The shrinking space of ideology

If the end of the Iran war results from negotiation, mutual compromise and economic considerations, it would indeed strengthen the argument that the 21st Century rewards pragmatism more than ideological absolutism. The US possesses great military power, and Iran has greater ideological commitment and strategic resilience. Yet, both sides calculated that a compromise better served their interests than pursuing maximalist goals that threatened the international economy. Is pragmatism finally overcoming ideology as the preferred tool of statecraft? For an answer, let's discuss four important aspects: 1) Effects of the Iran War on global ideology; 2) Abraham Accords; 3) Ideological change and the concept of End of History; and 4) India-Pakistan ideological differences.

The Iran War ending on a compromise suggests that more and more states in the future may avoid policies framed as ideological projects and instead justify them in terms of national interests, economic growth, security, stability and scientific and technological advancement. In the 21st Century, the global ideological space is increasingly constrained by economic and technological realities. It is now a space in which practising ideological silence and furthering national interests is more rewarding. The end of the Iran War is an isolated example. Similar patterns can be observed in the Abraham Accords.

The Abraham Accords are perhaps one of the clearest examples of how the global ideological map is being fragmented and how states are preferring ideological silence and how state ideologies are becoming subordinate to pragmatism. Before the Accords, much of the Arab world's position toward Israel was shaped by a combination of Arab nationalism, solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and opposition to Israeli policies. The traditional view and the Arab consensus were that normalisation would follow, not precede, a resolution of the Palestinian issue. The Abraham Accords reversed that sequence. Gulf states, such as the UAE and Bahrain, concluded that economic opportunities, technology cooperation, investment and shared security concerns justified normalisation even without a final Palestinian settlement. The Accords tell us that in tomorrow's world, national interests and security calculations will continue to matter more than longstanding ideological commitments. The Accords lead towards a new pathway and a global trend towards pragmatism. They rest on a set of ideas, a new ideology of regional integration, economic modernisation, and strategic cooperation so they simply prioritise different values.

During the Cold War, states were often concerned with the ideology they supported. Today, states increasingly ask what serves their national interests. The question asked by the states today is not 'who shares my ideology?' but 'who can help advance my security and prosperity?' Given this, the Accords demonstrate that states are increasingly willing to manage ideological differences when economic interests, security concerns and geopolitical realities make cooperation more beneficial than confrontation. The Accords, therefore, symbolise not the arrival of a post-ideological world but the growing influence of pragmatism in international relations. The Accords highlight that in the 21st Century, national interests will often speak louder than ideology. This raises a larger question: are we witnessing a broader process of de-ideologisation in international politics?

The Global South debates whether the developed world or the Global North advocates ideological silence or the abandonment of ideology as the preferred statecraft in the Global South. What the Global North prefers is to push the relevance of pragmatism, economic performance and effective governance as ideas that take precedence over rigid ideological commitments in the Global South. The West never asked the Global South to abandon any ideology; it merely presented its own ideology as a better substitute. Liberal democracy, free markets, globalisation and human rights were not merely Western ideas but universal principles. Francis Fukuyama famously expressed this in the notion of the 'End of History', which in itself was an ideology. The West emphasised pragmatism due to the great ideological fatigue and struggles of the 20th century, which produced world wars, fascism and the Cold War. The current Iran War suggests that the future world can no longer progress if it continues to align in ideological blocs; the multipolar world of the future must compete through technology, trade and investment blocs.

Liberal democracy, human rights, rule of law, individual freedoms and gender equality are often framed as universal norms. In fact, they are the ideological values of the pragmatic world of tomorrow, which the ideological world of rigidity will find hard not to follow. The first quarter of the 21st Century reveals that the states are more likely to focus on administration, economics, technology and governance, and less on the competing ideological visions of their societies. In other words, more and more states will focus on not what society should be but how society can be managed more efficiently. The big hope is that this will produce fewer ideological wars and more political and economic integration, and the ideal citizen would become a consumer, voter and economic actor rather than an ideological revolutionary.

Lastly, the real test of the ideological proposition lies not in the Middle East but in the Indo-Pak relations. In the future world, will India and Pakistan ever stop viewing each other through an ideological lens? What can prompt them to do so? The relationship between India and Pakistan is not merely geopolitical; it is also historical, ideological and deeply identity-based. Economics acts as the strongest force against ideology, and if future generations are less influenced by memories of Partition and past wars, they may overcome their deep-rooted grievances and focus more on economic competitiveness rather than mutual rivalry. The future multipolar world will have little room and rewards for the Indo-Pak confrontation. Although it is unlikely that both states will become post-ideological states in relation to each other, they may become less ideological. The decisive factor will not be a change of ideas or sudden abandonment of their ideologies on their part. It will be more the emergence of economic, technological and strategic incentives that may, in the end, dictate that pragmatism is more rewarding than confrontation. Only when national development becomes more important than historical narratives will the ideological lens begin to fade.