war; and given a choice, they would prosecute a 'just war' or conduct the 'war justly'. To enable such 'just prosecution of combat', politicians must debate jus ad bellum or the 'ethics of initiating war', whereas Generals should manage jus in bello or 'professional conduct of forces during warfare'. Errant missile, killing over 150 school kids in Iran, during the opening days of Operation 'Epic Fury', and not offering even an apology subsequently is one of the many cases of unprofessional conduct by a professional USMIL in recent years.

As far as Israeli military's complicity in the genocide of Palestinian kids, women, elderly and sick is concerned, this amounts to war crimes and 'holocaust' that should and would 'probably' one day bedevil the IDF. Escaping consequences is generally not in the higher/divine scheme of things and is reflected through increasing cases of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), broken families and suicide cases among veterans.

For better institutional balance, the system of governance has recourse to constitutionalism, which, in theory, ensures balancing of civilian oversight with military providing expert advice. However, practically politicians can be short-sighted, seeking quick victory (Iran); undertaking risky operations (killing Osama Bin Laden); trying to remake complex societies (Afghanistan); etc. Elections can be an enforced imperative leading to faulty decision-making in haste. Likewise, Generals can also be equally naïve, manipulative or both, providing only a 'favoured' course of action to their political bosses, while seeking promotion, better placement, plush post-retirement jobs or simply scrambling for citations and medals. These handicaps affect the conduct of war, plunging militaries into unnecessary wars of choice (Epic Fury).

Although the 'Military Decision-Making Process' (MDMP) is a structured methodology wherein militaries arrive at their war plans after rigorous study of: a) the environment – international, regional and domestic; b) deducing threat from the prevailing and likely environment in the near, mid to long term, in what is a foundational work patched together from strategic intelligence and domestic pulse; c) mounting a response to threat by analysing various hypotheses and making operational plans; and d) putting in place a 'developmental strategy' for immediate needs, and acquisition of military wherewithal in mid to long-term. It is laughable when one hears many intellectual stalwarts in various think tanks lamenting Pakistan for not having a policy to deal with this or that, like Afghanistan-based terrorism, Indian designs or any other issue impacting national security. Yes, policy implementation sometimes may appear to suffer from lack of focus and resource crunch.

In Pakistan, overall civil-military synergy has historically remained turbulent. The outcome is generally shaped by domestic political instability, institutional interplay and threat perceptions. The 'paradox' that lies at the heart of traditional theory of civil-military relations is particularly evident in case of Pakistan. The military, as an institution, is designed to protect the polity, for which it must be strong enough. By becoming strong enough, it threatens the other nodes of power it serves, resulting 'sometimes' in military takeovers.

A possible remedy can be the military accepting that civilian authorities have the 'right to be wrong'… without stretching it too much.