NPT Review Conference - challenges ahead?

The 11th Nuclear Non-proliferation (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) is under way at the UN, having started on 27 April to run till 22 May. As per the NPT's Article 8, the RevCon is mandated to take place every five years, convening all the member and observer states as well as intergovernmental and civil society organisations to review the implementation process of the treaty. Two previous RevCons, in 2015 and 2022, had failed to build consensus on a final document. This year's RevCon is taking place at a time when the world is more fragmented and disordered, and the multilateral system is deeply fractured. Wars are being legitimised in search of a notion of victory, and arms buildup is increasing while discussions on disarmament are waning. New technologies have taken a role in the battlefield, and states' territorial boundaries are disrespected, and the UN charter is dishonoured. Nuclear weapons are being seen widely as a toolkit to safeguard national security against foreign invasions. Thus, it is thought that negotiations at RevCon 2026 will be potentially challenging and without a consensus; and the event may conclude in another failure to reach an agreed-upon outcome.

The diplomatic atmosphere going into the conference is widely tense. The divergences over the Ukraine war and its impact on the nuclear energy infrastructure of the country; the differences over the Iran war and its nuclear programme, the management of its enriched uranium and verification processes; the attack of some states on others' nuclear facilities; and the safety of nuclear material amid civil unrest will remain on the table. Anxieties of the US-led alliance system about China's strategic force modernisation; apprehensions of many states on the forward deployment of USA's tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe and Russia's declaration of deployment of its TNWs in Belarus; and the inability of the P5 states to engage in meaningful negotiations on nuclear disarmament will also dominate discussions.

Already, deep geopolitical divisions between nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) seem to widen during this RevCon. The ongoing geopolitical rivalry and great power competition between the US, Russia and China, and the division between NATO and others, have already created sharp disagreements and mistrust within P5 states over nuclear policies and transparency. These competing trends seem to become a stumbling block as regards cooperation and shared understanding at the RevCon forum.

Recently, US President Donald Trump's announcement to resume nuclear testing and abrogate the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has removed barriers for the US and Russia to increase their strategic arsenals in current times. Against the backdrop of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and the USA's shrinking footprint from European security architecture, France has also demonstrated on modernisation of its strategic forces and working closely with its allies on making nuclear deterrence credible.

The ongoing arms control crisis is a major blow to the NPT's survival. With the global demise of the arms control architecture between the US and Russia, conventional asymmetries are aggravated in various conflict-prone regions. States in the Asia-Pacific, South Asia, the Middle East, the Korean peninsula and Eastern Europe are actively involved in a security-dilemma-driven arms race problem. Thus, the NPT's norms are losing credence; states' reliance on armament and military capabilities has increased; and their aspiration for nuclear disarmament has declined.

The advent of new technologies such as cyber warfare toolkits, AI-led drones and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, nuclear hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, global prompt strikes, states monopoly in space and cyberspace, anti-satellite and surveillance systems and blurring of the thin line between TNWs and high-precision advanced conventional systems have lowered the threshold for use of nuclear weapons. These developments will be impossible areas for this year's RevCon to grapple with.

There is a growing gap between the NPT and the growth of emerging technologies. The principal technology holders participating in the REvCon forum are unprepared to engage in meaningful discussions to craft an actionable regulatory mechanism to regulate new technologies. NWS are resistant to the notion of relinquishing their nuclear capabilities. Indeed, the new technologies have become a significant conventional advantage to those who possess them, leading to an increased reliance on nuclear weapons by states that lack such technological advancements.

Further discussion of the RevCon will surround the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW). This treaty grounds its core idea on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which was propagated by civil society groups and the public alike, aspiring for a world free of nuclear weapons. This treaty potentially could not build an interface between new technologies and states' security needs. The TPNW seems to create conflicting political cleavages between its supporters and those who hold a monopoly on strategic weapons. The TPNW may not have the power to bridge the divide between NWS and NNWS without integrating debates on emerging regional tensions and states' security considerations. The TPNW's emergence echoes frustration within the NPT structure. In a nutshell, the NPT process is trying to function while its supporting ecosystem is weakening.

There is a need to revise the core power structure inside the NPT to make it consistent with new realities. There is a need to re-establish an arms control regime to build renewed momentum towards non-proliferation. It is vital to mitigate the divide between NWS and NNWS by maintaining a balance between states' security needs and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. TPNW has to ensure that no state or group of states gains a military advantage over others and that equal and undiminished security for states across the board is guaranteed.

RevCon 2026 won't be able to yield any results until certain new conditions are set to create a renewed security environment, globally and regionally. Without meaningful discussions within the UN system to create an implementable security mechanism, which provides guarantees for regional states against arbitrary action by the powerful states, making the NPT relevant in today's world is not possible. Arguably, the restoration of the Conference on Disarmament forum can offer a comprehensive framework providing for simultaneous efforts to address non-nuclear military asymmetries, militarisation of AI and prevention of arms race in outer space. More narrowly, the special session on disarmament (SSOD-I) offers an avenue for the creation of a new security environment and a new framework for reviving the spirit of NPT.