Proxy wars and human rights in Afghanistan

The geopolitical architecture built around Afghanistan since August 2021 clearly prioritises hard borders, security imperatives and economic connectivity over human rights. The West's attempt to isolate the Taliban has largely failed as regional powers normalise engagement with the Islamic Emirate. Pak-Afghan borders remain shut while India and Russia are embracing Afghanistan. Moscow is also accusing the West of attempting to weaken the Taliban regime.

Five key dynamics shaping Afghanistan's position and their implications for Pakistan deserve dispassionate consideration.

On May 27, Moscow and Kabul signed a military-technical cooperation agreement, the first formal step after the former recognised the Taliban regime nearly a year ago. Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Mohammad Yaqoob, the Taliban's Defense Minister, oversaw the signing of the agreement.

The agreement came less than two weeks after Shoigu had declared the Russian intent for a "full-fledged partnership with Kabul" at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) ministerial meeting in Bishkek on May 14.

The move marks a realpolitik recalibration rooted in three considerations. First, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) poses a direct threat to Russian interests in Central Asia and the Afghan Taliban represent a formidable ally against ISIS-K, which Russia believes is drawing western support.

Alexander Bortnikov, director of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), for instance, recently accused the British intelligence of conniving with ISKP and its allies to weaken the government in Kabul. "Westerners hope to subsequently influence the situation in Central Asian republics to their advantage," Bortnikov said at a Commonwealth of Independent States' meeting.

Moscow has also been keen to fill the power vacuum created by the abrupt US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's return to power nearly five years ago. Moscow still believes Afghanistan's location offers potential SCO-linked trade corridors and energy routes.

Secondly, India recently signed a $46.3 million agreement with Afghanistan's National Standards Authority to establish ten advanced quality-control laboratories in Kabul and key border points. These labs will professionalise Afghan trade standards, create documentation trails and build local capacity through training. This constitutes classical diplomacy of influence through "soft" infrastructure in contested spaces.

For India, the deal provides entry into Taliban-ruled governance structures which it once loathed as "terror nurseries". Without formal recognition, it offers Kabul an alternative to disrupted Pakistan transit routes since October 2025, when it sealed borders citing continuous rise in cross-border terrorism.

The technical agreement appears to be an ambitious quid pro quo: India's infrastructure push may help route Afghan trade away from Karachi to Iran's Chabahar port. Afghanistan on the other hand gains institutional capacity building tools.

The risk inherent in this Indo-Afghan initiative, however, is further deepening of the Indo-Pak rivalry on the Afghan soil - once defined by British historian William Delrymple as Indo-Pak proxy war.

Thirdly, although China continues to withhold formal recognition of the Taliban regime, both countries operate through full-fledged ambassadors in respective capitals.

China's strategic priorities are straightforward: preventing Uyghur militants from using Afghan territory; securing access to copper, lithium and rare earths; and ensuring stability to protect investments in Pakistan and Central Asia. At the UN, Beijing advocates "practical engagement" over sanctions and largely refrains from criticising the Taliban's social policies including those on women.

The Taliban's latest decree on marriage and separation starkly illustrates the erosion of women's rights. It permits child marriage through non-parental guardians, interprets a minor girl's silence as consent upon puberty, and grants reappearing husbands authority over remarried wives. Despite this, all big powers continue engagement.

This implies an unmistakable shift in geopolitics: in a multipolar order, major powers - also reeling from Israel's aggression against Palestinians and Lebanese since October 2023 - have deprioritised women's rights in favour of political pragmatism.

Pakistan finds itself in a catch 22 situation. Border closure by Pakistan followed Islamabad's futile efforts to nudge the Afghan Taliban into action against TTP militants responsible for deadly attacks inside Pakistan. The demand is clear: enough is enough; dismantle TTP sanctuaries and turn in the terrorists. Yet the policy has disrupted transit trade with both Afghanistan and Central Asia and pushed Afghan commerce toward routes facilitated by Iran and India.

Socio-economically, the border closure has only exacerbated the woes of marginalised border communities - with tens of thousands reliant on cross-border movement for healthcare, family and informal trade rendered jobless. On the security front, violence continues to rage at levels not witnessed in the last 13 years.

Closure has also diminished Pakistan's leverage by reducing channels for dialogue and intelligence. Permanent estrangement risks driving Afghanistan further into the orbit of Iran, Russia and India. Islamabad faces a dilemma: reopening without concessions signals weakness, yet prolonged closure harms its own economy, particularly that of the two border provinces and regional connectivity ambitions.

Once the Taliban's primary backer, Pakistan now sees Russia and India expand influence in Kabul. Russian security dialogues sidestep Pakistani TTP concerns, while Indian technical deals and Chabahar Port connectivity erode Islamabad's geographic leverage.

This necessitates a selective reopening of crossings like Torkham and Chaman for trade and humanitarian flows, resuming targeted military-to-military talks, and leveraging China's influence for mediated security understandings on TTP.

Pakistan's path lies in pragmatic deterrence with necessary and selective engagement anchored in accepting a bitter reality: geography still dictates relations and the strategy. That is why, as Afghanistan is again turning into a hotbed of an intense proxy wars and shifting alliances, Pakistan needs to recalibrate too.